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MISSISSIPPI, et al. ~ Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY. The DC held unconstitutional a variety of 
provisions in the 
(PURPA), 92 Stat. 3117, that required state utility authorities 
to consider certain energy-conservation measures and to adopt 
certain others. The DC based its decision on the Commerce 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Suprem;r1clause, and the 
guarantee of a republican form of government. 
~ r ,t- ~ t, __ IJ 
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2. FACTS & HOLDING BELOW. PURPA was one of a quintet of 
statutes adopted in November 1978 to counter national enerqy ------problems.l This particular statute addresses problems of ----electrical generation and their impact on nationwide consumption 
~------------------------~ 
of oil and natural gas. 
Titles I and III. Titles I and III, administered primarily 
by the Sec'y of Energy, require state agencies that regulate 
utilities to consider the adoption of specific rate designs and 
standards. These titles have three common goals: (1) promotion 
of conservation~ (2) optimization of the efficient use of 
facilities and resources~ and (3) equitable rates for consumers. ~ 
15 u.s.c. § 3201~ 16 u.s.c. § 3201. 
More specifically, § 111, 16 u.s.c. § 2621, requires state 
IL 
authorities to consider including in rate schedules various -
certain provisions that would pass through to each consumer the -
true cost of service to that consumer~ ~' adjusting rates by 
season and by time of day and lowered rates for consumers 
consenting to interruption of service during peak demand periods. 
Consideration must have commenced by November 8, 1980, and be 
completed by November 8, 1981. In addition, § 113, 16 u.s.c. § 
2623, requires consideration of regulations that would mandate 
various other conservation techniques~ ~' unit-by-unit 
metering in new buildings, restricting automatic pass-through of 
cost increases, and prohibiting pass-through of advertising costs 
lThe other statutes were the National Gas Policy Act of 
1978 (NGPA), 92 Stat. 3350~ the National Energy Conservation 
Policy Act, 92 Stat. 3206~ the Energy Tax Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 
3174~ and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 
Stat. 3289. 
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to consumers. Title III, through§ 303, 15 U.S.C. § 3203, 
mandates consideration of the § 113 regulations for natural gas 
utilities, and § 114 in Title I, 16 u.s.c. § 2624, of whether 
rates should be reduced for essential uses by residential 
consumers. A dec is ion on § 113 regulations and related measures 
was due by November 8, 1980. 
The statute imposed no direct penalties for failure to meet 
these deadlines. PURPA does, however, mandate procedures for --
consideration of these regulations. There must be a public 
hearing, with notice. If the regulatory authority does not adopt 
the PURPA regulations, it must issue a written statement of its 
I 
reasons. "Any person" may bring an action to compel the hearing 
and decision. The Secretary, affected utilities, and consumers 
may intervene in Title I standards: only the Secretary has a 
right to intervene in natural-gas cases under Title III. These 
intervenors may seek judicial review in state courts of the 
agency decision on Title I matters: the Secretary may participate 
as an amicus curiae in Title III judicial review. Title I and 
III also incorporate reporting requirements regarding Title I. 
Title II, § 210. This provision is designed to encourage 
"cogeneration" (i.e., joint production of electricity and thermal 
energy, such as heat or steam) and "small power production 
facilities" (i.e., facilities generating no more than 80 
meagwatts through the use of biomass, waste, or renewable 
resources such as wind, water, or solar power). PERC is required 
to promulgate, after consultation with state regulatory agencies, 
rules to encourage these two activities, including rules 
requiring purchase of electricity from these sources. 16 u.s.c. 
§ 824a-3. This section also requires state agencies to implement 
- 4 -
the rules, and authorizes FERC to enforce such requirements 
against state agencies in federal courts. FERC has adopted 
implementing rules. 
PURPA also authorizes the Secretary to make grants to state 
agencies to defray the costs of compliance. 
Proceedings Below. In April 1979, Appellees State of 
Mississippi and Miss Public Service Commission filed this action 
in the USDC for SD Miss against the appellants (FERC and the 
Sec'y of Energy) challenging the constitutionality of Titles I 
and III and§ 210. The third appellee, the Miss Power &~ight 
Co., was allowed to intervene on behalf of the State and the - ------------------~--~~----------~-------------
Public Service Commission. - ------ .... 
On cross-motions for summarv judgment, Judge ~eld these 
provisions unconstitutional. In an opinion filed February 19, 
1981, he stated that these provisions exceed Congress' power 
under the Commerce Clause: the Framers could not have envisioned 
federal regulation of the rates of utitilities such as 
telephones, electricity, and natural gas. They also usurp state 
authority over purely intrastate consumers. In a judgment order 
filed February 27, Judge Cox stated that Titles I and III and§ 
210 
"are unconstitutional and void in that they constitute a 
direct intrusion on integral and traditional functions of 
the State of Missippi and violate the Constitution of the 
United States, especially the Tenth Amendment, the Supremacy 
Clause [Art. VI, § 2], anda republican form of government as 
guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 ...• " App to Juris 
Statement at 9a.2 
2For a discussion of the arguments regarding the Supremacy 
Clause and the guarantee of a republic form of government, see 
infra, at 6. 
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3. CONTENTIONS. The SG believes the contested provisions 
of PURPA are clearly within the Commerce Clause and do not 
intrude into state sovereignty. The Federal Govt may regulate 
intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce, and 
regulation of the supply of electricity and natural gas to 
consumers falls within this authority. Intrusiveness into state 
affairs is a closer question, but this statute does not exceed 
the limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment. This is not a case in 
which Congress has displaced state decisionmaking in an area 
traditionally governed by the States, National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), for federal and state governments 
have been exercising concurrent jurisdiction over public utitlies 
for over 60 years. Thus, this is not a function traditionally 
intrusted to the States, such as police and fire protection, 
public health, and sanittion. In addition, Usery's distinction 
of Frv v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975), indicates that 
federal regulation of state matters is permitted when necessary 
to counter a serious nationwide problem that can only be 
addressed through a single national program and, in such cases, 
when the interference with ultimate state decisionmaking. The 
energy crisis, like inflation, is a serious concern that can be 
attacked only through a unified national program. Title I and 
III let the States make the ultimate decisions, and the 
regulation stops short of wholly preempting state authority in 
this area. These issues are substantial enough to merit the 
Court's attention. 
The appellees have filed two motions to affirm, one jointly 
from the State and the State Commission and the other from the 
- 6 -
Miss Power & Light Co.3 All three believe the SG's argumentsare 
insubstantial. PURPA interferes greatly with matters under the 
sovereign power of the States. It also structures the internal 
operation of state utility regulation through its procedural 
provisions. PURPA does not address a serious national problem, 
for the Dept of Energy has acknowledged PURPA may save only 
160,000 barrels of oil a day, a figure the Sec'y has 
independently indicated will have only a slight effect on 
imports. This is not a limited regulation of a short duration, 
as Usery characterized the wage freeze in Fry~ rather, it is a 
long term matter. 
Miss Power & Light Co. add that PURPA really noes not 
regulate commerce~ it regulates state governments' regulation of 
commerce. Thus, it exceeds the Commerce Clause. In addition, by 
establishing federal law as state law, it confuses the ranking of 
law under the Supremacy Clause. Finally, by imposing rules and 
regulation on States that they did not adopt through their 
elected representatives, PURPA fails to ensure the State a 
republican form of government. 
4. DISCUSSION. Obviously, the issue is substantial. The 
statute clearly is authorized by the Commerce Clause. In 
general, it probably does not violate the Tenth Amendment, 
although I am troubled by the provisions that establish state 
agency--and court--procedures. The DC's reliance on the 
3There also are three amicus briefs, two urging affirmance 
(Louisiana State Public Service Commission and Southeastern Legal 
Foundation) and one urging reversal (Windfarms, Ltd., a company 
involved in generating electricy through wind and governed by § 
210). 
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Supremacy Clause and the guarantee of a republican form of 
government, if based on Miss Power & Light's theory, is wholly 
mer it less. 
Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596, and 80-231, the Surface Mining Cases, 
address the application of Usery in other areas of state 
authority. One possible solution here is to hold for those cases 
and then vacate and remand. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme 
here is substantially different, and I doubt a remand woul.d do 
anything but delay this Court's consideration of the case. I 
therefore recommend that probable jurisdiction be noted. 
There are two motions to affirm. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell January 10, 1982 
From: John Wiley 
No. 80-1749: FERC v. Mississippi 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause pow-
er when it passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 
of 1978 (PURPA) . 
2. Whether PURPA transgresses federalism limits on 
national power, as articulated by National League of Cities. 
I. Background 
PURPA is set forth in the Jurisdictional Statement at 
pages 12a-67a. I will sketch the key provisions of this 
lengthy statute. 
By way of overview, PURPA basically is an energy con--
2. 
servation measure. 1 First, it seeks to cut back on electricity ......_ _ _ 
consumption by stimu~ting _reform of traditional electrical 
pricing policies. Such pricing policies often created incen-
tives for increased electrical consumption at the same time 
that they failed to reflect the economic cost of peak consump-
tion. 2 An accompanying and, to some extent, inconsistent ob-
jective of PURPA's economic reform is distributional: assuring 
that low income groups do not suffer "excessively" from this 
....._ ---
attempted reformation of utility rate structures. 
Second, PURPA seeks to supplement and improve tradi---tional fossil fuel usage by encouraging "~ogeneration"-­
----.,. 
combining energy use facilities in ways that permit waste ener-
gy to be utilized-7 and smaller scale producers that employ new 
1At the outset, I should confess that I was the ~ff author of a 
California Energy Commission report that advoc~ed energy policy 
options similar to some of those eventually adopted by PURPA. The 
California Energy Commission, for which I worked, first considered 
these matter in 1975-76, and since has taken steps to implement many 
I 
of these policies at the state level. The PURPA was passed in 1978 
J 
and was IDQdelled in some measure after the experience of various 
states (including California) with these programs. 
2High energy consumption at peak demand periods is undesirable 
because it causes the inefficient use of power generation facili-
ties. For instance, suppose 24 people own electric clothes dryers 
that each require one watt-hour to dry clothes. It would require a 
24 watt generator to supply enough electricity if all of these 
individuals dried their clothes at the same time. The generator 
then would sit idle for the remaining 23 hours in the day--an inef-
ficient use of a capital-intensive investment. A one watt genera-
tor, however, would be sufficient to supply all of these 24 differ-
ent people if each one dried clothes during a different hour. Then 
the generator would operate continuously with no idle time--an effi-
cient use of the capital investment. 
3. 
and alternative technologies (such as solar, wind, small scale 
hydro power, biomass, etc.). PURPA attempts to facilitate de-
hese technologies by two means. The first is to -
require electric utili ties to tie such facilities into their 
power grids, so that small producers can sell excess energy and 
buy back-up energy during their own times of peak demand. 
(Utilities, at least in California, historically have not been 
anxious to make such accomodations.) PURPA's second means is 




These reforms are directed at changing utility prac-
Today, of course, 
ject of state regulation. 
such practices usually are the sub-~ 
The PURPA therefore addresses exist-~~ 
~.~ 
(1) bying state utility regulation, in three general ways: 
requiring state utility regulators (and unregulated utilities) ~5 
to consider federal reform proposals ("hortatory standards") ~ 
( 2) by requiring state regulators (and unregulated utili ties) 
to implement substantive FERC rules about utility power sales 
and purchases from cogenerators and small alternative energy . . 
producers ("implementation standards")~ and (3) by exempting 
cogenerators and small alternative energy producers from all 
utility regulation--federal as well as state ("preemption stan-
. . '· · 
dards"). 
A. Hortatory standards ____ __..,...__ 
This type of regulation constitutes the bulk of 
4. 
PURPA's text. On a general plane, this portion of PURPA con-
tains no mandatory substantive federal policies. It aims at 
producing substantive changes in utility practices instead by 
stating substantive federal policies and by applying mandatory 
federal procedural policies to state utility regulation. This 
part of PURPA thus tries to "talk" state regulators into policy 
changes by means of federal procedural requirements. I am not 
familiar with another federal statute that takes this unusual 
approach. 
Examining the hortatory portions of the statute at a 
more detailed level, Title I proposes a number of federal stan-
dards that state regulatory commissions and unregulated elec-
trical utilities are to consider. These standards come in 
three batches: §§ 2621, 2623, and 2624. But all three groups 
of standards relate primarily to structuring the terms, condi-
tions, and practices of electricity sales. 3 - ________________ ,, ____ _ 
3section 2621 p:__o;eo~stan?ards in six subject areas: (1) class 
costs of service (In e past, utilities have recovered different 
contributions towards total costs from different classes of users. 
California traditionally had lowered the burden for residential and 
large industrial and raised the burden for small to medium commer-
cial consumers.); (2) declining block (or quantity discount) rates; 
(3) time-of-day rates (a form of peak load pricing); (4) seasonal 
rates (a different form of peak load pricing); and (5) interruptible 
rates (same); and load management techniques (same). 
Section 2623 proposes standards in five different subject 
areas: (1) master metering (aimed at eliminating average cost 
pricing for apartment dwellers, where one pays only the per capita 
energy cost for the building even though individually one may use 
more than the average amount of energy); (2) automatic adjustment 
clauses (aimed at forcing utili ties to reexamine their rate struc-
tures and practices every time they increase their rate levels); (3) 
information to consumers (designed to inform consumers about often 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
State regulatory commissions and unregulated utilities 
are requi r ed to "consider"--but not necessarily to adopt--these 
standards. §2622. "Consideration" entails a number of manda- Vi~ _. 
tor~ p~oc:?ur:.: :;e,.;s :- noti~ ' hearing' and writ ten dec~~c 
(§262l(b)) ~ broad participation rights by "any electric consum-
er" (§2631) ~ and judicial review in state court of any determi-
nation by any participant in the original proceeding. 
§2633 (c). Utili ties are made liable for reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees of consumers whose positions are adopted. 
§2632. State authorities and unregulated utilities must report 
annually to DOE regarding their considerations. §2626. 
The state regulators (and unregulated utilities) are 
to determine, regarding the standards in §2621, "whether or not 
it is appropriate to implement such standard to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter" (emphasis added). This directive is 
qualified, however: "Nothing in this subsection prohibits any 
State regulatory authority or nonregulated electric utility 
from making any determination that it is not appropriate to 
complex electrical pricing systems so that they are aware of how to 
alter their consumption to save money and increase utility efficien-
cy)~ (4) procedures for electrical termination (a consumer "due pro-
cess" concern rather than a utility efficiency or energy conserva-
tion measure)~ and (5) prohibition on consumer reimbursement of 
utility promotional and political advertising (obviously a provision 
that predates your- Central Hudson and Consolidated Edison 
opinions!) . 
Section 2624 proposes a standard for "lifeline" rates--an 
equity rather than efficiency measure aimed at reducing the cost of 
small amounts of consumption that are thought to represent the ener-







implement any such standard, pursuant to its authority under 
otherwise applicable State law" (emphasis added). 
Regarding the standards in §2623, state regulators and 
utili ties are to determine whether adoption of the proposed 
federal standards "is appropriate to carry out the purposes of 
this chapter, is otherwise appropriate, and is consistent with 
otherwise applicable state law • . • II §2623 (a) (1) (emphasis 
added) . And regarding the lifeline rates proposed in §2624, 
state regulators and utili ties are to decide "whether such a 
[lifeline] rate should be implemented by such utility" (empha-
sis added). 
Title III of the statute adopts a similar approach 
respecting two natural gas utility standards: procedures for 
terminating natural gas service; and a prohibition on recovery 
of utility advertising costs from consumers (another pre-
Central Hudson and Consolidated Edison provision) . §§ 3201 -
11. 
B. Mandatory rules ----The second type of PURPA regulation does require state 
~
regulators and unregulated utili ties to implement substantive 
federal rules. Sections 210 (a) & (f) require FERC to promul-
---------J 
gate rules after consultation with state authorities and after 
notice and hearing. These rules essentially are to require 
electric utili ties to 
) { ,, J ( • v 
hook cogenerators and small alternat1ve ---e~ergy facilit :: s ~L to thei ;-grids at fair rates. This portion 
.... 
____________________________ _, 
- -- -# -------------
.~ Ji. . 
··' 
7. 
of PURPA also provides for judicial review of state regulators' 
and unregulated utili ties' actions, §210 (g) (1), and for en-
forcement by "any person" of "any requirement" adopted by regu-
lators or utili ties pursuant to § 210 (f) . §210 (g) ( 2) . FERC 
also is empowered to enforce the requirement that state regula-
tors and utilities implement the FERC rules. §210 (h) (2). 
c. Preemptive provisions 
Section 210 (e) directs that the FERC is to prescribe 
rules under which cogenerators and small power producers are 
exempted from federal and/or state utility regulation. Again, 
FERC is only to adopt these rules after "consultation with rep-
resentatives of State regulatory authorities" and others. 
II. Discussion 
Resps State of Mississippi and Miss. Public Service 
Comm' n state that there are two issues: (1) whether Congress 
exceeded its Commerce Clause power: and (2) whether PURPA in-
fringes on National League of Cities states' rights. Resp 
Miss. Power & Light Co. raises additional issues based on the 
Republican Form of Government Clause: the Supremacy Clause: and 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The SG does not 
address any of the latter issues. I think this is sound, be-
cause none are serious arguments in my opinion. The Republican 
Form of Government Clause long has been regarded as 
nonjusticiable: it is extremely peculiar to attack a federal 
8. 
statute on the basis of the Supremacy Clause: and any conceiv-
able takings problems would have to be resolved on a cases by 
case basis--not in a facial attack of this type. See Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining. Therefore I will not discuss this 
last group of issues unless you so request. ---
A. Whether Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power -
This is not a substantial issue. Congress explicitly 
found, inter alia, that proper regulation of interstate corn-
rnerce requires increased electrical and natural gas conserva-
tion and equitable retail rates for electrical consumers. See 
Jur. Strnt. 13a. The Virginia Surface Mining opinion from last 
Term devoted considerable time explaining that the test here is 
whether there is a rational basis for Congress' finding that 
the regulated activity substantially affects interstate corn-
rnerce. See 101 s.ct. 2359-64. 
Congress did have such a rational basis. As previous-
ly stated, PURPA essentially is an energy conservation measure. 
It takes a brave advocate to argue with a straight face that 
energy conservation--of any type--does not affect interstate 
commerce, in these post-Arab embargo days of foreign oil depen-
dency. 
The PURPA does contain ancillary "equity" measures 
that are rationalized as attempts to soften the impact of high-
er and restructured energy prices for consumers. These mea-
sures pr irnar ily are the "lifeline" electrical rate proposals 
. 
" 
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and the "due process" provisions for termination of residential 
utility service. These provisions are rationally related to 
the overall PURPA regulatory package. These provisions also 
can be independently justified by their own impact on inter-
state commerce: retaining the national purchasing power of 
marginal families upon whom increasing energy rates fall the 
hardest. One may differ with the soundness of the policies, 
but it is difficult to say that there is not a rational basis 
for concluding that the measures substantially affect inter-
state commerce. 
Resps argue that PURPA seeks to regulate State regula-
tory processes rather than "commerce." This point does not 
convince me. Congress plainly was concerned with combatting 
the national energy crisis via reform of electrical and gas 
utility practices and rate design. PURPA attempts to introduce 
these reforms directly upon nonregulated utities. Where these 
matters are the subject of state regulation, PURPA addresses 
that regulation as a means of affecting those same utility 
practices. 
I might agree with resps' argument if the situation 
were one in which Congress sought simply to displace state ac-
tivities without any ultimate interstate commerce goal. In 
this case, however, I think resps would like the Court to focus 
on the regulatory means and to ignore the interstate commerce 
ends of PURPA. This argument should fail, however, because the 
Commerce Clause power inquiry traditionally has been very con-
,. 
.. 
cerned with the intended ends of congressional action. 
B. Whether PURPA transgresses National League of 
i1-v 
Cities ~ 
This is the serious issue in this case. This case, as 
well as the Long Island R.R. case that also is being argued 
this month, provides the Court with the opportunity to shape 
the protean doctrine that National League of Cities launched 
and that so far has been elaborated only in Virginia Surface 
Mining. 
Virginia Surface Mining stated that the National 
League of Cities test has four elements: (1) whether a federal 
statute regulates "States as States;" (2) whether the federal 
regulation addresses indisputable "attributes of state 
soverreignty;" (3) whether the federal law directly impairs 
state ability "to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional functions;" and (4) whether, if a federal law of-
fends all three of the foregoing principles of state indepen-
dence, the nature of the federal interest is such as to justify 
state submission. (The first three requirements were listed 
together in text, while the fourth was added in a footnote.) 
101 s.ct. at 2366 & n.29. 
The Virginia Surface Mining case was decided on the 
first ground: that the strip mining regulations concerned pri-
vate activity rather than "States as States." See, e.g., 101 
s.ct. at 2369. The federal program there intruded considerably 
on state sovereignty by requiring federal administrative ap-
11. 
proval of state legislative activity. Id. at 2357. This fed-
eral/state interaction was entirely optional, however, because 
the federal program directed that a state could do nothing--in 
which case the federal agency would undertake complete imple-
mentation of the federal scheme. Id. at 2357-58. 
PURPA offers states a similar but less explicit op-
tion. PURPA directs that states undertake procedures and im-
plement substantive policies only if they have ratemaking au-
thority over utili ties. See PURPA, §260 2 (18) (definition of 
"State regulated electric utility"); §2621 (a) ; §2623 (a); 
§210 (f) (1); §3202 (c). States therefore could shift all PURPA 
obligations to rpi vate utili ties by withdrawing from utility 
rate regulation entirely. This option resembles Virginia Sur-
face Mining in that it permits the states to avoid any federal 
obligations if they are willing to cede this regulatory realm 
to the federal government. This option differs, however, in a 
crucial regard. 
Because PURPA does not provide for federal utility - -
rate regulation, the federal program offers states no assurance -
t the federa ent will perform the entire regulatory 
function at issue if the states withdraw. The Surface Mining ____.....,-_ 
Act, by contrast, did provide for federal surface mining regu-
lation. A state could withdraw from or decide not to comply 
with the Surface Mining Act to avoid the federal intrusion with 
the knowledge that the federal government was undertaking re-
sponsibility for the entire regulatory activity. In this case, 
,, 
• 
"··· . •· 
a state can avoid federal intrusion only by withdrawing from 
all utility rate regulation, knowing that that regulatory re-
sponsibility has been abandoned completely. 
This fact illustrates that the cost of the state 
avoidance of federal intrusion is high: abandonment of a regu-
latory activity judged by most states to be important enough to 
conduct. The option of avoiding the federal intrusion thus 
considerably less realistic, and itself more intrusive, than 
Virginia Surface Mining. 
The Court could analogize PURPA to the Surface Mining 
Act in this manner so as to find National League of Cities in-
applicable. But my feeling is that PURPA must be regarded as 
~-----~---------------
regulating "States as States" if a pragmatic meaning is to be --attached to that phrase. If you agree, then PURPA thus sat is- j 
fies the first prong of National League of Cities. This factor 
then distinguishes this case from Virginia Surface Mining. 
The second (indisputable attributes of state sover-
eignty) and third (displacement of state ability to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional functions) elements 
of the National League of Cities test are difficult for me to 
differentiate. For purposes of this memo, I will assume that 
the second test does not have additional content that is mate-
rial in this case. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note an ambi-
gui ty in the third element (displacement of state ability to 
structure integral operations in areas of traditional func-
13. 
tions) • This third step might in fact represent a single in-
quiry, or it could be two distinct sub-tests. The difference 
is important. It depends on whether "integral operations" and 
"traditional functions" represent rephrasings of the same no-
tion, or whether the two phrases are additive requirements, 
both of which must be satisfied before the Tenth Amendment pro-
tects a given state action from federal invasion. 
The difference can be illustrated with a hypothetical. 
Suppose California decides to undertake an activity that is 
completely untraditional for a state. For instance, suppose it 
embarks on a space exploration program. (Don't laugh too soon-
-Jerry Brown at one point had proposed this!) Suppose also 
that Congress passes a minimum wage law similar to that in 
National League of Cities, except that the law applies only to 
federal and state government space exploration programs. would 
the Tenth Amendment prohibit the application of this law to 
California? 
Yes, if the third test is a single inquiry. National 
League of Cities makes clear that wage determination is an in-
tegral state activity. With only slight semantic difference 
one can also say that it is traditional for states to determine 
their own wage policy. 
But if the third test is a double inquiry, the Tenth 
Amendment would not constrain the application of this federal 
law. As before, National League of Cities establishes that 





an integral state operation would not displace the state in an 
area of traditional functions, because traditionally states do 
not explore space. 
My sense is that the third inquiry should a two-
1 
pronged test. I am led to this conclusion by the language of 
National League of Cities. See 426 u.s. at 851: 
[The 1974 amendments to the wage act will] 
significantly alter or displace the States' 
abilities to structure employee-employer rela-
tionships in such areas as fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, public health, 
parks and recreation. These activities are 
typical of those performed by state and local 
governments in discharging their dual func-
tions of administering the public law and fur- ( 
nishing public services. Indeed, it is func-
tions such as these which governments are cre-
ated to provide, services such as these which 
the States have traditionally afforded their 
citizens (emphasis added). 
I also think this is wiser of the two possible inter-
pretations. To hold otherwise would permit states to insulate 
themselves from federal regulation in fields that traditionally 
have been national matters, simply by establishing programs in 
those fields. A contrary decision also could cut the National 
League of Cities doctrine off from its concern with preserving 
historic state roles. The doctrine instead would focus on the 
general need for protecting state autonomy in any area in which 
a state might chose to become involved. This idea seems to 
accord more with the concept of states in the Articles of Con-
federation than with the notion of states in the present Con-
stitution. 
If you accept the idea of a two part test for the 
15. 
third step of the National League of Cities inquiry, the next 
problem is to apply each of these two parts to the present 
problem. Starting first with the "traditional functions" part, 
the main argument in favor of holding electrical utility regu-
lation to be a "traditional function" for states is the wide- ~ 
spread nature of such activity. Virtually every state does it. 
I discern two arguments to the contrary. First, al-
though virtually every state does engage in such activity, this 
is a relatively recent development in the constitutional scheme 
of things. As the SG points out at 30 n.35, Mississippi only 
I know from the papers that 9 ~ 
Texas--one of the last states to avoid the practice--only began ~ / 
~~­
/).:/;i:::tt 
began such regulation in 1956. 
such regulation in the late 1970's. -~t More importantly, energy regulation has been a share~
state and federal responsibility for the better part of this ~ 
century. Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act 4-in 1920. 
~ 
Partly in response 
Comm'n v. Attleboro 
Congress augmented 
to this Court decision in Pulic Utility f:v' 
Steam & Electric Co., 273 u.s. 83 (1927), ~ 
this regulation with the Federal Power Act ct-~ 
in 1935. (As you recall, the history of this regulation is 
recounted in part by the briefing in New England Power Co. v. 
New Hampshire, which was argued in December.) Federal energy 
regulation has steadily increased since that time. 
My inclination is to think that electrical and natural 
gas utility regulation is not a "traditional function" of state 




Surface Mining emphasized that "a claim that congressional com-
merce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of 
National League of Cities must satisfy each of three require-
ments." 101 S .ct. 2366 (emphasis in original) • Consequently 
reversal would be appropriate. 
If you do regard utility regulation as a traditional 
state function, then the next step is to decide whether PURPA 
displaces "intergral operations" in this function. The three 
~ --
different categories of PURPA regulation, see pages 3-7 supra, 
must be analyzed separately in this inquiry. 
A. Preemptive provisions 
Taking these categories out of order, the least iQ!ru-
sive type of federal regulation is the preemptive provision 
(described on page 7, supra). This type of regulation simply 
tells state regulators to leave cogenerators and small energy 
producers alone. This type of provision does not intrude ex-
cessively into the integral mechanics of utility regulation. 
States are bypassed altogether. They are not told how to run 
their own affairs or transformed into administrative arms of 
the federal government. Of the three types of PURPA regula-
tion, this provision is the most analogous to typical and ac-




B. Hortatory provisions 
)/ "" 




pages 3-6 supra. Although these sections contain no mandatory 
substantive requirements, they do dictate to states how states 
are to run certain state procedures. I do not perceive of any-
thing "integral," however, about a state's ability to refuse to 
consider policies that the federal government considers to be 
important and of national import. Therefore the notice-and- ~ 
hearing and written decision requirements seem innocuous. The 
associated timing provisions also seem unobjectionable; they 
appear reasonable and unlikely to place great strains on state 
regulators. And the broad standing provisions, although ~ 
somewaht more senstive, still does not seem to displace any ~ 
- ..t.-.r 
"integral" state operation. The ultimate decision on the mer- ~-- ~~ 
its remains in the hands of the state. 
The judicial revJ;w provisions initially concerned me, 
' 
but my concern has subsided upon reflection. The sections pro-
viding can bring an action to enforce the 
PURPA requirement to hold hearings and make determinations are 
but offshoots of the basic state obligation under PURPA to con-
sider the federal proposals. So I do not think these portions 
amount to unconstitutional invasions by the federal government. 
Section 2633 (c) (1) also authorizes "any person" to seek "re-
view of any determination . . with respect to any electric 
utility in the appropriate State court if such person 
• intervened . in the original proceeding or if State law 
permits such review." The standard for this judicial review is 




own standard of agency review--probably along the lines of a 
substantial evidence review. Because the key sections of this 
portion of PURPA essentially leave these determinations to the 
discretion of the state regulatory authority, see pages 5-6 
supra, this provision for judicial review does not add much 
more of an intrusion than does the initial consideration re-
quirement. Again, ultimate decision authority rests with the 
state. 
C. Implementation provisions 
The implementation provision is the most intrusive 
federal requirement because it combines the procedural require-
---------.., J L '' 
ments of the hortatory section with substantive federal rules 
that state regulators must adopt. These substantive federal 
rules are to be determined by the FERC after consultation with 
~ 
state authorities. The ,Arules are 
---:. 
to require electric utilities to offer to--
(1) sell electric power to qualifying 
cogeneration facilities and qualifying small 
power production facilities and 
(2) purchase electric energy from 
such facilties. 
* * * * 
Such rules may not author i ~ • 
for purposes other th~sale. 
§210(a) 
. any sale 
State regulators are required to "implement such rule[s] 
for each electric utility for which [the regulator] has 
ratemaking authority." §210(f) (1). 
"Implementation" is defined by regulation. State im-
plementation "may consist of the issuance of regulations, an 
undertaking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities 
and electric utilities . , or any other action reasonably 
designed to implement [the FERC rules]." 18 C.P.R. 292.40l(a). 
These provisions, with their associated judicial re-
view and enforcement specifications, are the portion of PURPA 
most vulnerable to National League of Cities invalidation. 
) 1.. t-\. 
They establish that a federal bureaucracy is to decide upon 
~ --------------
standards of utility operation that state regulators are then 
--
responsible for administering, under pain of judicial review. 
State sovereignty is infringed because state regulators are 
essentially reduced to administrative arms of a federal agency. 
On the other hand, the federal provision does operate 
only in a narrow area: wholesale transactions between utili-
ties and small developers of new energy technologies. 4 And the 
loose regulation defining "implementation," recited at the top 
of this page, does permit state regulators some latitude in 
deciding how to implement even these mandatory rules. My in-
stinct (and I think instinct does have a place with a doctrine 
as young as that of National League of Cities) is that this is 
not a sufficient infringement upon state sovereingty to require 
the invalidation of an act of Congress. ~~~~~ 
~ lA.--.to~ 4- tu)..?~ ~ 
~a.?<.i~~J 4Apparently the FERC rules are to apply only to utility purchases 
of excess power from cogenerators and small producers. Utility 
sales of back-up power to cogenerators would be for "purposes other 
than retail." -
20. 
If you disagree, then the fourth prong to be consid-
ered is whether "the nature of the federal interest •.• [is] 
such that it justifies State submission." Virginia Surface 
Mining, 101 S .Ct. at 2366 n. 29. The SG attempts to compare 
this case to KEY. v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975) (the 
price controls case). KEY. i~ / easily distinguishable, in that 
KEY. involved o~ temporary federal intrusions on state sover-
eignty. PURPA does require only a one-time consideration of 
federal standards, but the implementation, preemption, and re-
porting requirements are on-going. 
This fourth test could, however, p~vide a rationale 
for rescuing the PURPA implementation provision if you feel 
that provision does displace Mississippi's ability to structure 
an integral operation in a traditional function but that the 
federal provision nonetheless is acceptable. This fourth ele-
ment of the National League of Cities test has only been de-
fined in a single footnote, and the concept certainly could be 
adapted to fit this situation. 
You may ultimately decide that this portion of the 
statute does transgress National League of Cities. If so, in 
my opinion the implementation provision is sufficiently sever-
able so that such a finding would require invalidation qply of 
---------------------------§210 (which includes the preemptive provision analyzed on page -- -





({;) PURPA has ~~e types of state regulations: preemp-
tive: hortatory: an~ndatory implementation standards. All 
three regulate "States as States" as a practical matter. 
-~
Therefore all three pass the first prong of the National League 
of Cities test, as articulated by Virginia Surface Mining. 
The second and third prongs of the National League of 
Cities test should, in my view, be understood as inquiring, 
first, whether a given activity is a "traditional function" of 
state government, and second, whether the federal intrusion is 
so great as to displace an "intergral operation." I think a 
convincing argument can be made that electrical and natural gas 
regulation is not a traditional state function--because Missis-
sippi only undertook this activity in 1956 and because of the 
long history of federal involvement in this field. If you 
agree that utility regulation is not a "traditional function," 
you should vote to reverse on this basis. ~ 
A contrary decision on this point requires a section 
by section assessment of PURPA to consider whether the federal 
interference extends to "integral operations." While I think 
there clearly is not an invasion of integral functions . by the 
preemptive and hortatory portions of PURPA, the question is 
closer regarding 
,l ~~ 
the mandatory implementation standards. My -
judgment is that the entire PURPA should survive this scrutiny 
and that the case should be reversed. A contrary holding 
should sever the invalidated implementation standards from the -
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell January 15, 1981 ~q~~J 
From: John Wiley ~ 
No. 80-1749: FERC v. Mississippi 
The SG has filed a reply brief. His reply does not 
change my basic analysis of this case. He does, however, make 
two points that warrant comment. 
First, the SG argues that the substantive irnplernenta-
tion standards of §210, which I thought were the most intrusive 
portions of the PURPA, are "essentially adjudicative in 
nature." 
The states are not compelled to enact legisla-
tion, promulgate regula t i ons, or expend state 
funds. At most, Section 210 simply establish-
es federal substantive rules of decision and 
r~u 1 res the state cornrn1ssions to apply those 
rules in particular settings J n which the corn-
missions already exercise jurisdiction. 
SG reply brief at 4. 
2. 
The SG completes this point by citing Testa v. Katt, 330 u.s. 
386 (1947) (state courts obligated to enforce federal law). 
This is a powerful argument. As noted at pages 18-19 
of my bench memo, "implementation" is defined by regulation to 
mean "the issuance of regulations, an undertaking to resolve 
disputes between qualifying facilities and electric utilities • 
. . , or any other action reasonably designed to implement [the 
FERC rules]." 18 C.F.R. 292.40l(a) (emphasis added). So de-
fined, the duty of "implementation" that PURPA places on state 
/ r{gulators does come to resemble the traditional duty upon 
state adjudicative bodies to enforce federal law. To my mind, 
this is a key point that argues strongly in favor of permitting 
this type of federal/state interaction. 
Second, the SG argues that the PURPA was passed under u/a.r--
SG p~ Congress' war power as well as its Commerce Clause power. 
reply brief at 9-11. The PURPA does state that ....,. 
The Congress finds that the protec-
tion of the public health, safety, and wel-
fare, the preservation of the national securi-
!Y, and the proper exercise of the of congres-
sional authority under the Constitution to 
regulate inter state commerce require [various 
actions] (emphasis added). 
Jur Stmt at 13a. 
National League of Cities declined to decide whether 
its proscription on federal power extended to federal legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to grants of power other than the Com-
merce Clause. 426 u.s. at 852 n.l7. That decision also ob-
--
3. 
served that "[n] othing we say in this opinion addresses the 
scope of Congress' authority under its war power." Id. at 855 
n.l8. 
Despite these disclaimers, I have a hard time under- \ 
standing why the National League of Cities test should be inap-
plicable outside the realm of the Commerce Clause. Your memos 
to file in our National League of Cities file show that you 
believe federalism limits to be a fundamental tenet of the con-
sti tutional order, irrespective of whether those limits are 
drawn from the Tenth Amendment or from the form of the Consti-
tutional as a whole. As restated by Virginia Surface Mining, 
the fourth element of the National League of Cities test takes 
into account the objection to applying federal limits to non-
Commerce Clause legislation: that such federal legislation 
might be too pressing to be subject to federalism limits. 
My present thinking is that the source of congressio-
nal power for a particular statute might be material in how the ___ __..._ 
statute is analyzed under the National League of Cities test. 
For instance, war power legislation may have a stronger claim 
to legitimacy under the fourth prong of the test. But the 
source of Congress' power does not seem material to whether a 
particular statute must accord with National League of Cities. 
As I understand it, your view is that federalism limits are of ? 
a broad importance that transcends such limitations. 
The SG does not introduce any new substantive consid-
erations in his war power discussion. The PURPA was designed 
4. 
to cope with the energy crisis. That crisis is serious, irre-
spective of whether it is analyzed for Commerce Clause or war 
power purposes. I conclude this part of the SG's discussion 
adds nothing to the analysis in my bench memo. 
80-1749 FERC v. MISSISSIPPI Argued 1/19/82 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: John Wiley 
No. 80-1749: FERC v. Mississippi 
January 21, 1982 
This memo responds to your request that I consider in 
more depth the constitutionality of the PURPA's broad standing 
provisions ·. 
A. Description of PURPA's standing provisions 
There are actually four types of standing provisions 
in PURPA. The four types of provisions grant:(£ktate regula-
tory intervention rightsP rights to [JUdicial~ enforce A those 
intervention rights; rights to judicial review of state regula-
tory decisions; and rights to judicial enforcement of PURPA 
requirements. I summarize these four types of provisions in 
turn. 




1. Regulatory intervention rights 
Section 2631 (page 36a of the Jur Stmt) grants the 
. h 1./ \) d . . . 1 d r1g t to 1ntervene an part1c1pate 1n state regu atory procee -
ings to "the Secretary, any affected utility, or any electric 
consumer of an affected electrical utility .. " The Title 
III (natural gas) counterpart to this provision is §3205 (page 
62a of the Jur Stmt). This section permits the Secretary (but 
only the Secretary) to intervene as a matter of right "solely 
for the purpose of advocating policies or methods which carry 
out the purposes set forth in section 3201 [equitable and effi-
cient use of natural gas] " This more limited inter-
vent ion right in natural gas proceedings presumably reflects 
the larger political muscle of the natural gas interests. Sig-
nificantly, PURPA conveys no right of intervention and partici-
pation for the "mandatory implementation" provisions of §210. 
2. Judicial enforcement of regulatory intervention rights 
Second, §2633(b) (page 40a-4la of the Jur Stmt) grants 
standing in the federal courts to enforce §2631 intervention 
and participation rights to the Secretary, as well a to "~ 
electric utility or electric consumer having a right to inter-
vene under section 2631 (a) " The Secretary is treated 
somewhat differently than the utilities and the consumers. The 
Secretary may bring an action in federal court to "enforce his 
right to intervene and participate under section 263l(a) ," 
while consumers and utilities may only bring an action in fed-
3. 
eral court if their intervention rights are denied by any state 
court. This difference presumably means that consumers and 
utilities--but not the Secretary--first must try to enforce 
their intervention rights in state court. 
The Title III counterpart to this intervention en-
forcement right is given by §3207(a) (2) (page 65a of the Jur 
Stmt). This section grants the Secretary a right to bring an 
action in federal court "to enforce his right to intervene un-
der section 3205 ...• " Once again, no counterpart to these 
provisions exists for the "mandatory implmentation" provisions 
of §210. 
3. Judicial review of state regulatory decisions 
The right to obtain judicial review of "any determina-
tion made under [the sections authorizing state regulatory con-
sideration] with respect to any electic utility" is granted by 
§2633(c) (pages 4la-42a of the Jur Stmt). Such judicial review 
may be brought in state court if the electric utility is other 
than a federal agency. In this case, the right of review is 
conferred to "[a]ny person . if such person (or the Secre-
tary) intervened or otherwise participated in the original pro-
ceedings or if State law otherwise permits such review." 
§2633 (c) (1) (first sentence) (page 4la of the Jur Stmt). 
If the utility is a federal agency, on the other hand, 
the judicial review is to be had in federal court, and the 





if such per son (or the Secretary) intervened or otherwise 
participated in the original proceedings or if otherwise appli-
cable law permits such review." §2633(c) (2) (page 4la of the 
Jur Stmt). In every instance, "the Secretary may also partici-
pate as an amicus curiae in any review in any court of an ac-
tion arising under the sections requiring state regulatory con-
sideration. §2633 (c) (3) (page 42a of the Jur Stmt). 
The Title III counterpart to this judicial review pro-
vision is set forth by §3207 (b) (2) (page 65a-66a of the Jur 
Stmt). Strikingly, this provision does not grant a right of 
judicial review. It instead provides that the Secretary is not 
authorized "to appeal or otherwise seek judicial review of the 
decisions of a State regulatory authority ••. or to become a 
party to any action to obtain such review or appeal. The Sec-
retary may participate as an amicus curiae in any judicial re-
view of an action arising under the provisions of this 
chapter." Under Title III, then, judicial review of state reg-
ulatory decisions apparently is only available as otherwise 
provided by state law. 
A §210 counterpart to the judicial review provision 
does exist--for a change. Section 210 (g) (1) (page 53a of the 
Jur Stmt) states that judicial review (respecting state regula-
tory proceedings for purposes of implementing the mandatory 
provisions) is to be available in the same manner as under 
§2633. Therefore the judicial review is cont~ous with judi-
cial review under Title I of the PURPA. See page 3 supra. 
5. 
This provision is difficult to understand, however, because 
§2633 grants judicial review rights only to those who partici-
pated in the proceedings or to those who already have review 
rights under otherwise applicable law. (The Secretary also is 
given amicus curiae rights.) But §210 does not grant partici-
pation rights in the first instance. See page 2 supra. There-
fore apparently §210 (g) (1) does not grant review rights that 
are any more expansive than those already extant under state 
law. 
4. Judicial enforcement of PURPA 
Finally, a right to enforce by state court action 
PURPA's Title I consideration provisions--with respect to util-
ities other than federal agencies--is provided by 
§2633 (c) (1) (second sentence) (page 4la of the Jur Stmt). This 
right is granted to "[a]ny person (including the Secretary)," 
without any requirement that the person be a utility consumer 
or have participated in any regulatory proceedings. (Because 
"enforcement" presumably would mean forcing a regulatory com-
mission to hold hearing and to consider standards, as Title I 
directs, in most instances there probably would be no proceed-
ings in which litigants could yet have participated.) ~gain, 
if the utility is a federal agency, §2633(c) (2) (second sen-
tence) permits "[a]ny person (including the Secretary)" to 
bring an action to enforce the Title I consideration provisions 




There are counterparts to this enforcement provision 
in both Title III and in §210. For Title III, "[a]ny person 
may bring an action to enforce the requirements of this chapter 
[to consider natural gas policies] in the appropriate State 
court." §3207 (b) (1) (page 65a of the Jur Stmt). And for §210, 
"[a] ny person (including the Secretary) may bring an action 
against any electric utility, qualifying small power producer, 
or qualifying cogenerator to enforce any requirement estab-
lished by a State regulatory authority [requiring utilities to 
implement utility interconnections]. " §210 (g) (2) (page 
53a of the Jur Stmt). Such §210 enforcement actions are to be 
brought in the same manner as provided under §2633. These §210 
enforcement actions, however, differ from the enforcement pro-
visions in Titles I and III; §210 directs enforcement against w~t ~e~ 
private parties--ordering them to comply with the state regula- 5~lo(~)(zJ 
tory commission's orders--while enforcement under Titles I and 
III is aimed at the regulatory bodies themselves, requiring 
them to comply with PURPA's consideration requirements. 
B. Discussion 
I first discuss the type of standing provision grant-
ing state regulatory intervention rights. This type of stand-
ing provision differs from the traditional grant of standing to 
adjudicate. This distinction derives from the fact that the 
Mississippi Public Service Comm' n does more than adjudicate. 
In fact, the key activity here--policy decisions about electri-
cal and natural gas pricing for the state--more closely resem-
bles a rulemaking proceeding. This activity is quasi-
legislative in character. This grant of standing consequently 
begins to resemble instructions to a state legislature to con-
sider a given legislative proposal. 
As a result, this standing provision conveys to "any ? 
electric consumer" a federal right to a place on the state leg-
islati ve agenda. Because state decision about which laws to 
enact is, virtually beyond all dispute, an "essential attribute 
of state sovereignty," such a grant of "legislative standing" 
trenches on federalism values. States as sovereigns surely 
have a right to decide which political voices they will ulti-
mately heed. It thus must be a component of this right for the 
state to decide who will be given an audience in the state leg-
islative process. The federal government runs into a dangerous 
area when it begins to dictate to state legislators (and quasi-
legislators) to whom and in what manner such legislators must 
pay attention, for the reason that federalism demands that 
states not be reduced to simple administrative arms of the fed-
eral government. 
On the other hand, this right of autonomy respecting 
political input to the state legislative process cannot be ab-
solute. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (federal 
reapportionment of Alabama Legislature). It strikes me as 
overly rigid to insist that Congress cannot tell states even to 
consider given legislative policies that the national govern-
8. 
ment believes to be important. The consequence would be to 
leave the federal government with the stark choice of either 
carrying out a policy itself--preempting the state role entire-
ly (which most seem to concede that Congress could have done in 
this case)--or else doing nothing. The intermediate course of 
federal/state dialog--if conducted with regard for sovereign 
comity--does seem to me to offer a hopeful possibility of coop-
erative federalism. The prospect has some advantages beyond 
those offered either federal preemption or federal inaction, 
and is a technique of governance that should not be foreclosed 
by the decision in this case. 
If absolute proscription of federal interference with 
the state legislative process is inappropriate, however, then 
dividing "acceptable" and "unacceptable" federal interference 
in state legislative processes is a line drawing problem: how 
much federal intervention is too much? The first type of 
standing provision--"legislative standing"--raises two distinct 
sort of problems: who is permitted to participate in state 
legislative decisions, and how are they to participate. 
On the first point, PURPA's language is quite clear--
"any electric consumer of an affected utility" is given partic-
ipation rights. But the extent of the actual conflict with 
governing Mississippi law is quite unclear. Neither of the 
respondents' briefs explains current Miss. Public Service 
Comm' n standing laws. My own research (with the aid of the 
library staff) shows that the Mississippi PSC is to give notice 
': r 
', 
of proposed rate change "to such other persons as the commis-
sian, in its discretion, may determine." MCA §77-3-37 (1973). 
Moreover, "[a] ny interested person shall have the right to pe-~ 
titian the commission for issuance, amendment, or repeal of a 
rule or regulation." Id. at §77-3-45. These sources suggest 
that the Miss PSC--like most state public utility comm' ns--is 
quite liberal in granting participation rights. (This does not 
surprise me. While in law school, I helped conduct a survey of 
state power plant siting statutes as part of a contract for the 
u.s. Energy Research & Development Admin. The study found 
relaxed--in many cases virtually nonexistent--standing rules to 
~ 
~ 
be characteristic of state utility comm'ns in the power plant ~ 4_ 
~.Lo 
In this light, my instinct is that Tenth Amendment , • 
siting area.) 
~~~ 
standing conflicts may be better resolved on a case by case ----basis rather than in a facial attack. It may well be the poli-
cy of the Miss PSC to allow virtually any interested concumer 
group to join a given proceeding. (The rights that attend in-
tervention is a different matter that I will consider in a mo-
ment.) At minimum, I have found nothing to show that Missis-
sippi's policy is the contrary, and the parties have identified 
no sharp and inevitable conflicts. If the state and federal 
policies in fact do not conflict in noticable degree, this sug-
gests that the case for invalidating an act of Congress in the 
absense of a concrete dispute is weak. 




legitimation of PURPA 1 s broadened standing laws. Rather, I 
think the appropriate technique would be to follow your pr ac-
tice in Virginia Surface Mining: note the problem (there a 
taking issue) and reserve it for adjudication in specific cases 
in which constitutional limitations bind in factually specific 
cases. 
The alternative to this deferral technique is to in-
validate all or a portion of this type of PURPA regulatory 
standing provision in this case. The Court is free to do this; 
oJ~. it simply could say that th~ setting of the state legislative /r 
agenda is an . in~egral operation of a sovereign state, and that~ 
PURPA 1 s broad conferral of this power as a federal matter is 
unacceptable. The Court clearly would not be bound by Testa v. 
Katt, as that case simply directed that state courts enforce 
federal laws. Obviously legislatures can be distinguished from 
courts. The conclusion that the PURPA 1 s standing provisions 1 
infringement of state control of its own processes is excessive 
would be a novel holding, but that will be true no matter how 
the Court disposes of this case. One difficulty with this ap-
preach might be that all of Title I probably would have to ex-
sufficiently distinct from the remainder 
standing provision is j -?:1---0 
of this Title to allow ~ 
cised from the PURPA; I doubt that the 
any more detailed severance. 
On the second point regarding how individuals are per-
mitted to intervene in state hearings, again there is the prob-
lem of the lack of a concrete dispute about particular prac-
,; 
....... 
tices. But I think that the Court should state that PURPA was 
passed with an evident regard for state autonomy. Therefore 
future courts interpreting the intervention provision should be 
directed to interpret PURPA to leave state regulatory authori-
ties their traditional control over their own proceedings. For 
instance, PURPA certainly should be read to preserve state PSC 
power to set and enforce timing deadlines, limitations on oral 
presentations, consolidation of numbers of parties, and other 
essential powers of docket management. I think a plain expres-
sion that such an interpretation should be favored, together 
with a refusal to declare PURPA's intervention grant unconsti-
tutional absent a showing of conflict with state law, should 
suffice to accomodate federalism values with congresional in-
tent respecting this first type of standing provision. 
These same comments largely apply to the second and 
fourth grants of standing--the rights to bring actions to 
enforce intervention rights and PURPA' s hearing requirements. 
These rights to me seem to derive from the orginal PURPA man-
date that state regulators allow participation and hold hear-
ings. If the original PURPA mandate is legitimated, I believe 
it follows that these standing provisions should also be le-
gitimated. They essentially amount to a federal grant of a 
private right of action to individuals against the states. Of 
course, both types of standing provision grant access to feder-
al court under some circumstances. See pages 2-3 & 5-6 supra. 
The Court should observe that Article III limitations will ap-
'' 
-'-""'• 
ply in such situations. Further comment probably is not possi-
ble or appropriate until a concrete case arises. 
On the other hand, if you are not inclined to defer 
judgment on the regulatory standing provisions that I discussed 
first, then these subsidiary standing grants should fall as 
well. 
Finally I come to the third PURPA grant of standing, 
which essentially allows intervenors the right to appeal state ~ 
regulatory decisions. See pages 3-4 supra. Significantly, 
/...o 
the~ 
key provision, § 2633 (c) (1}, states that "[s] uch review or ac-
tion in a State court shall be pursuant to any applicable State 
procedures." 
Again I am uncertain about the extent of actual con-
flict between PURPA and Miss. law. Miss. statutes provide that 
" [ i] n addition to other remedies now available at law or in 
equity ~ party aggrieved by any final finding, order, or 
judgment of the commission shall have the right, regardless of 
the amount involved, of appeal to the chancery court . 
Any person whose rights may be directly affected by said appeal 
may appear and become a party, or the court on proper notice 
order any person to be joined as a party." MCA §77-3-65 (em-
phasis added} • 
This is a realtively broad grant of a right of review. 
My feeling once more is that, while federal/state conflict cer-
tainly is not impossible, neither is it obvious on this facial 
record. Again I lean toward utilizing your Virginia Surface 
lJ. 
Mining technique of identifying the issue, declining to resolve 
it on facial attack, and leaving resolution of the problem to a 
more concrete case. Once more, also, this provision logically 
should be invalidated if your belief is that the breadth of the 
federal intrusion is unacceptable as a facial matter. 
C. Conclusion 
The features of the PURPA that you find most 
troubling--its broad grants of standing--are complex and poten-
tially very intrusive. In this case, however, the actual con-
flict between federal and state law is not sharp. In fact, 
while conflict is not impossible, it is not inevitable and may 
even be quite unlikely--given the broad state rights of partic-
ipation that have used by state regulatory commissions in re-
cent years. Collision between state and federal law can be 
further minimized by construing PURPA to accomodate traditional 
state regulatory agency controls over proceedings. I conclude ~ 
that the Court should await a concrete clash between state and 
federal policy before it invalidates one of these vulnerable 




Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: FERC intervention rights and amicus briefing 
1. My fast research on whether "intervenors" become "parties" has 
focussed on Davis' Administrative Law Treatise. My initial conclu-
sion is that existing law has usually assumed that an intervenor 
does become a party. This area of law, however, has undergone sub-
stantial change with "public interest intervention" in the 1970's. 
Because the question is solely one of legislative intent, the Court 
would be free to interpret the PURPA to preserve considerable Mis-
sissippi control over the conduct of its hearings conducted pursuant 
to PURPA. I append the relevant pages of Davis' 1980 treatise. 
2. We have amicus briefs from six states. Texas and Louisiana urge 
affirmance. Maryland, Maine, and the Calif. Public Utilities Comm'n 
urge reversal. The Calif. Energy Comm' n and the State of Oregon 
urge partial reversal--taking no position beyond stating that the 
"preemption" portions of PURPA (the sections that entirely exempt 
small producers from~ regulation) should be consitutional. 
We also have briefs urging reversal from the United States 
Conference of Mayors and the County of Onondaga, New York . 
. ,. 
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Justice Blackmun circulates his draft in this case. ~/16 .3 .. ~ 
Sections I-II are factual and procedural. Section III holds ____ __, 
that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact 
the PURPA. This is a reasonably argued section that reaches a 
result with which I agree and with which I expect you have no 
problem. So far, so good. 
ll "' Section IV is the guts of the opinion. It holds that -
the PURPA in its entirety passes scrutiny under National League 
of Cities. In section IV A, HAB gets around the difficult §210 
"mandatory implementation" requirement in the predictable man-
ner: by relying solely on the FERC regulation that softens the 
State's duty. This regulation permits teh States to discharge 
the "implementation" function by requiring only that they "re-
solve disputes • " Draft, at 16. Testa v. Katt is the 
authority for this point. As you recall, this is the approach 
I considered in my 1/15/82 supplemental bench memo in reaction 
to the SG's reply brief. I still believe it is a correct reso-
lution of the challenge to this particular provision. The 
holding does not foreclose future state attacks on the manda-




tory implementation provision if in the future FERC adopts more 
intrusive regulatory policies. 
Of key significance, §210 does not intrusively confer 
private rights of action against state regulatory bodies in the 
manner of the the other PURPA sections. See 1/21/82 supplemen-
tal bench memo at 2, 3, 4-5 & 6. I therefore advise that you 
consider joining this section of HAB's draft. 
Section IV B of the draft addresses PURPA's direction 
that States consider its proposed federal standards. At core, --
this section states that Congress is permitted to try and "per-
suade" state legislative bodies by requiring them to consider 
federal issues. The only limiting principle in this section 
seems to be that "[t]here is nothing in PURPA 'directly compel-
ling' the States to enact a legislative program." Draft at 20. 
HAB's answer to PURPA's broad grant of rights of ac-
to compel regulatory consideration through the courts is 
I. L. \\ 
that PURPA's grant of "standing" rights is no broader than that 
presently accorded by Mississippi law. Draft at 22-23. Beyond 
~- that, HAB again finds Testa v. Katt controlling. 
I continue to have mixed feelings regarding the le-~/ 
~~ 
gitimacy of federal efforts to "persuade" States to enact fed-
erally suggested policies. As I mentioned in our conversations 
on this subject, I do think this method of federal/state inter-
action has considerable potential for abuse; it would make a 





tive agendas with mandatory federal issues so that no time was 
left for activity of the States's own choosing. On the other 
hand, it also would be unwise to condemn the "persuasion" tech-
nique completely. This would force Congress to the choice of 
entirely preempting a field whereever it seeks federal involve-
ment. Surely it is preferable to leave Congress free to pre-
serve as much state decision-making authority as possible. 
With such conflicting reactions, my response would be 
to balance. My conclusion in this case is that the PURPA "per-
suasion" burdens are acceptable -- because Mississippi (who 
must bear the burden of demonstrating consitutional invalidity 
of an act of Congress) has not shown the PURPA "consideration" 
burdens to involve even a significant amount of space on the ......_ _ 
State regulatory agenda. That is, we have not seen a demon-
stration that PURPA in fact imposes much of a time-and-expense 
compliance burden. This relatively slight injury to state sov-
ereignty does not outweigh the federalism interest in preserv-
ing this type of "cooperative federalism" program. I therefore 
would join HAB's judgment on this point, writing separately to 
stress both that limits exist in this field and that Mississip-
pi failed to make any factual showing regarding PURPA's actual 
compliance intrusion. 
I know you are quite concerned about PURPA' s broad 
grant of a right of action to enforce via the courts its "con-
sideration" prescription. I see two alternatives.~irs , you 
"- -----could dissent from the validation of PURPA' s broa grant of 
t~ 
. ~ '· 
'•· 
4. 
access to courts to bring actions against state regulatory au-
thorities. The dissenting principle presumably would be that 
the federal government should not be able to expand a State's 
rules of access to courts when the target of the lawsuit is the 
State itself. A rough analogy could be drawn to the Eleventh 
Amendment. The analogy would be very rough because the rele-
vant judicial action here predominately is directed to take 
place in state court. The Eleventh Amendment, of course, pre-
vents only unconsented actions against States in federal court. 
Still, part of the notion behind the Eleventh Amendment is that 
States are free to close their own courts to their citizens 
under principles of severe ign immunity. Under PURPA, States 
enjoy no such freedom. 
The second alternative is to concur in the judgment on 
this issue and write separately. Your concurrence could say 
this problem of broad access to courts is serious but not arne-
nable to facial attack. The reasoning is that I have previous-
ly proposed: there has been no showing that Mississippi's 
"standing" law differs in any significant respect from the 
broad PURPA grants of rights of action. See draft at 22-23. 
I recommend the second alternative. My instinct is 
that National League of Cities should be employed to invalidate 
congressional handiwork only when a State can point to a real 
difference between federal and state policy . 




Finally, in section IV C HAB upholds PURPA's procedur-
al requirements. I think these provisions do not differ sig-
nificantly from the "consideration" issue -- indeed, they are 
part and parcel. I therefore would uphold them on the balanc-
ing logic set forth on page 3 of this memo. 
In sum, I recommend that you join the judgment and all 
but sections IV B & c. Your separate statement should stress 
the potential difficulties that lie ahead in this field, but 
that the federal requirements in this case have not been shown 
to be so intrusive and different from existing Mississippi pol-
icy as to justify a finding of unconstitutionality. Alterna-
tively, you may wish to dissent from sections IV B & C on the 
grounds I have suggested, or others that I have missed. I of 
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February 16, 1982 
Re: 80-1749 - FERC v. Mississippi 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 
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'J!lrurl(ington, l5 . <q. ZD?J.!.2 
February 16, 1982 
No. 80-1749 Federal Energy Regulatory Comrn. 
v. Mississippi 
Dear Harry, 
I will circulate a dissent in due course. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
Justice Powell: 
By way of s~pplementing the memo I just gave you in this case, I now 
would advise awaiting SOC's effort. I spoke to her clerk at lunch and their 
Chambers may be quite in tune with ours on this case.~ 
,'', i 
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February 16, 1982 
No. 80-1749 Federal Energy Regulatory Comm. 
v. Mississippi 
Dear Harry, 
I will circulate a dissent in due course. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
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Re: 80-1749 - FERC v. Mississippi 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Blackrnun 
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cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
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._-u!fing~ ~. <lf. 20p~~ 
February 17, 1982 
/ 
Re: No. 80-1749 Federal Energy Regulatory Comm. v. 
Mississippi 
Dear Harry: 
I will await Sandra's dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
jsw 04/08/82 ~ • ~~ ~L/-f..J-~ . j ~ 
~~~ ~tf~r ICJ ~~ 
( r'J~ ~~~~Oc'o~s ~ 
Memorandum to Justice Powell~·~~ 
Re: SOC dissent in FERC v. Mississippi~ ~~ 
~U.,~.,t.~./})3 ~Pk. ~~ ~ J ~·!'~ 
~~~~~~~~~{_.£t~A~-~ .. ~- - J-~ 
SOC has writ¥ en a dissent in which she canJ take rear' p~
~~~-'t~k~Hu-~~ 
I think it is persuasive and eloquent. Although it sw-eeps -morfl ' 
~~~~.~IY(~~~ 
bro~y .... than what I / under stood to be y.i>ur initial inclin§: tions in -
this case, you may well wish to join her effort. 
If you harbor doubts about the breadth of her position, I 
would make the following points. The dissent can be charged with 
being long on rhetoric and short on analysis of the statute involved 
in this case. In particular, SOC objects to federal ordering of 
state legislative agendas. Federal involvement in state legislative 
agenda-setting is very intrusive, but I doubt that there should be 
an absolute ban on such federal intervention. For instance, state 
legislatures at federal direction now must devote a good deal of 
time to redistricting. It is true that this is a constitutional 
rather than a congressional requirement. But I'm not sure that 
states find the intrusion less objectionable because it comes from a 
9-person Court instead of the national representative body. 
My view still is that the Court should weigh the extent of 
federal intrusion against the value of preserving state choice in 
this type of "federal persuasion" legislation. See page 3 of my 
2/16/82 memo on HAB' s opinion. The statute in this case has not 






been shown to involve a significant expenditure of state quasi-
legislative effort. Indeed, if the States really have no interest 
at all in the PURPA' s proposed policies, my understanding is that 
they could satisfy PURPA's demands with very little effort. ------ Basi-cally, the state commissions have to holding hearings and issue a 
written report. There is no minimum length for the hearings or the 
report. (There are generous intervenor and judicial review provi-
sions, as you know. I will deal with these provisions separately, 
on page of this memo.) Given these facts, my view is that Mis-
sissippi has not shown the federal intrusion into the setting of its 
quasi-legislative be of constitutional magnitude. I 
therefore would not follow SOC's broad objection to ~federal in-
ference in this regard. 
My suggestion instead would be to write separately in order 
to r~-~!i~ if; the ~ that you find most troubling about the 
PURPA. I would sketch out the balancing approach that I suggest 
here, and state the conclusion that generally the PURPA has not been 
I ( \' 
shown on its face to involve an impermissible federal invasion of 
state quasi-legislative prerogatives -- simply because the Court has 
not shown that the burden on Mississippi is in fact significant. 
In other words, if Mississippi thinks the federal standards are non-
sense, we have not been shown that the PURPA requires States to take 
them with more serious than the State believes appropriate. 
I also would, however, qualify this general approval of the 
PURPA. I would note that the PURPA's intervention and judicial re-




cies to a greater extent than the states themselves choose to do. 
In this regard, I would say that the federal government fairly may 
------~--------------be held to take existing state institutions and procedures as it 
finds them. Correspondingly, the federal government ought to be _____...._ 
prevented from making states more vulnerable to overcrowded agency 
hearings and to state judicial action than the states choose to make 
themselves. 
ll l \ 
The principle would be that state institutions have the ------- ~
right to determine their own rules of access and procedure when that 
access and procedure is directed against the State itself. The ba-
sis for this principle would be found in the federal principles of 
independent state governments. As I mentioned previously, the best ----..... 
analogy I can think of would be to the 11th Amendment. This analogy 
is not exact, because that Amendment bars the exercise of only fed-
eral judicial power against the States. But the 11th Amendment does 
leave the States free to decide their own vulnerability to any judi-
cial power by means of adjustment of the sovereign immunity rules in 
$tate court. Under PURPA, however, the federal government arrogates 
the power to set rules on participation and judicial review of state 
agency decisionmaking. 
This intervention and judicial review aspect is the only 
portion of the PURPA in which I think the federal government neces-
sarily requires a State to devote a significant degree of time and 
energy to deliberation according to federal mandate. But, as I have 
said before, I think Justice Blackmun correctly points out that Mis-
--------~-------~~-------
sissippi has not shown that the PURPA expands Mississippi judicial 
4. 
and adminstrative access provisions any farther than Mississippi 
itself already has on its own. Absent a concrete controversy in 
this regard, then, I would simply spell out the potential hazards 
that exist in this field but would conclude that the PURPA has not 
yet been shown to have run afoul of them. 
* * * * * 
In sum, You may find SOC's dissnet persuasive enough to win 
your vote. It is an admirable piece of work. My own view, however, 
is that it sweeps too broadly and fails to focus on the provisions 
about which you have expressed the most concern. I would advise 
that you write separately. 
.. 
4,t' 
April 12, 1982 
80-1749 Federal Energy Comm. v. Mississippi 
Sandra: 
The clerk working with me on this case (John 
Wiley) began his memorandum as follows: ""lustice O'Connor 
has written a dissent in which she can take real pride. It 
is persuasive <ind eloquent." ·I agree with .:John's 
assessment, ann think your ophdon will be cited often and -
in view of your legislative experience - will have influence 
over the yenrs. 
I am inclined, nevertheless, to write separately. 
As you may recall from Conference, my principal concern was 
with the extent to which the statute mandates state 
procedure, including standing, judicial review, etc. I may 
not conclude that the entire statute is facially invalid. 
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April 12, 1982 
80-1749 FF.RC v. Mississippi 
Dear Harry: 
Although I aq'C'ee with much of what Sandra has 
written so well as to the intrusiveness of this statute, I 
am not entirely at rest and may write separately. 
Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
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Sincerely, 
' ~.~--·-----------~----------
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CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
April 13 , 1982 
Re : 80-1749 - FERC v . Mississippi 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE! 
Sandra ' s opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
as to § IVB and IVC, persuades me the Court goes too 
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Justice Brennan 
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From: Ju.Jtice Blackrn'm 
~~ulJ.td: FEB 1 5 1982 
Recirct' la ted: 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1749 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET 
AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
[February - , 1982] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, appellees successfully challenged the constitu-
tionality of Titles I and III, and of § 210 of Title II, of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (PURPA or Act.) We conclude that 
appellees' challenge lacks merit and we reverse the judgment 
below. 
I 
On November 9, 1978, President Carter signed PURPA 
into law. 1 The Act was part of a package of legislation/ ap-
proved the same day, designed to combat the nationwide en-
ergy -crisis. 
At the time, it was said that the generation of electricity 
consumed more than 25% of all energy resources used in the 
United States. S. Rep. No. 95-442, p. 7 (1977). Approxi-
1 The Senate vote was taken on Oct. 9, 1978. The Mississippi Senators 
voted against the bill. See 124 Cong. Rec. S17818. The House vote was 
taken on Oct. 15, 1978. The five-member Mississippi delegation voted 
three "ayes" and two "nays." See 124 Cong. Rec. H38503. 
2 In addition to PURP A, the package included the Energy Tax Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174; the National Energy Conservation 
Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206; the Powerplant and Indus-
trial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289; and the Nat-
ural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621 , 92 Stat. 3351. 
' .. 
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mately one-third of the electricity in this country was gener-
ated through use of oil and natural gas, and electricity gen-
eration was one of the fastest growing segments of the 
Nation's economy. S. Rep. No. 95-361, p. 32 (1977). In 
part because of their reliance on oil and gas, electricity utili-
ties were plagued with increasing costs and decreasing effi-
ciency in the use of their generating capacities; each of these 
factors had an adverse effect on rates to consumers and on 
the economy as a whole. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 9. Cvn-
gress accordingly determined that conservation by electricity 
utilities of oil and natural gas was essential to the success of 
any effort to lessen the country's dependence on foreign oil, 
to avoid a repetition of the shortage of natural gas that had 
been experienced in 1977, and to control consumer costs. 
A 
Titles I and III 
PURP A's Titles I and III, which relate to regulatory poli-
cies for electricity and gas utilities, respectively, are adminis-
tered (with minor exceptions) by the Secretary of Energy. 
These provisions are designed to encourage the adoption of 
certain retail regulatory practices. The Titles share three 
goals: (1) to encourage "conservation of energy supplied by 
. . . utilities;" (2) to encourage "the optimization of the effi-
ciency of use of facilities and resources" by utilities; and (3) to 
encourage "equitable rates ... to consumers." §§ 101 and 
301, 92 Stat. 3120 and 3149, 16 U. S. C. § 2611 (1976 ed., 
Supp. III), 15 U.S. C. §3201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 3 To 
achieve these goals, Titles I and III direct state utility regu-
latory commissions and nonregulated utilities to "consider" 
the adoption and implementation of specific "rate design" and 
regulatory standards. 
3 For simplicity of citation, and to avoid repetition, unless otherwise 
noted herein, any reference to 16 U. S. C. relates to Supplement III of the 
1976 edition of the Code, and any reference to 15 U. S. C. relates to Sup-
plement IV of that edition. 
'• 
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Section 111(d) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 2621(d), requires 
each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to 
consider the use of six different approaches to structuring 
rates: (1) promulgation, for each class of electricity consum-
ers, of rates that, "to the maximum extent practicable," 
would "reflect the costs of ... service to such class"; (2) 
elimination of declining block rates; 4 (3) adoption of time-of-
day rates; 5 (4) promulgation of seasonal rates; 6 (5) adoption 
of interruptible rates; 7 and (6}.use of load management tech-
niques. 8 The Act directed each state authority and 
nonregulated utility to consider these factors not later than 
two years after PURP A's enactment, that is, by November 
8, 1980, and provided that the authority or utility by N ovem-
ber 8, 1981, was to have made a decision whether to adopt 
the standards. § 2622(b). The statute does not provide 
penalties for failure to meet these deadlines; the state author-
4 "Declining block rates" are a traditional and still common approach 
used by utilities in their charges for electricity. The highest unit rate is 
charged for basic electrical consumption, with a declining per-unit price for 
each block of additional consumption. SeeS. Rep. No. 95-442, pp. 26-27 
(1977). 
~ "Time-of-day rates" are designed to reduce "peak load," the term used 
to describe the greatest demand for a utility's electricity. Demand varies 
by hour and season, usually reaching a daily maximum in the afternoon and 
a seasonal maximum in mid-summer or mid-winter. A utility must have 
enough generating capacity to meet that demand; steps that reduce peak 
demand also reduce the required amount of generating capacity and the 
use of "peaking'' generating equipment, which frequently is gas- or oil-
fueled. Under time-of-day rates, utilities charge more for electricity con-
sumed during peak load hours. SeeS. Rep. No. 95-442, at 29. 
6 "Seasonal rates" operate to reduce peak load by imposing higher rates 
during the seasons when demand is greatest. 
7 "Interruptible rates" tend to reduce peak load by charging less for 
service which the utility can interrupt, or stop, during peak demand 
periods. 
8 "Load management techniques" are methods used to reduce the de-
mand for electricity at peak times. For example, a utility might employ 
remote-control devices that temporarily turn off applicances during periods 
when the demand is particularly great. 
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ity or nonregulated utility is merely directed to consider the 
standards at the first rate proceeding initiated by the author-
ity after November 9, 1980. § 2622(c). 
Section 113 of PURP A, 16 U. S. C. § 2623, requires each 
state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to con-
sider the adoption of a second set of standards relating to the 
terms and conditions of electricity service: (1) prohibition of 
master-metering in new buildings; 9 (2) restrictions on the 
use of automatic adjustment clauses; 10 (3) disclosure to con-
sumers of information regarding rate schedules; (4) promul-
gation of procedural requirements relating to termination of 
service; and (5) prohibition of the recovery of advertising 
costs from consumers. Similarly, §303, 15 U. S.C. §3203, 
requires consideration of the last two standards-procedures 
for termination of service and the nonrecovery of advertising 
costs-for natural gas utilities. A decision as to the stan-
dards contained in§§ 113 and 303 was to have been made by 
November 1980, although, again, no penalty was provided by 
the statute for failure to meet the deadline. 
Finally, § 114 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 2624, directs each 
state authority and nonregulated utility to consider promul-
gation of "lifeline rates"-that is, lower rates for service that 
meets the essential needs of residential consumers-if such 
rates have not been adopted by November 1980. 
Titles I and III also prescribe certain procedures to be fol-
lowed by the state regulatory authority and the nonregulated 
9 "Master-metering" is the use of one meter for several living units. 
Studies have shown that tenants of master-metered buildings use 35% 
more electricity, on the average, than tenants of buildings where each 
apartment has its own meter. See S. Rep. No. 95--442, at 31. 
10 An "automatic adjustment clause" provides that as a utility's fuel costs 
rise it may increase its rates without public hearing or review by the state 
regulatory authority. A clause of this kind provides the utility with no 
incentive to reduce its costs or to shift away from oil- or gas-fueled gener-
ating facilities, and therefore tends to discourage the efficient use of en-
ergy resources. 
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utility when considering the proposed standards. Each 
standard is to be examined at a public hearing after notice, 
and a written statement of reasons must be made available to 
the public if the standards are not adopted. 16 U. S. C. 
§§ 2621(b) and (c)(2), and §§ 2623(a) and (c); 15 U. S.C 
§§ 3203(a) and (c). "Any person" may bring an action in 
state court to enforce the obligation to hold a hearing and 
make determinations on the PURPA standards. 16 U. S. C. 
§ 2633(c)(1); 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(1). 
The Secretary of Energy, any affected utility, and any con-
sumer served by an affected utility is given the right to inter-
vene and participate in any rate-related proceeding consider-
ing the Title I standards. 16 U. S. C. § 2631(a). Under 
Title III, the Secretary alone has the right to intervene. 15 
U. S. C. §3205. Any person (including the Secretary) who 
intervenes or otherwise participates in the proceeding may 
obtain review in state court of any administrative determina-
tion concerning the Title I standards, 16 U. S. C. 
§ 2633(c)(1), and the Secretary has the right to participate as 
an amicus in any Title III judicial review proceeding initi-
ated by another. 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2). The right to in-
tervene is enforceable against the state regulatory authority 
by an action in federal court. 16 U. S. C. § 2633(b); 15 
U. S. C. § 3207(a)(2). 
Titles I and III also set forth certain reporting require-
ments. Within one year of PURP A's enactment, and annu-
ally thereafter for 10 years, each state regulatory authority 
and nonregulated utility is to report to the Secretary "re-
specting its consideration of the standards established." 16 
U. S. C. §2626(a); 15 U. S. C. §3209(a). The Secretary, in 
turn, is to submit a summary and analysis of these reports to 
Congress. 16 U. S. C. § 2626(b); 15 U. S. C. § 3209(b). 
Electricity utilities also are required to collect information 
concerning their service costs. 16 U. S. C. § 2643. This in-
formation is to be filed periodically with appellant Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and with appropri-
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ate state regulatory agencies, and is to be made available to 
the public. Title III requires the Secretary, in consultation 
with FERC, state regulatory authorities, gas utilities, and 
gas consumers, to submit a report to Congress on gas utility 
rate design. 15 U. S. C. § 3206. 
Despite the extent and detail of the federal proposals, how-
ever, no state authority or nonregulated utility is required to 
adopt or implement the specified rate design or regulatory 
standards. Thus, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2621(a) and 2623(a) and 15 
U. S. C. § 3203(a) all provide: "Nothing in this subsection 
prohibits any State regulatory authority or nonregulated . . . 
utility from making any determination that it is not appropri-
ate to [implement or adopt] any such standard, pursuant to 
its authority under otherwise applicable State law." Simi-
larly, 16 U. S. C. § 2627(b) and 15 U. S.C § 3208 make it clear 
that any state regulatory authority or nonregulated utility 
may adopt regulations or rates that are "different from any 
standard established by this [subchapter or chapter]." 
B 
Section 210 
Section 210 ofPURPA's Title II, 92 Stat. 3144, 16 U. S. C. 
§ 824a-3, seeks to encourage the development of cogenera-
tion and small power production facilities. 11 Congress be-
lieved that increased use of these sources of energy would re-
duce the demand for traditional fossil fuels. But it also felt 
that two problems impeded the development of nontra-
ditional generating facilities: (1) traditional electricity utili-
ties were reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power 
11 A "cogeneration facility" is one that produces both electric energy and 
steam or some other form of useful energy, such as heat. 16 U. S. C. 
§ 796(18)(A). A "small power production facility" is one that has a produc-
tion capacity of no more than 80 megawatts and uses biomass, waste, or 
renewable resources (such as wind, water, or solar energy) to produce elec-
tric power. § 796(17)(A). 
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to, the nontraditional facilities, 12 and (2) the regulation of 
these alternative energy sources by state and federal utility 
authorities imposed financial burdens upon the nontraditional 
facilities and thus discouraged their development. 13 
In order to overcome the first of these perceived problems, 
§ 210(a) directs FERC, in consultation with state regulatory 
authorities, to promulgate "such rules as it determines neces-
sary to encourage cogeneration and small power production," 
including rules requiring utilities to offer to sell electricity to, 
and purchase electricity from, qualifying cogeneration and 
small power production facilities. Section 210(f), 16 U. S. C. 
§ 824a-3(f), requires each state regulatory authority and 
nonregulated utility to implement FERC's rules. And 
§ 210(h), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(h), authorizes FERC to enforce 
this requirement in federal court against any state authority 
or nonregulated utility; if FERC fails to act after request, 
any qualifying utility may bring suit. 
To solve th.e second problem perceived by Congress, 
§ 210(e), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(e), directs FERC to prescribe 
rules exempting the favored cogeneration and small power 
facilities from certain state and federal laws governing elec-
tricity utilities. 
Pursuant to this statutory authorization, FERC has 
adopted regulations relating to purchases and sales of elec-
tricity to and from cogeneration and small power facilities. 
See 18 CFR pt. 292 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 12214-12237 (1980). 
These afford state regulatory authorities and nonregulated 
12 See 123 Cong. Rec. 25848 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Percy); id., at 32403 
(remarks of Sen. Durkin); id., at 32437 (remarks of Sen. Haskell); id., at 
32419 (remarks of Sen. Hart); National Energy Act: Hearings on H.R. 
6831 et al. before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 3, pp. 552-553 (1977). 
"See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 9&-1750, p. 98 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 9&-496, 
pt. 4, p. 157 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 32399 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Cran-
ston); id., at 32660 (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
80-1749-0PINION 
8 FERC v. MISSISSIPPI 
utilities latitude in determining the manner in which the 
regulations are to be implemented. Thus, a state commis-
sion may comply with the statutory requirements by issuing 
regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or 
by taking any other action reasonably designed to give effect 
to FERC's rules. 14 
II 
In April 1979, the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi 
Public Service Commission, appellees here, filed this action 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Mississippi against FERC and the Secretary of Energy, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that PURP A's Titles I and 
III and § 201 are unconstitutional. App. 3. 15 Appellees 
maintained that PURP A was beyond the scope of congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause and that it consti-
tuted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment. 16 · 
Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the Dis-
trict Court, in an unreported opinion, held that in enacting 
PURP A Congress had exceeded its powers under the Com-
merce Clause. App. to Juris. Statement 1a. The court ob-
served that the Mississippi Public Service Commission by 
"Congress recognized that a State's compliance with the requirements 
ofPURPA would involve the expenditure of funds. Accordingly, it autho-
rized the Secretary of Energy to make grants to state regulatory authori-
ties to assist them in carrying out the provisions of Titles I and III , includ-
ing the reporting requirements, and the provisions of § 210. See 42 
U. S. C. § 6807 (1976 ed., Supp. III). 
For each of the fiscal years 1979 and 1980, Congress authorized for 
appropriation up to $40 million to help state regulatory authorities defray 
the costs of complying with PURPA. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 142(1), 92 
Stat. 3134, 42 U. S. C. § 6808(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). 
15 Mississippi Power & Light Company was permitted to intervene in the 
action as a plaintiff and is also an appellee here. 
16 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." U. S. Const. , Arndt. 10. 
-~ .. ' 
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state statute possessed the "power and authority to regulate 
and control intrastate activities and policies of all utilities op-
erating within the sovereign state of Mississippi." I d., at 
2a. Relying on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 
(1936), the court stated: "There is literally nothing in the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution which authorizes or 
justifies the federal government in taking over the regulation 
and control of public utilities. These public utilities were ac-
tually unknown at the writing of the Constitution." App. to 
Juris. Statement 4a. Indeed, in the court's view, the legisla-
tion "does not even attempt to regulate commerce among the 
several states but it is a clear usurpation of power and au-
thority which the United States simply does not have under 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." !d., at 7a. 
Relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 
833 (1976), the court also concluded that PURP A trenches on 
state sovereignty. 17 It therefore pronounced the statutory 
provisions void because "they constitute a direct intrusion on 
integral and traditional functions of the State of Mississippi." 
App. to Juris. Statement 8a-9a. For reasons it did not ex-
plain, the court also relied on the guarantee of a republican 
form of government, U. S. Const., Art. IV, §4, and on the 
Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2. App. to Juris. Statement 
2a, n. 1, and 9a. 
FERC and the Secretary of Energy appealed directly to 
this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. See Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U.S.--,--, n. 
15 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. --
(1981). 
III 
The Commerce Clause 
We readily conclude that the District Court's analysis and 
the appellees' arguments are without merit so far as they 
17 "The sovereign state of Mississippi is not a robot , or lackey which may 
be shuttled back and forth to suit the whim and caprice of the federal gov-
ernment." App. to Juris. Statement 2a. 
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concern the Commerce Clause. To say that nothing in the 
Commerce Clause justifies federal regulation of even the in-
trastate operations of public utilities misapprehends the 
proper role of the courts in assessing the validity of federal 
legislation promulgated under one of Congress' plenary pow-
ers. The applicable standard was reiterated just last Term 
in Hodel v. Indiana,-- U. S. -- (1981): 
"It is established beyond peradventure that 'legisla-
tive Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic 
life come to the Court with a presumption of constitu-
tionality .... ' Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 
428 U. S. 1, 15 (1978). . . . A court may invalidate leg-
islation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is 
clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional 
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate com-
merce, or that there is no reasonable connection between 
the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." 
ld., at-- (slip op. 7)." 18 
Despite these expansive observations by this Court, appel-
lees assert that PURP A is facially unconstitutional because it 
'
8 In the companion case decided the same day, this Court observed: 
"Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the fact that the 
Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress . . . . This 
power is 'complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and ac-
knowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.' 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has made 
clear that the commerce power extends not only to 'the use of channels of 
interstate or foreign commerce' and to 'protection of the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce .. . or persons or things in commerce,' but also to 
'activities affecting commerce.' Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150 
(1971). As we explained in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 
(1975) , '[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regu-
lated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by oth-
ers similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign 
nations.' " Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., -- U. S. 
- , - (1981) (slip op. 9-10). 
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does not regulate "commerce"; instead, it is said, the Act di-
rects the nonconsenting State to regulate in accordance with 
federal procedures. This, appellees continue, is beyond 
Congress' power: "In exercising the authority conferred by 
this clause of the Constitution, Congress is powerless to reg-
ulate anything which is not commerce, as it is powerless to do 
anything about commerce which is not regulation." Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S., at 297. The "governance of 
commerce" by the State is to be distinguished from com-
merce itself, for regulation of the former is said to be outside 
the plenary power of Congress. 19 
It is further argued that the proper test is not whether the 
regulated activity merely "affects" interstate commerce but, 
instead, whether it has "a substantial effect" on such com-
merce, citing JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion concurring in 
the judgment in the Hodel cases,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 
IH>). PURP A, appellees maintain, does not meet this 
standard. 
The difficulty with these arguments is that they disregard 
entirely the specific congressional finding, in § 2 of the Act, 
16 U. S. C. § 2601, that the regulated activities have an im-
mediate effect on interstate commerce. Congress there de-
termined that "the protection of the public health, safety, and 
welfare, the preservation of national security, and the proper 
exercise of congressional authority under the Constitution to 
regulate interstate commerce require," among other things, 
a program for increased conservation of electric energy, in-
creased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by 
electricity utilities, and equitable retail rates for electricity 
consumers, as well as a program to improve the wholesale 
19 For this proposition, appellees reply on Brown v. EPA , 521 F . 2d 827, 
839 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99 (1977), and District of 
Colum bia v. Train, 172 U. S. App. D.C. 311, 332, 521 F . 2d 971, 992 
(1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 
(1977). 
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distribution of electric energy, and a program for the con-
servation of natural gas while ensuring that rates to gas con-
sumers are equitable. 16 U. S. C. § 2601. The findings, 
thus, are clear and specific. 
The Court heretofore has indicated that federal regulation 
of intrastate power transmission may be proper because of 
the interstate nature of the generation and supply of electric 
power. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S. 453 
(1972). Our inquiry, then, is whether the congressional find-
ings have a rational basis. Hodel v. Virginia Suiface Min. 
& Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 10); Hodel v. In-
diana, -- U. S., at -- (slip op. 7). 
The legislative history provides a simple answer: there is 
ample support for Congress' conclusions. The hearings were 
extensive. Committees in both Houses of Congress noted 
the magnitude of the Nation's energy problems and the need 
to alleviate those problems by promoting energy conserva-
tion and more efficient use of energy resources. See S. Rep. 
No. 95-442, at 7-10; H.R. Rep. No. 95--543, vol. I, pp. 5--10 
(1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95--496, pt. 4, pp. 3-7, 125--130 (1977). 20 
Congress was aware that domestic oil production had lagged 
behind demand and that the Nation had become increasingly 
dependent on foreign oil. I d., at 3. The House Committee 
observed: "Reliance upon imported oil to meet the bulk of 
U. S. oil demands could seriously jeopardize the stability of 
the Nation's economy and could undermine the independence 
ofthe United States." Ibid. See H.R. Rep. No. 95--543, at 
5-6. Indeed, the Nation had recently experienced severe 
shortages in its supplies of natural gas. I d., at 7. The 
20 See also 124 Cong. Rec. S17528 (Oct. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jack-
son); id., at S17530 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers); 124 Cong. Rec. S17804 
(Oct. 9, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Robert C. Byrd); 124 Cong. Rec. H13103 
(Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id., at H13121-H13122 (remarks 
of Rep. Dingell); 123 Cong. Rec. 25894 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Ashley); 
id., at 25916-25917 (remarks of Rep. Ottinger); id., at 27063-27064 (re-
marks of Rep. Wolff). 
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House and Senate committees both noted that the electricity 
industry consumed more than 25% of the total energy re-
sources used in this country while supplying only 12% of the 
user demand for energy. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 7-8; H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, at 125. In recent years, the electric-
ity utility industry had been beset by numerous problems, 
id., at 129, which resulted in higher bills for the consuming 
public, a result exacerbated by the rate structures employed 
by most utilities. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 26. Congress nat-
urally concluded that the energy problem was nationwide in 
scope, 21 and that these developments demonstrated the need 
to establish federal standards regarding retail sales of elec-
tricity, as well as federal attempts to encourage conservation 
and more efficient use of scarce energy resources. See S. 
Rep. No. 95-442, at 24-32; H.R. Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, at 
131-133, 136-138, 170-171. 
Congress also determined that the development of 
cogeneration and small power production facilities would con-
serve energy. The evidence before Congress showed the po-
tential contribution of these sources of energy: it was esti-
mated that if proper incentives were provided, industrial 
cogeneration alone could account for 7o/o--10% of the Nation's 
electrical generating capacity by 1987. S. Rep. No. 95-442, 
at 21, 23. 
We agree with appellants that it is difficult to conceive of a 
more basic element of interstate commerce than electric en-
ergy, a product used in virtually every home and every com-
mercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on 
its own resources in this respect. See FPC v. Florida 
Power & Light Co., supra. Indeed, the utilities involved in 
this very case, Mississippi Power & Light Company and Mis-
sissippi Power Company, sell their retail customers power 
that is generated in part beyond Mississippi's borders, and 
21 See, e. g. , 123 Cong. Rec. 32437-32438 (1977) (remarks of Sen. 
Brooke); id., at 32444 (remarks of Sen. Percy). 
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offer reciprocal services to utilities in other States. App. 
93-94. The intrastate activities of these utilities, although 
regulated by the Mississippi Public Service Commission, 
bring them within the reach of Congress' power over inter-
state commerce. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 
404 U. S., at 458; New England Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire,-- U. S.-- (1982). 22 
Even if appellees were correct in suggesting that PURP A 
will not significantly improve the Nation's energy situation, 
the congressional findings compel the conclusion that "'the 
means chosen by [Congress are] reasonably adapted to the 
end permitted by the Constitution'" Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Min. & Reel. Assn., --U.S., at-- (slip op. 9), 
quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U. S. 241, 262 (1964). It is not for us to say whether the 
means chosen by Congress represent the wisest choice. It is 
sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that 
limited federal regulation of retail sales of electicity and natu-
ral gas, and of relationships between cogenerators and elec-
tric utilities, was essential to protect interstate commerce. 
That is enough to place the challenged portions of PURP A 
within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 23 Be-
cause PURP A's provisions concern private nonregulated util-
ities as well as state commissions, the statute necessarily is 
valid at least insofar as it regulates private parties. See 
22 PURP A could be upheld even if some of its provisions were not directly 
related to the purpose of fostering interstate commerce: "A complex regu-
latory program ... can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a 
showing that every single facet of the program is independently and di-
rectly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the chal-
lenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that 
the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this test." 
Hodel v. Indiana,- U.S. -,-, n. 17. (1981). 
23 This is not to say the Congress can regulate in an area that is only tan-
gentially related to interstate commerce. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U. S. 183, 196-197, n. 27 (1968). That obviously is not the case here. 
. t', 
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Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at 
- (slip op. 19-20). 
IV 
The Tenth Amendment 
Unlike the Commerce Clause question, the Tenth Amend-
ment issue presented here is somewhat novel. This case ob-
viously is related to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U. S. 833 (1976), insofar as both concern principles of state 
sovereignty. But there is a significant difference as well. 
National League of Cities, like Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975), presented a problem the Court often con-
fronts: the extent to which state sovereignty shields the 
States from generally applicable federal regulations. In 
PURP A, in contrast, the Federal Government attempts to 
use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. To 
an extent, this presents an issue of first impression. 
PURP A, for all its complexity, contains essentially three 
requirements: (1) § 210 has the States enforce standards pro-
mulgated by FERC; (2) Titles I and III direct the States to 
consider specified rate-making standards; and (3) those Titles 
impose certain procedures on state commissions. We con-
sider these three requirements in turn: 
A. Section 210. On its face, this appears to be the most 
intrusive of PURP A's provisions. The question of its con-
stitutionality, however, is the easiest to resolve. Insofar as 
§ 210 authorizes FERC to exempt qualified power facilities 
from "State laws and regulations," it does nothing more than 
pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the traditional way. 
Clearly, Congress can pre-empt the States completely in the 
regulation of retail sales by electricity and gas utilities and in 
the regulation of transactions between such utilities and 
congenerators. Cf. Southern Pacific Co . v. Arizona, 325 
U. S. 761, 769 (1945). The propriety of this type of regula-
tion-so long as it is a valid exercise of the commerce 
power-was made clear in National League of Cities, and 
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was reaffirmed in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. 
Assn.: the Federal Government may displace state regulation 
even though this serves to "curtail or prohibit the States' pre-
rogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the 
States may consider important." -- U. S. --, at --
(slip op. 23). 
Section 210's requirement that "each State regulatory au-
thority shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, 
implement such rule (or revised rule) for each electric utility 
for which it has ratemaking authority," 16 U. S. C. 
§ 824a-3(f)(1) (emphasis added), is more troublesome. The 
statute's substantive provisions require electricity utilities to 
purchase electricity from, and to sell it to, qualifying 
cogenerator and small power production facilities. 
§ 824a-3(a). Yet FERC has declared that state commissions 
may implement this by, among other things, "an undertaking 
to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric 
utilities arising under [PURPA]." 18 CFR § 292.401(a) 
(1980). In essence, then, the statute and the implementing 
regulations simply require the Mississippi authorities to ad-
judicate disputes arising under the statute. Dispute resolu-
tion of this kind is the very type of activity customarily en-
gaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission. 
See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 77-1-31, 77-3-5, 77-3-13(3), 
77-3-21, 77-3-405 (1973). 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), is instructive and con-
trolling on this point. There, the Emergency Price Control 
Act, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, created a treble damages rem-
edy, and gave jurisdiction over claims under the Act to state 
as well as federal courts. The courts of Rhode Island re-
fused to entertain such claims, although they heard analogous 
state causes of action. This Court upheld the federal pro-
gram. It observed that state courts have a unique role in 
enforcing the body of federal law, and that the Rhode Island 
courts had "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under es-
' .. 
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tablished local law to adjudicate this action." 330 U. S., at 
394. Thus the state courts were directed to heed the con-
stitutional command that "the policy of the federal Act is the 
prevailing policy in every state," id., at 393, "'and should be 
respected accordingly in the courts of the State.'" I d., at 
392, quoting Mondau v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 
u. s. 1, 57 (1912). 
So it is here. The Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction 
to entertain claims analogous to those granted by PURP A, 
and it can satisfy § 210's requirements simply by opening its 
doors to claimants. That the Commission has administrative 
as well as judicial duties is of no significance. 24 Any other 
conclusion would allow the States to disregard both the pre-
eminent position held by federal law throughout the Nation, 
cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340-341 (1816), 
and the congressional determination that the federal rights 
granted by PURP A can appropriately be enforced through 
state adjudicatory machinery. Such an approach, Testa em-
phasized, "flies in the face of the fact that the States of the 
Union constitute a nation," and "disregards the purpose and 
effect of Article VI of the Constitution." 330 U. S., at 389. 
B. Mandatory Consideration of Standards. We acknowl-
edge that "the authority to make . . . fundamental . . . deci-
sions" is perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty. 
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 851. 
Indeed, having the power to make decisions and to set policy 
is what gives the State its sovereign nature. See Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 360 (1977) (State Su-
preme Court speaks as sovereign because it is the "ultimate 
body wielding the State's power over the practice of law"). 
It would follow that the ability of a state legislative (or, as 
24 In another context, the Court has noted that "the role of the modern 
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge .. . is 'functionally 
comparable' to that of a judge." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513 
(1978). 
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here, administrative) body-which makes decisions and sets 
policy for the State as a whole-to consider and promulgate 
regulations of its choosing must be central to a State's role in 
the federal system. Indeed, the nineteenth century view, 
expressed in a well known slavery case, was that Congress 
"has no power to impose upon a State officer, as such, any 
duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." Kentucky v. 
Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861). 
Recent cases, however, demonstrate that this rigid and 
isolated statement from Kentucky v. Dennison-which sug-
gests that the States and the Federal Government in all cir-
cumstances must be viewed as co-equal sovereigns-is not 
representative of the law today. While this Court never has 
sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to pro-
mulgate and enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown, 
431 U. S. 99 (1977), there are instances where the Court has 
upheld federal statutory structures that · in effect directed 
state decision-makers to take or to refrain from taking cer-
tain actions. In Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), 
for example, state executives were held restricted, with re-
spect to state employees, to the wage and salary limitations 
established by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. 
Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 (1979), 
acknowledged a federal court's power to enforce a treaty by 
compelling a state agency to "prepare" certain rules "even if 
state law withholds from [it] the power to do so." !d., at 
695. 25 And certainly Testa v. Katt, supra, by declaring that 
"the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every 
state," 330 U. S., at 393, reveals that the Federal Govern-
ment has some power to enlist a branch of state govern-
ment-there the judiciary-to further federal ends. In 
25 The Court did express doubt as to whether a state agency "may be or-
dered actually to promulgate regulations having effect as a matter of state 
law." 443 U.S., at 695. As we have noted, however, PURPA does not 
require promulgation of particular regulations. 
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doing so, Testa clearly cut back on both the quoted language 
and the analysis of the Dennison case of the preceding 
century. 26 
Whatever all this may forebode for the future, or for the 
scope of federal authority in the event of a crisis of national 
proportions, it plainly is not necessary for the Court in this 
case to make a definitive choice between competing views of 
federal power to compel state regulatory activity. Titles I 
and III of PURP A require only consideration of federal stan-
dards. And if a State has no utilities commission, or simply 
2<1 In Dennison, the Court concluded that the state courts entertained 
federal actions solely as a discretionary "matter of comity, which the sev-
eral sovereignties extended to one another for their mutual benefit. It 
was not regarded by either party as an obligation imposed by the Constitu-
tion." 24 How., at 109. That analysis cannot survive Testa, which 
squarely held "that state courts do not bear the same relation to the United 
States that they do to foreign countries." 330 U. S., at 389. And Testa, 
of course, placed the obligation of state officials to enforce federal law 
squarely in the Supremacy Clause. 
Our recent cases also demonstrate that the Federal Government, at least 
in certain circumstances, can structure the State's exercise of its sovereign 
powers. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), for 
example, the Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relation-
ship with its employees is an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 
!d., at 845. Yet, by holding "unimpaired" California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 
553 (1957), which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to state rail-
road employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, National League of Cities ac-
knowledged that not all aspects of a State's sovereign authority are im-
mune from federal control. This analysis was restated in Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., supra, which indicated that federal 
regulations are subject to Tenth Amendment attack only if they "regulat[e] 
the 'States as States,"' "address matters that are indisputably 'attributes 
of state sovereignty, ' " and impair the States' "ability 'to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional functions.'" -- U. S., at-- (slip op. 
21), quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 854, 845, 
852. And even when these requirements are met, "[t]here are situations 
in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it 
justifies State submission.'' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. 
Assn.,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 21 n.29). 
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stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the 
federal proposals. In a sense, then, this case is only one step 
beyond Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., 
supra. There, the Federal Government could have pre-
empted all surface mining regulations; instead, it allowed the 
States to enter the field if they promulgated regulations con-
sistent with federal standards. In the Court's view, this 
raised no Tenth Amendment problem: "We fail to see why 
the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally sus-
pect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a reg-
ulatory role." -- U. S., at-- (slip op. 24.) "[T]here 
can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legisla-
tive processes of the States by directly compelling them to 
enact and enforce a regulatory program." ld., at-- (slip 
op. 22). 
Similarly here, Congress could have pre-empted the field; 
PURP A should not be invalid simply because, out of defer-
ence to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive 
scheme and allowed the States to continue regulating in the 
area on the condition that they consider'the suggested fed-
eral standards. -n There is nothing in PURP A "directly com-
pelling'' the States to enact a legislative program. And be-
cause the two challenged Titles simply condition continued 
state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration 
of federal proposals, they do not threaten the States' "sepa-
27 1t seems evident that Congress intended to defer to state preroga-
tives-and expertise-in declining to pre-empt the utilities field entirely. 
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-442, pp. 9, 13-14 (1977); 124 Cong. Rec. S17528 
(Oct. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id., at S17530 (remarks of Sen. 
Bumpers); id., at S17801 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum); id., at S17806 (re-
marks of Sen. Durkin); 123 Cong. Rec. 32430 (1977) (remarks of Sen. John- · 
ston); id., at 32395 (remarks of Sen. Bartlett). The congressional inten-
tion would not save the statute, of course, if the method of regulation were 
constitutionally impermissible. But it would be a peculiar type of federal-
ism that encourages Congress to pre-empt a field entirely, when its prefer-
ence is to allow the States a continued role in the field. 
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rate and independent existence," Lane County v. Oregon, 7 
Wall. 71, 76 (1869); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 580 
(1911), and do not impair the ability of the States "to function 
effectively in a federal system." Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S., at 547, n. 7; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U. S., at 852. To the contrary, they offer the States a vehi-
cle for remaining active in an area of overriding concern. 
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States-
that of either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or 
considering the federal standards-may be a difficult one. 
And that is particularly true when Congress, as is the case 
here, has failed to provide an alternative regulatory mecha-
nism to police the area in the event of state default. Yet in 
other contexts the Court has recognized that valid federal en-
actments may have an effect on state policy-and may, in-
deed, be designed to induce state action in areas that other-
wise would be beyond Congress' regulatory authority. Thus 
in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U. S. 127 (1947), 
the Court upheld Congress' power to attach conditions to 
grants-in-aid r.eceived by the States, although the condition 
under attack involved an activity that "the United States is 
not concerned with, and has no power to regulate." I d., at 
143. The Tenth Amendment, the Court declared, "has been 
consistently construed 'as not depriving the national govern-
ment of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a 
granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to 
the permitted end,"' ibid, quoting United States v. Darby, 
312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941)-the end there being the disburse-
ment of federal funds. Thus it cannot be constitutionally de-
terminative that the federal regulation is likely to move the 
States to act in a given way, or even to "coerc[e] the States" 
into assuming a regulatory role by affecting their "freedom to 
make decisions in areas of 'integral governmental functions.'" 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at 
- (slip op. 22, 23). 
. ' 
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Equally as important, it has always been the law that state 
legislative and judicial decisionmakers must give preclusive 
effect to federal enactments concerning governmental activ-
ity, no matter what the strength of the competing local inter-
ests. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 340--341. 
This requirement follows from the nature of governmental 
regulation of private activity. "[l]ndividual businesses nec-
essarily [are] subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern-
ment of the Nation and the State in which they reside," Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 845; when 
regulations promulgated by the sovereigns conflict, federal 
law necessarily controls. This is true though Congress exer-
cises its authority "in a manner that displaces the States' ex-
ercise of their police powers," Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 25), or in 
such a way as to "curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives 
to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States 
may consider important," id., at-- (slip op. 23)-or, to put 
it still more plainly, in a manner that is "extraordinarily in-
trusive." Id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring) (slip op. 1). 
Thus it may be unlikely that the States will or easily can 
abandon regulation of public utilities to avoid PURP A's re-
quirements. But this does not change the constitutional 
analysis: as in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., 
"[t]he most that can be said is that the ... Act establishes a 
program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, 
within limits established by federal minimum standards, to 
enact and administer their own regulatory programs, struc-
tured to meet their own particular needs." I d., at -- (slip 
op. 22). 
To be sure, PURP A gives virtually any affected person the 
right to compel consideration of the statutory standards 
through judicial action. We fail to see, however, that this 
places any particularly onerous burden on the State. Missis-
sippi by statute already grants "{ a]ny interested person ... 
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the right to petition the [Public Service] [C]ommission for is-
suance, amendment or repeal of a rule or regulation," Miss. 
Code Ann. § 77-3-45 (1973) (emphasis added), and provides 
that "any party aggrieved by any final finding, order or judg-
ment of the commission shall have the right, regardless of the 
amount involved, of appeal in chancery court." Miss. Code 
Ann. § 77-~7(1) (1981 Cum. Supp.) (emphasi~ added). In-
deed, "[a]ny person whose rights may be directly affected by 
said appeal may appear and become a party .... " Ibid. 
And "[a]ppeals in accordance with law may be had to the su-
preme court of the State of Mississippi from any final judg-
ment of the chancery court." Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-71 
(1973). 
It is hardly clear on the statute's face, then, that PURP A's 
standing and appeal provisions grant any rights beyond those 
presently accorded by Mississippi law, and appellees point to 
no specific provision of the Act expanding on the State's ex-
isting, liberal approach to public participation in ratemaking. 
In this light, we again find the principle of Testa v. Katt, 
supra, controlling: the State is asked only to make its admin-
istrative tribunals available for the vindication of federal as 
well as state-created rights. PURP A, of course, establishes 
as federal policy the requirement that state commissions con-
sider various ratemaking standards, and it gives individuals a 
right to enforce that policy; once it is established that the re-
quirement is constitutionally supportable, "the obligation of 
states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason 
of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they 
provide." Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S., at 391. See Second 
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912). 
In short, Titles I and III do not involve the compelled exer-
cise of Mississippi's sovereign powers. And, equally impor-
tant, they do not set a mandatory agenda to be considered in 
all events by state legislative or administrative 
decisionmakers. As we read them, Titles I and III simply 
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establish requirements for continued state activity in an oth-
erwise pre-emptible field. Whatever the constitutional 
problems associated with more intrusive federal programs, 
the "mandatory consideration" provisions of Titles I and III 
must be validated under the principle of Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Min. & Reel. Assn. 28 
C. The Procedural Requirements. Titles I and III also 
require state commissions to follow certain notice and com-
ment procedures when acting on the proposed federal stan-
dards. In a way, these appear more intrusive than the "con-
sideration" provisions; while the latter are essentially 
hortatory, the procedural provisions obviously are prescrip-
tive. Appellants and amici Maryland, et al., argue that the 
procedural requirements simply establish minimum due proc-
ess standards, something Mississippi appears already to pro-
vide, 29 and therefore may be upheld as an exercise of Con-
28 As we note above, PURPA imposes certain reporting requirements on 
state commissions. But because these attach only if the State chooses to 
continue its regulatory efforts in the field, we find them supportable for the 
reasons addressed in connection with the other provisions of Titles I and 
Ill. Appellees nevertheless suggest that PURPA's requirements must 
fall because compliance will impose financial burdens on the States. We 
are unconvinced: in a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional activ-
ity, "the determinative factor ... [is] the nature of the federal action, not 
the ultimate economic impact on the States." Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U.S., at --, n. 33. In any event, Congress 
has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the economic burden of compliance. 
See n. 14, supra. 
29 Mississippi law provides for reasonable notice in the fixing of rates and 
conditions of service of utilities. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-33(2) (1973). It 
also requires the Public Service Commission to keep a "full and complete 
record" of all proceedings, § 77+63, and to "make and file its findings and 
order, and its opinion, if any," § 77--3--59. Indeed, the state statute re-
quires that ~'[a]ll findings of the commission and the determination of every 
matter by it shall be in writing and placed upon its minutes." § 77-1-41. 
These "shall be deemed a public record, and shall at all seasonable times be 
subject to the inspection of the public." Ibid. Thus, the requirements 
that appellees characterize as an extraordinary burden on the State appear 
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gress' Fourteenth Amendment powers. We need not go 
that far, however, for we uphold the procedural require-
ments under the same analysis employed above in connection 
with the "consideration" provisions. If Congress can require 
a state administrative body to consider proposed regulations 
as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible 
field-and we hold today that it can-there is nothing uncon-
stitutional about Congress' requiring certain procedural min-
. ima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks. The pro-
cedural requirements obviously do not compel the exercise of 
the State's sovereign powers, and do not purport to set stan-
dards to be followed in all areas of the state commission's 
endeavors. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1749 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ET 
AL., APPELLANTS, v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
[April -, 1982] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part in the judgment 
and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the majority that the Commerce Clause sup-
ported Congress' enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(PURP A). I disagree, however, with much of the majority's 
Tenth Amendment analysis. Titles I and III of PURP A~­
script state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic 
army This result is contrary to the principles of National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), antithetical 
to the values of federalism, and inconsistent with our con-
stitutional history. Accordingly, I dissent from subsections 
IVB and C of the majority's opinion.' 
'~ --
) 
1 I concur in the majority's decision to uphold Title II, § 210 of PURPA 1!-:n!!i?C-<:tt::.~~~ 
I against appellees' facial attack. As the majority explains, part of that sec-
tion permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to ex- ~ ~....£/ 
empt cogeneration and small power production facilities from otherwise ap- ...r ~--;- "t 
plicable state and federal laws. 16 U.S. C. §824a-3 (e) (1976 ed., Supp. --~~ 
IV). This exemption authority does not violate the Tenth Amendment, 
for it merely preempts state control of private conduct, rather than regu-
lating the "States as States." See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 (1981). 
Section 210's requirement that the States "implement" rules promul-
gated by the Secretary of Energy, 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (f) (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV), is more disturbing. Appellants, however, have interpreted this statu-
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I 
Titles I and III of PURP A require state regulatory agen-
cies to decide 'Yheth~dop_f·a d_gzen federaLstandar:_ds 
governing gas afi:'<f§ectric utilities. 2 The statute describes, 
in some e ail, the procedures state authorities must follow 
when evaluating these stanaard~ but does not compel the 
tory obligation to include "an undertaking to resolve disputes between 
qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [§ 210], or any other 
action reasonably designed to implement [that section]." 18 CFR 
§ 292.401 (a) (1981). It appears, therefore, that state regulatory authori-
ties may satisfy § 210's implementation requirement simply by adjudicating 
private disputes arising under that section. As the majority points out, 
ante, at 16-17, the Mississippi Public Service Commission has jurisdiction 
over similar state disputes, and it is settled that a State may not exercise 
its judicial power in a manner that discriminates between analogous federal 
and state causes of action. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947). 
Under these circumstances, but without foreclosing the possibility that 
particular applications of § 210's implementation provision might uncover 
hidden constitutional defects, I would not sustain appellees' facial attack on 
the provision. 
Section 210 also authorizes FERC, electric utilities, cogenerators, and 
small power producers to "enforce" the above implementation provision 
against state utility commissions. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (h) (2) (1976 ed., 
Supp. IV). As applied, it is conceivable that this enforcement provision 
would raise troubling federalism issues. Once again, however, I decline to 
accept appellees' facial challenge to the provision, preferring to consider 
the constitutionality of this provision in the setting of a concrete 
controversy. 
2 The statute imposes the same requirements upon nonregulated utili-
ties. In this respect, it regulates purely private conduct and does not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment. Throughout this dissent, I consider only the 
constitutionality of Titles I and III as applied to state regulatory authori-
ties. I would allow the District Court, on remand, to decide whether the 
constitutionally defective aspects of Titles I and III are severable from the 
unobjectionable portions. 
3 See majority op., ante, at 4-6. The majority overlooks several of 
PURPA's procedural mandates. For example, with respect to six of the 
standards, tfie stat-;agency must publish a written determination, includ-
ing findings, even if it decides to adopt the federal standard. 16 U. S. C. 
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States to adopt thP suggested federal standards. 15 
U. S.C. §3203 (a) (1~76 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U.S. C. §§2621 
(a), 2623 (a), 2627 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The latter, de-
ceptively generous, feature of PURP A persuades the Court 
that the statute doeE not intrude impermissibly into state 
sovereign functions. The Court's conclusion, however, rests \ 
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that state l 
governments play in our federalist system. 
tat"ele~slative and administrative bodies are not field of-
fices of the ti al areaucracy. Nor are they think tanks 
o wh1ch Congress m&y assign problems for extended study. 
Instead, each State is sovereign within its own domain, gov-
erning its citizens anJ providing for their general welfare. 
While the Constitution and federal statutes limit the scope of 
state authority, they do not harness that power for national 
purposes. The Constitution contemplates "an indestructible 
Union, composed of indestructible States," a system in which 
both the state and national governments retain a "separate 
and independent existence." Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 
725 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869). 
Adhering to these principles, the Court has recognized that 
the Tenth Amendment restrains congressional action that 
woul~tate's ability to function as a State." 
United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
§ 2621 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). In addition, PURPA guarantees certain 
~ht~discover information, § 2631 (b); requires the State to provide 
transcnp s, at the cost of reproduction, to parties to ratemaking proceed-
ings or other "regulatory proceeding[s] relating to [electric utility] rates or 
rate design," § 2632 (c); and, under some circumstances, mandates com-
pensation for reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other 
costs to consumers who contribute substantially to the adoption of a Title I 
standard, § 2632 (a), (b). These requirements, as well as the ones de-
scribed by the majority, may impose special burdens on state adminis- j 
trative agencies. I do not weigh the constitutionalit of these individual 
procedural requirements, owever, because wou d invalidate the entire 
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U. S. --, -- (1982); National League of Cities --k1lsery, 
426 U. S. 833, 842-852 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542, 547, n. 7 (1975). See also City of Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 423-424 (1978) 
(CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment). For 
example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, the 
Court held that Congress could not prescribe the minimum 
wages and maximum hours of state employees engaged in 
"traditional governmental functions," id., at 852, because the 
power to set those wages and hours is an "attribute of state 
sovereignty" that is "essential to [a] separate and independ-
ent existence." ld., at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 
supra, at 76). 
Just last Term this Court identified three separate inqui-
ries underlying the result in National League of Cities. A 
congressional enactment violates the Tenth Amendment, we 
observed, if it regulates the "'States as States,"' addresses 
"matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty,"' and "directly impair[s] [the States'] ability to 'struc-
ture integral o;>erations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions."' v1Iodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Association, 452 U. S. 264, 287-288 (1981) (quoting Na-
tional League of Cities, supra, at 854, 845, 852). See also 
United Transportation Union, supra, at --. 4 
Application of these principles to the present case reveals 
the Tenth Amendment defects in Titles I and III. Plainly 
those titles regulate the "States as States." While the stat-
ute's ultimate aim may be the regulation of private utility 
companies, PURP A addresses its commands solely to the 
• In both Hodel and United Transportation Union we further noted 
that, even when these three requirements are met, "the nature of the fed-
eral interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29; United Transportation Union, 455 U. S., 
at-, n. 9. Neither of those cases involved such an exception to Na-
tional League of Cities, and the Court has not yet explored the circum-
stances that might justify such an exception. 
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States. Instead of requesting private utility companies to 
adopt lifeline rates, declining block rates, or the other 
PURP A standards, Congress directed state agencies to ap-
praise the appropriateness of those standards. It is djffi- ( 
cult to argue that a statute structuring the regulatory agenda 
or a state a ency is ~a regu atwn of the "State." -
...______ -- - -.__.... ..---.,.,..- -..... 
find it equally clear that Tit es I an III address 
"attributes of state sovereignty." Even the majority recog-
nizes that "the power to make decisions and to set policy is 
what gives the State its sovereign nature." Ante, at 17. 
The power to make decisions and set policy, however, em-
braces more than the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also 
includes the power to decide which proposals are most wor-
thy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken 
up, and the precise form in which they should be debated. 
PURP A intrudes upon all of these functions. It chooses 
twelve proposals, forcing their consideration even if the state 
agency deems other ideas more worthy of immediate atten-
( 
tion. In addition, PURP A hinders the agency's ability to 
schedule consideration of the federal standards. 5 Finally, 
PURP A specifies, with exacting detail, the content of the 
standards that will absorb the agency's time.6 
s As the majority recognizes, ante, at 5, PURP A permits "[a]ny per-
son" to bring an action in state court to enforce the agency's obligation to 
consider the federal standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3207 (b) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV); 16 U. S. C. § 2633 (c) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The Secretary of En-
ergy, moreover, may intervene in any ongoing ratemaking proceeding to 
require consideration of PURPA's standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3205 (a) (1976 
ed., Supp. IV); 16 U. S. C. §§ 2631 (a), 2622 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Title 
I grants affected utilities and consumers the same right of intervention. 
16 U. S. C. § 2631 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Because of these rights of in-
tervention and enforcement, state agencies lack even the power to sched-
ule their consideration of PURPA's standards. 
6 For example, the proposed standards governing advertising provide 
that "No electric [or gas] utility may recover from any person other than 
the shareholders (or other owners) of such utility any direct or indirect ex-
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If Congress routinely required the state legislatures to de-
bate bills drafted by congressional committees, it could 
hardly be questioned that the practice would affect an 
attribute of state sovereignty. PURPA, which sets the 
agendas of agencies exercising delegated legislative power in 
a specific field, has a similarly intrusive effect. 
ther] defined in . . . this title." 16 U. S. C. § 2623 (b) (5) (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV); 15 U. S. C. § 3203 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). PURPA then defines 
the terms advertising, political advertising, and promotional advertising: 
"(1) For purposes of this section and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title-
(A) The term 'advertising' means the commercial use, by an electric util-
ity, of any media, including newspaper, printed matter, radio, and televi-
sion, in order to transmit a message to a substantial number of members of 
the public or to such utility's electric consumers. 
(B) The term 'political advertising' means any advertising for the pur-
pose of influencing public opinion with respect to legislative, adminis-
trative , or electoral matters, or with respect to any controversial issue of 
public importance. 
(C) The term 'promotional advertising' means any advertising for the 
purpose of encouraging any person to select or use the service or additional 
service of an electric utility or the selection or installation of any appliance 
or equipment designed to use such utility's service. 
"(2) For purposes of this subsection and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title, the 
terms 'political advertising' and 'promotional advertising' do not include-
(A) advertising which informs electric consumers how they can conserve 
energy or can reduce peak demand for electric energy, 
(B) advertising required by law or regulation, including advertising re-
quired under part 1 of title II of the National Energy Conservation Policy 
Act ... , 
(C) advertising regarding service interruptions, safety measures, or 
emergency conditions, 
(D) advertising concerning employment opportunities with such utility, 
(E) advertising which promotes the use of energy efficient appliances, 
equipment or services, or 
(F) any explanation or justification of existing or proposed rate sched-
ules, or notifications of hearings thereon." 16 U. S. C. § 2625 (h) (1976 
ed., Supp. IV). 
See also 15 U. S. C. § 3204 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (containing similar pro-
visions for gas utilities). 
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Finally, PURPA directly impairs the States' ability to 
"structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions." Utility regulation is a traditional func-
tion of state government, 7 and the regulatory commission is 
the most integral part of that function. By taxing the lim-
ited resources of these commissions, and decreasing their 
ability to address local regulatory ills, PURP A directly im-
pairs the power of state utility commissions to discharge 
their traditional functions efficiently and effectively. 8 
The majority sidesteps this analysis, suggesting that the 
States may escape PURP A simply by ceasing regulation of 
public utilities. Even the majority recognizes that this 
choice "may be a difficult one," ante, at 21, and that "it may 
be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regula-
tion of public utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements." 
Ante, at 22. In fact, the majority's "choice" is an absurdity, 
for if its analysis is sound, the Constitution no~longer liriiits 
federal regulation of state affairs. Under the majority's 
7 The Court has not explored fully the extent of "traditional" state func-
tions. Utility regulation, however, should fall within any definition of that 
term. See generally W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Indus-
tries 25-44 (2d ed. 1976) (tracing history of state regulation of utilities). 
8 PURP A thus offends each of the criteria named in Hodel. I do not 
believe, moreover, that this is a case in which "the nature of the federal 
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Seen. 
4, supra. Whatever the ultimate content of that standard, it must refer, 
not only to the weight of the asserted federal interest, but to the necessity 
of vindicating that interest in a manner that intrudes upon state sover-
eignty. In this case, the Government argues that PURPA furthers vital 
national interests in energy conservation. Although the congressional 
goal is a noble one, appellants have not shown that Congress needed to 
commandeer state utility commissions to achieve its aim. Consistent with 
the Tenth Amendment, Congress could have assigned PURPA's tasks to 
national officials. Alternatively, it could have requested state commis-
sions to comply with Titles I and III and directed the Secretary to shoulder 
the burden of any State choosing not to comply. 
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analysis, for example, National League of Cities, would have 
been wrongly decided, because the States could have avoided 
the Fair Labor Standards Act by "choosing'' to fire all em-
ployees subject to that Act and to close those branches of 
state government. Similarly, Congress could dictate the 
agendas and meeting places of state legislatures, because un-
willing States would remain free to abolish their legislative 
bodies. 9 I do not agree that this dismemberment of state 
government is the correct solution to a Tenth Amendment 
challenge. 
The choice put to the States by the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 
ed., Supp. Ill), the federal statute upheld in Hodel and dis-
cussed by the Court, ante, at H~20, is quite different from 
the decision PURP A mandates. The Surface Mining Act in-
vites the States to submit proposed surface mining regula-
tions to the Secretary of the Interior. 30 U. S. C. § 1253 
(1976 ed., Supp. III). If the Secretary approves a state reg-
ulatory program, then the State enforces that program. If a 
State chooses not to submit a program, the Secretary devel-
ops and implements a program for that State. § 1254. 
Even States in the latter category, however, may supple-
ment the Secretary's program with consistent state laws. 10 
9 But cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) ("The power to 
locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall 
be changed from one place to another . . . are essentially and peculiarly 
state powers. That one of the ... States could now be shorn of such pow-
ers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained"). 
10 Subsection 1254 (g) of Title 30 only preempts state laws "insofar as 
they interfere with the achievement of the purposes and the requirements 
of this chapter and the Federal program." Similarly, § 1255 (a) provides 
that no state law or regulation "shall be superseded by any provision of this 
chapter or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, except insofar as such 
State law or regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter." 
Subsection 1255 (b) explains that neither state laws that are more stringent 
than the federal standards nor state laws governing operations "for which 
no provision is contained in this chapter" are "inconsistent" with the con-
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The Surface Mining Act does not force States to choose be-
tween performing tasks set by Congress and abandoning all 
mining or land use regulation. That statute is "a program of 
cooperative federalism," 452 U. S., at 289, because it allows 
the States to choose either to work with Congress in pursuit 
of federal surface mining goals or to devote their legislative 
resources to other mining and land use problems. By con-
trast, there is nothing "cooperative," about a federal program 
that com/els state agencies either to function as
1
bureaucratic 
puppets of the federal government or to abandon regulation 
of an entire field traditionally reserved to state authority. 11 
Yet this is the "choice" the Court today forces upon the 
States. 
The Court further defends its novel decision to permit fed-
eral conscription of state legislative power by citing three 
cases that "in effect directed state decision-makers to take or 
to refrain from taking certain actions." Ante, at 18. Testa 
v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), is the most suggestive of these 
decisions. 12 In Testa, the Court held that state trial courts 
gressional Act. 
11 As one scholar has written, "[a] federal system implies a partnership, 
all members of which are effective players on the team and all of whom 
retain the capacity for independent action. It does not imply a system of 
collaboration in which one of the collaborators is annihilated by the other." 
L. White, The States and the Nation 3 (1953) (hereinafter White). 
12 The other two decisions, Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), 
and Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel Association, 443 U. S. 658 (1979), are readily distinguishable. Fry 
upheld a temporary wage freeze as applied to state and local governmental 
employees. As we subsequently observed, this emergency restraint "dis-
placed no state choices as to how governmental operations should be struc-
tured, nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. In-
stead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment 
relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during 
[a] period of ... emergency." National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 
at 853. In Washington State Fishing Vessel Association, state agencies 
were defendants to a suit charging violations of federal treaties, and we 
'· I 
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may not refuse to hear a federal claim if "th[e] same type of 
claim arising under [state] law would be enforced by that 
State's courts." I d., at 394. A facile reading of Testa might 
suggest that state legislatures must also entertain congres-
sionally sponsored business, as long as the federal duties are 
similar to existing state obligations. Application of Testa to 
legislative power, however, would expand vastly the scope of 
that decision. Because trial courts of general jurisdiction do 
not choose the cases that they hear, the requirement that 
they evenhandedly adjudicate state and federal claims falling 
within their jurisdiction does not infringe any sovereign au-
thority to set an agenda. As explained above, however, the 
power to choose subjects for legislation is a fundamental 
attribute of legislative power, and interference with this 
power unavoidably undermines state sovereignty. Accord-
ingly, the existence of a congressional authority to "enlist 
... the [state] judiciary ... to further federal ends," ante, at 
18, does not imply an equivalent power to impress state legis-
lative bodies into federal service. 
The Court, finally, reasons that, because Congress could 
have preempted the entire field of intrastate utility regula-
tion, the Constitution should not forbid PURP A's "less intru-
sive scheme." Ante, at 20 and n. 27. The majority's evalua-
tion of intrusiveness, however, is simply irrelevant to the 
constitutional inquiry. The Constitution permits Congress 
to govern only through certain channels. This Court's task 
is to enforce those limits, not to decide wh~ther alternative 
upheld the lower court's power to enforce its judgment by ordering the de-
fendants to comply with federal law. The power of a court to enjoin ad-
judicated violations of federal law, however, is far different from the power 
of Congress to demand state legislative action in the absence of any show-
ing that the State has violated existing federal duties. See Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 51~16 
(1954) (hereinafter Hart); Salmon, The Federalist Principle: The Interac-
tion of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air 
Act, 2 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 290, 334-337 (1976) (hereinafter Salmon). 
. ,
. ~· 
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courses would better serve state and federal interests. 13 I do 
not believe, moreover, that Titles I and III of PURPA are 
less intrusive than preemption. 14 When Congress preempts 
a field, it precludes only state legislation that conflicts with 
the national approach. The States usually retain the power 
to complement congressional legislation, either by regulating 
details unsupervised by Congress or by imposing require-
ments that go beyond the national threshold. 15 Most impor-
tantly, after Congress preempts a field, the States may sim-
ply devote their resources elsewhere. This country does not 
lack for problems demanding legislative attention. PURP A, 
however, drains the invept.jye epet~ of...state..governmental 
bodies by reqmrmg them to wei h its detailed standards, en-
ter WI1tt~n findings, an efend their determinations in state 
court:- -wJiile engaged in these congressionally mandated 
--tasks, state utility commissions are less able to pursue local 
proposals for conserving gas and electric power. The States 
13 Justice Harlan once commented that times of "international unrest and 
domestic uncertainty" are "bound to produce temptations and pressures to 
depart from or temporize with traditional constitutional precepts or even 
to short-cut the processes of change which the Constitution establishes." 
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Bal-
ance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943, 943 (1963) (hereinafter Harlan). Justice Harlan 
then cautioned that it "[i]s . . . the special responsibility of lawyers, 
whether on or off the bench, to see to it that such things do not happen." 
Ibid. 
14 In 1975, then Attorney General Edward H. Levi responded to a simi-
lar argument that the "greater'r power of preempb6h includes the "lesser" 
power of demanding affirmative action from state governments. Attorney 
General Levi remarked that "it is an insidious point to say that there is 
more federalism by compelling a State instrumentality to work for the Fed-
eral Government." Hearings on S. 354 before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , 503 (1975). In a similar vein, he warned 
against "lov[ing] the States to their demise." Id., at 507. 
' 5 In rare instances, Congress so occupies a field that any state regula-
tion is inconsistent with national goals. The Court, however, is reluctant 
to infer such expansive preemption "in the absence of persuasive reasons." 
Florida Lime & A vocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963) . 
? .. 
... 
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might well prefer that Congress simply impose the standards 
described in PURP A; this, at least, would leave them free to 
exercise their power in other areas. 
Federal preemption is less intrusive than PURP A's ap-
proach for a second reason. Local citizens hold their utility 
commissions accountable for the choices they make. Citi-
zens, moreover, understand that legislative authority usually 
includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as p\A.C.. 1o ~ 
which policies to adopt. Congressional compulsion of statn .J{ N.~ ~~ 1 ,. J,J._t-r 
agencies, unlike preemption, blurs the lines of political \o ~ cJ.,t.oorc-
accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their repre- ~....d" ~tAl 
sentatives are no longer responsive to local needs. 16 -\1> ()P"''. vr 7 
The foregoing remarks suggest that, far from approving a ~ " 
minimally intrusive form of federal regulation, the majority's 
decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federal-
ism. Courts and commentators frequently have recognized 
that the fift States serve as laboratories for the develop-
ment of new socia , economic, and po 1 1ca 1 eas. 17 State in-
16 See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federal-
ism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 
86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1239-1247 (1977) (hereinafter Stewart); Comment, Re-
defining the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine, 129 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1460, 1477-1478 (1981). 
Daniel Elazar, testifying before the Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations in March 1980, commented upon this problem of gar-
bled political responsibility. He suggested that national officials tend to 
force state governments to administer unpopular programs, thus transfer-
ring political liability for those programs to the States. Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations, The Federal Role in the Federal Sys-
tem: The Dynamics of Growth, Hearings on the Federal Role 32 (October 
1980). As an example, he cited the President's attempt in 1979 to force 
state governors to establish and enforce unpopular gas rationing mecha-
nisms. I d., at 85 (formal statement of Professor Elazar). 
17 See, e. g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves, Inc . 
v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 597 and 
n. 20 (1977); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hart, supra, n. 12, at 540, 542; Macmahon, The 
Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in Federalism, Mature and Emergent 
. ' 
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novation is no judicial myth. When ~oming became a 
State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women to 
vote. 18 That novel idea did not bear national fruit for an-
other thirty years. 19 vW'fsconsin pioneered unemployment in-
surance, 20 while~ssachusetts initiated minimum wage laws 
for women and minors. 21 After decades of academic de-
bate, state experimentation finally provided an opportunity 
to observe no-fault automobile insurance in operation. 22 
Even in the field of environmental protection, an area subject 
to heavy federal regulation, the States have supplemented 
national standards with innovative and far-reaching stat-
utes. 23 Utility regulation itself is a field marked by valuable 
state invention. 24 PURP A, which commands state agencies 
3, 11}--11 (A. Macmahon, ed. 1955); N. Rockefeller, The Future of Federal-
ism S-9 (1962) (hereinafter Rockefeller); Stewart, supra, n. 16, at 1210; 
White, supra, n. 11, at 46-47. 
18 Wyoming's policy followed a practice it had adopted as a territory. 
Compare Act of Jan. 21, 1891, ch. 100, § 4, 1891}--1891 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
394, with Act of March 14, 1890, ch. 80, § 5, 1890 Sess. Laws Wyo. Terri-
tory 157. See generally C. Beard & M. Beard, The Rise of American Civi-
lization 563 (rev. ed. 1937). 
19 The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibits abridgement 
of the right to vote "on account of sex." 
20 See Act of Jan. 28, 1932, ch. 20, 1931-1932 Wis. Laws 57; Act of June 
1, 1933, ch. 186, 1933 Wis. Laws 448; Act of June 2, 1933, ch. 194, 1933 
Wis. Laws 491; W. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, 1932-1940, p. 130 (1963); Rockefeller, supra, n. 17, at 16. 
21 See Act of June 4, 1912, ch. 706, 1912 Mass. Acts 780; R. Morris, 
Encyclopedia of American History 768 (bicentennial ed. 1976). 
22 See C. Morris & C. Morris, Jr., Morris on Torts 244-245 (2d ed. 1980); 
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L.J. 1019, 1034 (1977). 
23 Florida, for example, has enacted particularly strict legislation against 
oil spills. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-.21 (1974 ed. and Supp. 1982). This 
Court upheld that legislation in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 
Inc., 411 U. S. 325 (1973). 
24 See Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 
489 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Long before the Federal Government 
could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative 
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to spend their time evaluating federally proposed standards 
and defending their decisions to adopt or reject those stand-
ards, will retard this creative experimentation. 
In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism en-
hances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in repre-
sentative government. Alexis de Tocqueville understood 
well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of 
American democracy: 
"It is incontestably true that the love and habits of re-
publican government in the United States were engen-
dered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies. 
[l]t is this same republican spirit, it is these man-
ners and actions of a free people, which are engendered 
and nurtured in the different States, to be afterwards 
applied to the country at large." 1 A. de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America 149-150 (H. Reeve trans. 1966). 25 
Citizens, however, cannot learn the lessons of self-govern-
ment if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals 
formulated by a far-away national legislature. If we want to 
preserve the ability of citizens to learn democratic processes 
through participation in local government, local citizens must 
retain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local 
problems. 
Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on 
governmental power. As ustice Irar a once explained, our 
ancestors "were suspicious f every form of all-powerful cen-
and almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their 
experiences"). 
25 See also Stewart, supra, n. 16, at 1210--1211, n. 62 (quoting Ignazio Si-
lone) ("The first test to be applied in judging an alleged democracy is the 
degree of self-governing attained by its local institutions. If ... the prov-
ince is governed by the representative of the central government, there 
can be no true and complete democracy. Only local government can accus-
tom men to responsibility and independence, and enable them to take part 
in the wider life of the state"). 
,.j.( 
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tral authority." Harlan, supra n. 13, at 944. To curb this 
evil, they both allocated governmental power between state 
and national authorities, and divided the national power 
among three branches of government. Unless we zealously 
protect these distinctions, we risk upsetting the balance of 
power that buttresses our basic liberties. While analyzing 
this brake on governmental power, Justice Harlan noted that 
"[t]he diffusion of power between federaland state authority 
. . . takes on added significance as the size of the federal bu-
reaucracy continues to grow." I bid. 26 Today, the Court dis-
regards this warning and permits Congress to kidnap state 
utility commissions into the national regulatory family. 
Whatever the merits of our national energy legislation, I am 
not ready to surrender this state legislative power to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
II 
As explained above, the majority's decision to uphold Ti-
tles I and III violates the principles of National League of 
Cities and threatens the values promoted by our federal sys-
tem. The majority's result, moreover, is j.s/at odds with our 
constitutional history, which demonstrates that the ramers 
consciOusly rejected a system in which the national legisla-
ture would achieve its ends by controlling state legislative 
power. 
The principal defect of the Articles of Confederation, eigh-
teenth century writers agreed, was that the new national 
government lacked the power to compel individual action. 
Instead, the central government had to rely upon the cooper-
ation of state legislatures to achieve national goals. · Thus, 
Alexander Hamilton explained that: "The great and radical 
vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the 
principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERN-
26 See also Stewart, supra, n. 16, at 1241-1244 (discussing "political safe-
guards of federalism") ; Rockefeller, supra, n. 17, at 10. 
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MENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPAC-
ITIES and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS 
of whom they consist." The Federalist No. 15, p. 93 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961). He pointed out, for example, that the na-
tional government had "an indefinite discretion to make req-
uisitions for men and money," but "no authority to raise ei-
ther by regulations extending to the individual citizens of 
America." Ibid. 
The Constitution cured this defect by permitting direct 
contact between the national government and the individual 
citizen, a change repeatedly acknowledged by the delegates 
assembled in Philadelphia. George Mason, for example, de-
clared that: 
"Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent[s] 
the States not the people of the States: their acts operate 
on the States not on the individuals. The case will be 
changed in the new plan of Government." 1 The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 133 (M. 
Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand) (abbreviations 
expanded in this and subsequent quotations). 
Alexander Hamilton subsequently explained to the people of 
New York that the Constitution marked the "difference be-
tween a league and a government," because it "extend[ed] 
the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens,-the 
only proper objects of government." The Federalist No. 15, 
p. 95. Similarly, Charles Pinckney told the South Carolina 
House of Representatives that "the necessity of having a 
government which should at once operate upon the people, 
and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by 
every delegation present; . . . however they may have dif-
fered with respect to the quantum of power, no objection was 
made to the system itself." 4 Elliot's Debates 256. 
The speeches and writings of the Framers suggest why 
they adopted this means of strengthening the national gov-
ernment. Mason, for example, told the Convention that be-
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cause "punishment could not [in the nature of things be exe-
cuted on] the States collectively," he advocated a national 
government that would "directly operate on individuals." 1 
Farrand 34. Hamilton predicted that a national government 
forced to work through the States could only "degenerate 
into a military despotism." The Federalist No. 16, p. 101 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961). This was so because a national government 
could enforce its will against the States only by maintaining a 
"large army, continually on foot to execute the ordinary req-
uisitions or decrees of the government." Ibid. See also id., 
at 102; The Federalist No. 15, pp. 95-96. 
Thus, the Framers concluded that government by one sov-
ereign through the agency of a second cannot be satisfactory. 
At one extreme, as under the Articles of Confederation, such 
a system is simply ineffective. At the other, it requires a 
degree of military force incompatible with stable government 
and civil liberty. 27 For this reason, the Framers concluded 
that "the execution of the laws of the national government 
... should not require the intervention of the State Legisla-
tures," The Federalist No. 16, p. 103, and abandoned the 
Articles of Confederation in favor of direct national 
legislation. 
At the same time that the members of the Constitutional 
Convention fashioned this principle, they rejected two pro-
posals that would have given the national legislature direct 
power to control state governments. The first proposal 
would have authorized Congress "to call forth the force of the 
27 Henry M. Hart, Jr., agreed that the Framers were well aware "of the 
delicacy, and the difficulties of enforcement, of affirmative mandates from 
a federal government to the governments of the member states." Hart, 
supra, n. 12, at 515. Until the second half of this century, congressional 
regulation apparently heeded this wisdom. "Federal law," Hart observed 
in 1954, "often says to the states, 'Don't do any of these things,' leaving 
outside the scope of its prohibition a wide range of alternative courses of 
action. But it is illuminating to observe how rarely it says, 'Do this thing,' 
leaving no choice but to go ahead and do it." Ibid. 
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Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its 
duty under the articles thereof." 1 Farrand 21. The dele-
gates never even voted on this suggestion. Madison moved 
to postpone it, stating that "the more he reflected on the use 
of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice 
and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and 
not individually." ld., at 54. Several other delegates ech-
oed his concerns, 28 and Madison ultimately reported that 
"[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, 
for the States as political bodies [has] been exploded on all 
hands." 2 Farrand 9. 
The second proposal received more favorable consider-
ation. Governor Randolph suggested that Congress should 
have the power "to negative all laws passed by the several 
States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legisla-
ture the articles of Union." 1 Farrand 21. On May 31, 
1787, the Committee of the Whole approved this proposal 
without debate. Id., at 61. A week later, Pinckney moved 
to extend the congressional negative to all state laws 
"which [Congress] should judge to be improper." ld., at 
164. Numerous delegates criticized this attempt to give 
Congress unbounded control over state lawmaking. Hugh 
Williamson, for example, thought "the State Legislatures 
ought to possess independent powers in cases purely local," 
id., at 171, while Elbridge Gerry thought Pinckney's idea 
might "enslave the States." I d., at 165. After much de-
bate, the Convention rejected Pinckney's suggestion. 
Late in July, the delegates reversed their approval of even 
Randolph's more moderate congressional veto. Several del-
28 Randolph, for example, opposed a similar proposal for national coercion 
on the ground that it was "impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals." 
Instead, he advocated "resort ... to a national Legislation over individ-
uals. " 1 Farrand 256 (emphasis deleted). Mason eloquently argued that 
"[t]he most jarring elements of nature; fire & water themselves are not 
more incompatible that [si c] such a mixture of civil liberty and.,military exe-
cution." Id. , at 339. 
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egates now concluded that the negative would be "terrible to 
the States," "unnecessary," and "improper." 2 Farrand 27. 29 
Omission of the negative, however, left the new system with-
out an effective means of adjusting conflicting state and na-
tional laws. To remedy this defect, the delegates adopted 
the Supremacy Clause, providing that the federal Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land" 
and that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." 
Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers substituted judicial re-
view of state laws for congressional control of state 
legislatures. 
While this history demonstrates the Framers' commitment 
to a strong central government, the means that they adopted 
to achieve that end are as instructive as the end itself. 30 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national legislature 
operated through the States. The Framers could have forti-
fied the central government, while still maintaining the same 
system, if they had increased Congress' power to demand 
obedience from state legislatures. In time, this scheme 
might have relegated the States to mere departments of the 
national government, a status the Court appears to endorse 
29 Thomas Jefferson disapproved of the congressional veto as soon as he 
heard of it. Writing to Madison from Paris, he declared: "The negative 
proposed to be given [the national legislators] on all the acts of the several 
Legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind. Prima facie I 
do not like it." C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 168 (1937) 
(hereinafter Warren). Notably, Jefferson suggested that "an appeal from 
the State Judicatures to a Federal Court, in all cases where the Act of Con-
federation controuled the question, [would] be as effectual a remedy." 
Id., at 168-169. 
30 Experience under the Articles of Confederation taught the Framers 
that multiple state legislatures, unchecked by any central power, 
"threat[en] danger not to the harmony only, but to the tranquillity of the 
Union." Warren, supra, n. 29, at 166 (quoting Madison). My analysis 
of the Framers' intent does not detract from the proper role of federal 
power in a federalist system, but merely requires the exercise of that 
power in a manner that does not destroy state independence. 
. 
' .. 
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today. The Framers, however, eschewed this course. 
They permitted Congress to pass laws directly affecting indi-
viduals, and rejected proposals that would have given Con-
gress military or legislative power over state governments. 
In this way, the Framers established independent state and 
national sovereigns. Each government retained the power 
to pursue its own ends, subject only to the Constitution and 
the restraints of judicial review. 31 The product of the Con-
stitutional Convention, I believe, is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with a system in which either Congress or a state legisla-
ture harnesses the legislative powers of the other sovereign. 32 
3
' This Court quickly recognized that Congress' strength derives from its 
own enumerated powers, not from the ability to direct state legislatures. 
In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the historic decision af-
firming Congress' power to establish a national bank, Chief Justice Mar-
shall declared: "No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to 
create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states, 
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are ade-
quate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the 
accomplishment of its ends." I d., at 424 (emphasis added). See also S. 
Davis, The Federal Principle 114 (1978) (after examining history of Con-
stitutional Convention, "only the principle of duality articulated in a single 
constitutional system of two distinct governments, national and state, each 
acting in its own right, each acting directly on individuals, and each quali-
fied master of a limited domain of action, stands out as the clearest fact"); 
Salmon, supra, n. 12, at 359 (discussing history of Constitutional Conven-
tion and concluding that substitution of Supremacy Clause for negative on 
state laws "evidenced the clear distinction in [the Framers'] minds between 
the supremacy of the nation, which they approved, and the power of the 
nation to control the functioning of the states, which they rejected"). 
32 After the Convention, several thinkers suggested that the national 
government might rely upon state officers to perform some of its tasks. 
Madison, for example, thought that Congress might rely upon state offi-
cials to collect national revenue. The Federalist No. 45, pp. 312-313 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961). None of these suggestions, however, went so far as to 
propose congressional control of state legislative power. The suggestions, 
moreover, seemed to assume that the States would consent to national use 
of their officials. See also W. Anderson, The Nation and the States, Ri-
vals or Partners? 8&-87 (1955) (noting that First Congress rejected propos-
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III 
During his last Term of service on this Court, Justice Black 
eloquently explained that our notions of federalism subordi-
nate neither national nor state interests: 
"The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' 
Rights' any more than it means centralization of control 
over every important issue in our National Government 
and its ,courts. The Framers rejected both these 
courses. What the concept does represent is a system 
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of 
both State and National Governments, and in which the 
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindi-
cate and protect federal rights and federal interests, al-
ways endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly in-
terfere with the legitimate activities of the States." 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971). 
In this case, I firmly believe that a proper "sensitivity to the 
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments" 
requires invalidation of Titles I and III of PURP A insofar as 
they apply to "state regulatory authorities." Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to uphold those 
portions of the statute. 
als to rely upon state officials to enforce federal law and suggesting that 
this decision to leave "the states free to work out, and to concentrate their 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1749 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ET 
AL., APPELLANTS, v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JusTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part in the judgment 
and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the Court that the Commerce Clause sup-
ported Congress' enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(PURPA). I disagree, however, with much of the Court's 
Tenth Amendment analysis. Titles I and III of PURP A con-
script state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic 
army. This result is contrary to the principles of National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), antithetical 
to the values of federalism, and inconsistent with our con-
stitutional history. Accordingly, I dissent from subsections 
IVB and C of the Court's opinion. 1 
'I concur in the Court's decision to uphold Title II, § 210 of PURP A 
against appellees' facial attack. As the Court explains, part of that section 
permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to exempt 
cogeneration and small power production facilities from otherwise appli-
cable state and federal laws. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (e) (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV). This exemption authority does not violate the Tenth Amendment, 
for it merely preempts state control of private conduct, rather than regu-
lating the "States as States." See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 (1981). 
Section 210's requirement that the States "implement" rules promul-
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I 
Titles I and III of PURP A require state regulatory agen-
cies to decide whether to adopt a dozen federal standards 
governing gas and electric utilities. 2 The statute describes, 
in some detail, the procedures state authorities must follow 
when evaluating these standards,3 but does not compel the 
States to adopt the suggested federal standards. 15 
gated by the Secretary of Energy, 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (f) (1976 ed., Supp. 
IV), is more disturbing. Appellants, however, have interpreted this statu-
tory obligation to include "an undertaking to resolve disputes between 
qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [§ 210], or any other 
action reasonably designed to implement [that section]." 18 CFR 
§ 292.401 (a) (1981). It appears, therefore, that state regulatory authori-
ties may satisfy § 210's implementation requirement simply by adjudicating 
private disputes arising under that section. As the Court points out, ante, 
at 16-17, the Mississippi Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over 
similar state disputes, and it is settled that a State may not exercise its 
judicial power in a manner that discriminates between analogous federal 
and state causes of action. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947). 
Under these circumstances, but without foreclosing the possibility that 
particular applications of § 210's implementation provision might uncover 
hidden constitutional defects, I would not sustain appellees' facial attack on 
the provision. 
Section 210 also authorizes FERC, electric utilities, cogenerators, and 
small power producers to "enforce" the above implementation provision 
against state utility commissions. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (h) (2) (1976 ed., 
Supp. IV). As applied, it is conceivable that this enforcement provision 
would raise troubling federalism issues. Once again, however, I decline to 
accept appellees' facial challenge to the provision, preferring to consider 
the constitutionality of this provision in the setting of a concrete 
controversy. 
2 The statute imposes the same requirements upon nonregulated utili-
ties. In this respect, it regulates purely private conduct and does not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment. Throughout this dissent, I consider only the 
constitutionality of Titles I and III as applied to state regulatory authori-
ties. I would allow the District Court, on remand, to decide whether the 
constitutionally defective aspects of Titles I and III are severable from the 
unobjectionable portions. 
3 See ante, at 4-6. The Court overlooks several of PURPA's proce-
dural mandates. For example, with respect to six of the standards, the 
' ,. 
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U.S. C. §3203 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U. S. C. §§2621 
(a), 2623 (a), 2627 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The latter, de-
ceptively generous feature of PURP A persuades the Court 
that the statute does not intrude impermissibly into state 
sovereign functions. The Court's conclusion, however, rests 
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that state 
governments play in our federalist system. 
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field of-
fices of the national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks 
to which Congress may assign problems for extended study. 
Instead, each State is sovereign within its own domain, gov-
erning its citizens and providing for their general welfare. 
While the Constitution and federal statutes define the bound-
aries of that domain, they do not harness state power for na-
tional purposes. The Constitution contemplates "an inde-
structible Union, composed of indestructible States," a 
system in which both the state and national governments re-
tain a "separate and independent existence." Texas v. 
White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). 
Adhering to these principles, the Court has recognized that 
the Tenth Amendment restrains congressional action that 
would impair "a State's ability to function as a State." 
state agency must publish a written determination, including findings, 
even if it decides to adopt the federal standard. 16 U. S. C. § 2621 (b) 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV). In addition, PURPA guarantees certain rights to dis-
cover information, § 2631 (b); requires the State to provide transcripts, at 
the cost of reproduction, to parties to ratemaking proceedings or other 
"regulatory proceeding[s] relating to [electric utility] rates or rate design," 
§ 2632 (c); and, under some circumstances, mandates compensation for rea-
sonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other costs to consumers 
who contribute substantially to the adoption of a Title I standard, § 2632 
(a), (b). These requirements, as well as the ones described by the Court, 
may impose special burdens on state administrative agencies. I do not 
weigh the constitutionality of these individual procedural requirements, 
however, because I would invalidate the entire regimen that Titles I and 
III impose on state regulatory authorities. 
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United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. --, -- (1982); National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 833, 842-852 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542, 547, n. 7 (1975). See also City of Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 423-424 (1978) 
(THE CHIEF JUSTICE, concurring in the judgment). For ex-
ample, in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, the 
Court held that Congress could not prescribe the minimum 
wages and maximum hours of state employees engaged in 
"traditional governmental functions," id., at 852, because the 
power to set those wages and hours is an "attribute of state 
sovereignty" that is "essential to [a] separate and independ-
ent existence." Id., at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 
supra, at 76). 
Just last Term this Court identified three separate inqui-
ries underlying the result in National League of Cities. A 
congressional enactment violates the Tenth Amendment, we 
observed, if it regulates the "'States as States,'" addresses 
"matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty,'" and "directly impair[s] [the States'] ability to 'struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions."' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Association, 452 U. S. 264, 287-288 (1981) (quoting Na-
tional League of Cities, supra, at 854, 845, 852). See also 
United Transportation Union, supra, at --. 4 
Application of these principles to the present case reveals 
the Tenth Amendment defects in Titles I and III. Plainly 
those titles regulate the "States as States." While the stat-
ute's ultimate aim may be the regulation of private utility 
companies, PURP A addresses its commands solely to the 
'In both Hodel and United Transportation Union we further noted 
that, even when these three requirements are met, "the nature of the fed-
eral interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29; United Transportation Union, 455 U. S., 
at-, n. 9. Neither of those cases involved such an exception to Na-
tional League of Cities, and the Court has not yet explored the circum-
stances that might justify such an exception. 
~. 
. ' 
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States. Instead of requesting private utility companies to 
adopt lifeline rates, declining block rates, or the other 
PURP A standards, Congress directed state agencies to ap-
praise the appropriateness of those standards. It is diffi-
cult to argue that a statute structuring the regulatory agenda 
of a state agency is not a regulation of the "State." 
I find it equally clear that Titles I and III address 
"attribute[s] of state sovereignty." Even the Court recog-
nizes that "the power to make decisions and to set policy is 
what gives the State its sovereign nature." Ante, at 17. 
The power to make decisions and set policy, however, em-
braces more than the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also 
includes the power to decide which proposals are most wor-
thy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken 
up, and the precise form in which they should be debated. 
PURP A intrudes upon all of these functions. It chooses 
twelve proposals, forcing their consideration even if the state 
agency deems other ideas more worthy of immediate atten-
tion. In addition, PURP A hinders the agency's ability to 
schedule consideration of the federal standards. 5 Finally, 
PURP A specifies, with exacting detail, the content of the 
standards that will absorb the agency's time. 6 
5 As the Court recognizes, ante, at 5, PURPA permits "[a)ny person" 
to bring an action in state court to enforce the agency's obligation to con-
sider the federal standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3207 (b) (1) (1976 eel., Supp. 
IV); 16 U. S. C. § 2633 (c) (1) (1976 eel., Supp. IV). The Secretary of En-
ergy, moreover, may intervene in any ongoing ratemaking proceeding to 
require consideration of PURPA's standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3205 (a) (1976 
eel., Supp. IV); 16 U. S. C. §§ 2631 (a), 2622 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Title 
I grants affected utilities and consumers the same right of intervention. 
16 U. S. C. § 2631 (a) (1976 ed. , Supp. IV). Because of these rights of in-
tervention and enforcement, state agencies lack even the power to sched-
ule their consideration of PURPA's standards. 
6 For example, the proposed standards governing advertising provide 
that "No electric [or gas] utility may recover from any person other than 
the shareholders (or other owners) of such utility any direct or indirect ex-
penditure by such utility for promotional or political advertising as [fur-
ther] defined in . .. this title." 16 U. S. C. § 2623 (b) (5) (1976 eel., Supp . 
6 
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If Congress routinely required the state legislatures to de-
bate bills drafted by congressional committees, it could 
hardly be questioned that the practice would affect an 
attribute of state sovereignty. PURPA, which sets the 
agendas of agencies exercising delegated legislative power in 
a specific field, has a similarly intrusive effect. 
Finally, PURPA directly impairs the States' ability to 
"structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
IV); 15 U. S. C. § 3203 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). PURP A then defines 
the terms advertising, political advertising, and promotional advertising: 
"(1) For purposes of this section and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title-
(A) The term 'advertising' means the commercial use, by an electric util-
ity, of any media, including newspaper, printed matter, radio, and televi-
sion, in order to transmit a message to a substantial number of members of 
the public or to such utility's electric consumers. 
(B) The term 'political advertising' means any advertising for the pur-
pose of influencing public opinion with respect to legislative, adminis-
trative, or electoral matters, or with respect to any controversial issue of 
public importance. 
(C) The term 'promotional advertising' means any advertising for the 
purpose of encouraging any person to select or use the service or additional 
service of an electric utility or the selection or installation of any appliance 
or equipment designed to use such utility's service. 
"(2) For purposes of this subsection and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title, the 
terms 'political advertising' and 'promotional advertising' do not include-
(A) advertising which informs electric consumers how they can conserve 
energy or can reduce peak demand for electric energy, 
(B) advertising required by law or regulation, including advertising re-
quired under part 1 of title II of the National Energy Conservation Policy 
Act ... , 
(C) advertising regarding service interruptions, safety measures, or 
emergency conditions, 
(D) advertising concerning employment opportunities with such utility, 
(E) advertising which promotes the use of energy efficient appliances, 
equipment or services, or 
(F) any explanation or justification of existing or proposed rate sched-
ules, or notifications of hearings thereon." 16 U. S. C. § 2625 (h) (1976 
ed., Supp. IV). 
See also 15 U. S. C.§ 3204 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (containing similar pro-
visions for gas utilities). 
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mental functions." Utility regulation is a traditional func-
tion of state government, 7 and the regulatory commission is 
the most integral part of that function. By taxing the lim-
ited resources of these commissions, and decreasing their 
ability to address local regulatory ills, PURP A directly im-
pairs the power of state utility commissions to discharge 
their traditional functions efficiently and effectively. 8 
The Court sidesteps this analysis, suggesting that the 
States may escape PURP A simply by ceasing regulation of 
public utilities. Even the Court recognizes that this choice 
"may be a difficult one," ante, at 22, and that "it may be un-
likely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of 
public utilities to avoid PURP A's requirements." Ante, at 
23. In fact, the Court's "choice" is an absurdity, for if its 
analysis is sound, the Constitution no longer limits federal 
regulation of state governments. Under the Court's analy-
sis, for example, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U. S. 833 (1976), would have been wrongly decided, because 
the States could have avoided the Fair Labor Standards Act 
by "choosing" to fire all employees subject to that Act and to 
7 The Court has not explored fully the extent of "traditional" state func-
tions. Utility regulation, however, should fall within any definition of that 
term. See generally W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Indus-
tries 25-44 (2d ed. 1976) (tracing history of state regulation of utilities). 
8 PURP A thus offends each of the criteria named in Hodel. I do not 
believe, moreover, that this is a case in which "the nature of the federal 
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Seen. 
4, supra. Whatever the ultimate content of that standard, it must refer, 
not only to the weight of the asserted federal interest, but also to the ne-
cessity of vindicating that interest in a manner that intrudes upon state 
sovereignty. In this case, the Government argues that PURPA furthers 
vital national interests in energy conservation. Although the congres-
sional goal is a noble one, appellants have not shown that Congress needed 
to commandeer state utility commissions to achieve its aim. Consistent 
with the Tenth Amendment, Congress could have assigned PURPA's tasks 
to national officials. Alternatively, it could have requested state commis-
sions to comply with Titles I and III and directed the Secretary to shoulder 
the burden of any State choosing not to comply. 
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close those branches of state government. 9 Similarly, Con-
gress could dictate the agendas and meeting places of state 
legislatures, because unwilling States would remain free to 
abolish their legislative bodies. 10 I do not agree that this dis-
memberment of state government is the correct solution to a 
Tenth Amendment challenge. 
The choice put to the States by the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 
ed., Supp. III), the federal statute upheld in Hodel v. Vir-
9 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 26, n. 31, National League 
of Cities did not involve only "federal interference with the State's provi-
sion of essential services." The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act brought "almost all public employees employed by the 
States and by their various political subdivisions" within the Act's cover-
age. 426 U. S., at 836. As one of the appellants in that case stressed, the 
amendments affected the wages and hours of nonprofessional workers em-
ployed in both "governmental" and "proprietary" agencies. Brief for Ap-
pellant State of California in National League of Cities v. Usery, O.T. 
1974, Nos. 74--878, 74--879, pp. 39-48. The complaint, for example, al- I 
leged that the federal Act would affect "state and local administrative and 
regulatory agencies which enforce laws and regulations preserving the 
public health, safety and welfare, including ... licensing of occupations 
and businesses, ... preservation of environmental quality, ... [and] pro-
tection of the public against fraud and sharp practice." 1 App. inN ational 
League of Cities v. Usery, 0. T. 1974, Nos. 74--878, 74--879, p. 16. The 
Court did not intimate that, because Congress could have preempted state 
regulation of these fields, it could regulate wages and hours as a condition 
of "continued state activity in an otherwise pre-emptible field." Ante, at 
25. Instead, the Court shielded the activities that state governments per-
form "in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law 
and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851 (emphasis added). 
I am confident that, as the Court itself stresses, ante, at 2fr.26, n. 31, 
today's decision is not intended to overrule National League of Cities. 
Instead, the novelty of PURPA's scheme, see ante, at 15, merely seems to 
have obscured the relevance of National League of Cities to this case. 
'
0 But cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) ("The power to 
locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall 
be changed from one place to another . . . are essentially and peculiarly 
state powers. That one of the ... States could now be shorn of such pow-
ers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained"). 
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ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U. S. 
264 (1981), and discussed by the Court, ante, at 20--21, 24, n. 
30, is quite different from the decision PURP A mandates. 
The Surface Mining Act invites the States to submit pro-
posed surface mining regulations to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. 30 U. S. C.§ 1253 (1976 ed., Supp. III). If the Secre-
tary approves a state regulatory program, then the State 
enforces that program. If a State chooses not to submit a 
program, the Secretary develops and implements a program 
for that State. § 1254. Even States in the latter category, 
however, may supplement the Secretary's program with con-
sistent state laws. 11 The Surface Mining Act does not force ' 
States to choose between performing tasks set by Congress 
and abandoning all mining or land use regulation. That stat-
ute is "a program of cooperative federalism," Hodel, supra, 
at 289, because it allows the States to choose either to work 
with Congress in pursuit of federal surface mining goals or to 
devote their legislative resources to other mining and land 
use problems. By contrast, there is nothing "cooperative" 
about a federal program that compels state agencies either to 
function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government 
or to abandon regulation of an entire field traditionally re-
served to state authority. 12 Yet this is the "choice" the 
11 Subsection 1254 (g) of Title 30 only preempts state laws "insofar as 
they interfere with the achievement of the purposes and the requirements 
of this chapter and the Federal program." Similarly, § 1255 (a) provides 
that no state law or regulation "shall be superseded by any provision of this 
chapter or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, except insofar as such 
State law or regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter." 
Subsection 1255 (b) explains that neither state laws that are more stringent 
than the federal standards nor state laws governing operations "for which 
no provision is contained in this chapter" are "inconsistent" with the con-
gressional Act. 
12 As one scholar has written, "[a] federal system implies a partnership, 
all members of which are effective players on the team and all of whom 
retain the capacity for independent action. It does not imply a system of 
collaboration in which one of the collaborators is annihilated by the other." 
L. White, The States and the Nation 3 (1953). 
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Court today forces upon the States. 
The Court defends its novel decision to permit federal con-
scription of state legislative power by citing three cases up-
holding statutes that "in effect directed state decision-makers 
to take or to refrain from taking certain actions." Ante, at 
18. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), is the most sugges-
tive of these decisions. 13 In Testa, the Court held that state 
trial courts may not refuse to hear a federal claim if "th[e] 
same type of claim arising under [state] law would be en-
forced by that State's courts." !d., at 394. A facile reading 
of Testa might suggest that state legislatures must also en-
tertain congressionally sponsored business, as long as the 
federal duties are similar to existing state obligations. 
Application of Testa to legislative power, however, vastly ex-
pands the scope of that decision. Because trial courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction do not choose the cases that they hear, the 
requirement that they evenhandedly adjudicate state and 
18 The other two decisions, Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), 
and Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel Association, 443 U. S. 658 (1979), are readily distinguishable. Fry up-
held a temporary wage freeze as applied to state and local governmental 
employees. As we subsequently observed, this emergency restraint "dis-
placed no state choices as to how governmental operations should be struc-
tured, nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. In-
stead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment 
relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during 
[a] period of . .. emergency." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U. S. 833, 853 (1976). In Washington State Fishing Vessel Association, 
state agencies were defendants to a suit charging violations of federal trea-
ties, and we upheld the lower court's power to enforce its judgment by or-
dering the defendants to comply with federal law. The power of a court to 
enjoin adjudicated violations of federal law, however, is far different from 
the power of Congress to demand state legislative action in the absence of 
any showing that the State has violated existing federal duties. See Hart, 
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 
51fr-516 (1954); Salmon, The Federalist Principle: The Interaction of the 
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air Act, 2 
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 290, 334-337 (1976). 
J. ' 
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federal claims falling within their jurisdiction does not in-
fringe any sovereign authority to set an agenda. 14 As ex-
plained above, however, the power to choose subjects for leg-
islation is a fundamental attribute of legislative power, and 
interference with this power unavoidably undermines state 
sovereignty. Accordingly, the existence of a congressional 
authority to "enlist ... the [state] judiciary ... to further 
federal ends," ante, at 19, does not imply an equivalent I 
power to impress state legislative bodies into federal service. 
The Court, finally, reasons that because Congress could 
have preempted the entire field of intrastate utility regula-
tion, the Constitution should not forbid PURP A's "less intru-
sive scheme." Ante, at 21 and n. 29. 15 The Court's evalua-
14 The Court suggests, ante, at 19, n. 27, that the requirement that state 
courts adjudicate federal claims may, as a practical matter, undermine the 
capacity of those courts to decide state controversies. Whatever the force 
of that observation, it does not demonstrate Testa's relevance to this case. 
State legislative bodies possess at least one attribute of sovereignty, the 
power to set an agenda, that trial courts lack. This difference alone per-
suades me not to embrace the Court's expansion of Testa. 
15 The Court's suggestion is somewhat disingenuous because Congress 
concluded that federal preemption of the matters governed by Titles I and 
III would be inappropriate. The administration's original proposal, as 
well as the version of PURP A approved by the House, would have pre-
empted state law by establishing minimum federal ratemaking standards. 
See generally H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1750, pp. 63-65 (1978); S. Conf. 
Rep. No. 95-1292, pp. 63-65 (1978). The Senate Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, however, rejected this approach because: 
"the committee felt that setting minimum federal standards for utility 
rates, or mandating the use of certain costing methods for ratesetting, 
would be an unnecessary intrusion into an area which has traditionally 
been regulated by the States. It was apparent to the committee that 
many State utility commissions are currently involved in innovative 
ratemaking and are working toward the goal of conservation of energy 
through rate reform. At present, the State regulatory agencies rather 
than the Federal Government, possess the expertise to conduct the de-
tailed costing and demand studies required to implement rate structure re-
vision. Moreover, the committee recognized that rate structures must re-
·. 
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tion of intrusiveness, however, is simply irrelevant to the 
constitutional inquiry. The Constitution permits Congress 
to govern only through certain channels. If the Tenth 
Amendment principles articulated in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), and Hodel v. Virginia Sur- l 
face Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U. S. 264 
(1981), foreclose PURP A's approach, it is no answer to argue 
that Congress could have reached the same destination by a 
different route. This Court's task is to enforce constitutional 
limits on congressional power, not to decide whether alterna-
tive courses would better serve state and federal interests. 16 
I do not believe, moreover, that Titles I and III of PURPA 
are less intrusive than preemption. 17 When Congress pre-
fleet the individual needs and local peculiarities of each utilities' service 
area . . . . Finally the committee felt that the potential uncertainty and 
delays accompanying Federal regulation threatened to have an adverse im-
pact on the financial health of the utility industry which outweighed the 
projected savings in capital expenditures claimed by supporters of the ad-
ministration's proposal." S. Rep. No. 95-442, p. 9 (1977). 
See also 123 Cong. Rec. 32392-32393 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Johnston); 
id., at 32394 (remarks of Sen. Domenici). The Senate version of PURPA, 
accordingly, eschewed the preemption route. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
95-1750, pp. 65--66 (1978); S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1292, pp. 65--66 (1978). 
While the Conferees produced a compromise bill, they too stopped short of 
preemption. Today's decision, therefore, permits Congress to set state 
legislative agendas in a field that Congress might have occupied but ex-
pressly found unsuited to preemption. 
16 Justice Harlan once commented that times of "international unrest and 
domestic uncertainty" are "bound to produce temptations and pressures to 
depart from or temporize with traditional constitutional precepts or even 
to short-cut the processes of change which the Constitution establishes." 
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Bal-
ance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943, 943 (1963). Justice Harlan then cautioned that it 
"[i]s ... the special responsibility of lawyers, whether on or off the bench, 
to see to it that such things do not happen." Ibid. 
17 In 1975, then Attorney General Edward H. Levi responded to a simi-
lar argument that the "greater" power of preemption includes the "lesser" 
power of demanding affirmative action from state governments. Attorney 
General Levi remarked that "it is an insidious point to say that there is 
., 
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empts a field, it precludes only state legislation that conflicts 
with the national approach. The States usually retain the 
power to complement congressional legislation, either by 
regulating details unsupervised by Congress or by imposing 
requirements that go beyond the national threshold. 18 Most 
importantly, after Congress preempts a field, the States may 
simply devote their resources elsewhere. This country does 
not lack for problems demanding legislative attention. 
PURPA, however, drains the inventive energy of state gov-
ernmental bodies by requiring them to weigh its detailed 
standards, enter written findings, and defend their deter-
minations in state court. While engaged in these congressio-
nally mandated tasks, state utility commissions are less able 
to pursue local proposals for conserving gas and electric 
power. The States might well prefer that Congress simply 
impose the standards described in PURP A; this, at least, 
would leave them free to exercise their power in other areas. 
Federal preemption is less intrusive than PURP A's ap-
proach for a second reason. Local citizens hold their utility 
commissions accountable for the choices they make. Citi-
zens, moreover, understand that legislative authority usually 
includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as 
which policies to adopt. Congressional compulsion of state 
agencies, unlike preemption, blurs the lines of political 
accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their repre-
sentatives are no longer responsive to local needs. 19 
more federalism by compelling a State instrumentality to work for the Fed-
eral Government." Hearings on S. 354 before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, 94th Con g., 1st Sess., 503 (1975). In a similar vein, he warned 
against "lov[ing] the States to their demise." ld., at 507. 
'" In rare instances, Congress so occupies a field that any state regula-
tion is inconsistent with national goals. The Court, however, is reluctant 
to infer such expansive preemption "in the absence of persuasive reasons." 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul , 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963). 
'
9 See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federal-
ism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 
86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1239--1247 (1977); Comment, Redefining the National 
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The foregoing remarks suggest that, far from approving a 
minimally intrusive form of federal regulation, the Court's 
decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federal-
ism. Courts and commentators frequently have recognized 
that the fifty States serve as laboratories for the develop-
ment of new social, economic, and political ideas. 20 This 
state innovation is no judicial myth. When Wyoming be-
came a State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women 
to vote. 21 That novel idea did not bear national fruit for an-
other thirty years. 22 Wisconsin pioneered unemployment in-
surance,23 while Massachusetts initiated minimum wage laws 
League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1460, 
1477-1478 (1981). . 
Daniel Elazar, testifying before the Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations in March 1980, commented upon this problem of gar-
bled political responsibility. He suggested that national officials tend to 
force state governments to administer unpopular programs, thus transfer-
ring political liability for those programs to the States. Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations, The Federal Role in the Federal Sys-
tem: The Dynamics of Growth, Hearings on the Federal Role, p. 32 
(October 1980). As an example, he cited the President's attempt in 1979 
to force state governors to establish and enforce unpopular gas rationing 
mechanisms. I d., at 85 (formal statement of Professor Elazar). 
20 See, e. g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves, Inc. 
v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 597 and 
n. 20 (1977); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hart, supra, n. 12, at 540, 542; Macmahon, The 
Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in Federalism, Mature and Emergent 
3, 10--11 (A. Macmahon, ed. 1955); N. Rockefeller, The Future of Federal-
ism 8-9 (1962); Stewart, supra n. 19, at 1210; White, supra n. 12, at 46-47. 
21 Wyoming's policy followed a practice it had adopted as a territory. 
Compare Act of Jan. 21, 1891, ch. 100, § 4, 1890--1891 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
394, with Act of March 14, 1890, ch. 80, § 5, 1890 Sess. Laws Wyo. Terri-
tory 157. See generally C. Beard & M. Beard, The Rise of American Civi-
lization 563 (rev. ed. 1937). 
22 The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibits abridgement 
of the right to vote "on account of sex." 
:?;! See Act of Jan. 28, 1932, ch. 20, 1931-1932 Wis. Laws 57; Act of June 
1, 1933, ch. 186, 1933 Wis. Laws 448; Act of June 2, 1933, ch. 194, 1933 
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for women and minors. 24 After decades of academic debate, 
state experimentation finally provided an opportunity to ob-
serve no-fault automobile insurance in operation. 25 Even in 
the field of environmental protection, an area subject to 
heavy federal regulation, the States have supplemented na-
tional standards with innovative and far-reaching statutes. 26 
Utility regulation itself is a field marked by valuable state in-
vention. 27 PURP A, which commands state agencies to 
spend their time evaluating federally proposed standards and 
defending their decisions to adopt or reject those standards, 
will retard this creative experimentation. 
In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism en-
hances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in repre-
sentative government. Alexis de Tocqueville understood 
well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of 
American democracy: 
"It is incontestably true that the love and the habits of 
republican government in the United States were engen-
dered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies. 
[l]t is this same republican spirit, it is these man-
ners and customs of a free people, which are engendered 
Wis. Laws 491; W. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, 1932- 1940, p. 130 (1963); Rockefeller, supra n. 20, at 16. 
24 See Act of June 4, 1912, ch. 706, 1912 Mass. Acts 780; R. Morris, 
Encyclopedia of American History 768 (bicentennial ed. 1976). 
25 See C. Morris & C. Morris, Jr., Morris on Torts 244-245 (2d ed. 1980); 
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L.J. 1019, 1034 (1977). 
26 Florida, for example, has enacted particularly strict legislation against 
oil spills. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-.21 (1974 ed. and Supp. 1982). This 
Court upheld that legislation in A skew v. A merican Waterways Operators, 
Inc. , 411 U. S. 325 (1973). 
27 See Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 
489 (1950) (Jackson, J ., dissenting) ("Long before the Federal Government 
could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative 
and almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their 
experiences"). 
16 
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and nurtured in the different States, to be afterwards 
applied to the country at large." 1 A. de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America 181 (H. Reeve trans. 1961). 28 
Citizens, however, cannot learn the lessons of self-govern-
ment if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals 
formulated by a far-away national legislature. If we want to 
preserve the ability of citizens to learn democratic processes 
through participation in local government, citizens must re-
tain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local 
problems. 
Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on 
governmental power. As Justice Harlan once explained, our 
ancestors "were suspicious of every form of all-powerful cen-
tral authority." Harlan, supra n. 16, at 944. To curb this 
evil, they both allocated governmental power between state 
and national authorities, and divided the national power 
among three branches of government. Unless we zealously 
protect these distinctions, we risk upsetting the balance of 
power that buttresses our basic liberties. In analyzing this 
brake on governmental power, Justice Harlan noted that 
"[t]he diffusion of power between federal and state authority 
. . . takes on added significance as the size of the federal bu-
reaucracy continues to grow." Ibid. 29 Today, the Court dis-
regards this warning and permits Congress to kidnap state 
utility commissions into the national regulatory family. 
Whatever the merits of our national energy legislation, I am 
28 See also I. Silone, The School for Dictators 119 (W. Weaver trans. 
1963) ("A regime of freedom should receive its lifeblood from the self-gov-
ernment of local institutions. When democracy, driven by some of its 
baser tendencies, suppresses such autonomies, it is only devouring itself. 
If in the factory the master's word is law, if bureaucracy takes over the 
trade union, if the central government's representative runs the city and 
the province, ... then you can no longer speak of democracy"). 
29 See also Stewart, supra, n. 19, at 1241-1244 (discussing "political safe-
guards of federalism"); Rockefeller, supra n. 20, at 10. 
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not ready to surrender this state legislative power to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
II 
As explained above, the Court's decision to uphold Titles I 
and III violates the principles of National League of Cities 
and threatens the values promoted by our federal system. 
The Court's result, moreover, is at odds with our constitu-
tional history, which demonstrates that the Framers con-
sciously rejected a system in which the national legislature \ 
would employ state legislative power to achieve national 
ends. 
The principal defect of the Articles of Confederation, eigh-
teenth century writers agreed, was that the new National 
Government lacked the power to compel individual action. 
Instead, the central government had to rely upon the cooper-
ation of state legislatures to achieve national goals. Thus, 
Alexander Hamilton explained that: "The great and radical 
vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the 
principle of legislation for states or governments, in their cor-
porate or collective capacities and as contradistinguished 
from the individuals of whom they consist." The Federalist 
No. 15, p. 93 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted). He 
pointed out, for example, that the National Government had 
"an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and 
money," but "no authority to raise either by regulations ex-
tending to the individual citizens of America." Ibid. 
The Constitution cured this defect by permitting direct 
contact between the National Government and the individual 
citizen, a change repeatedly acknowledged by the delegates 
assembled in Philadelphia. George Mason, for example, de-
clared that: 
"Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent[s] 
the States not the people of the States: their acts operate 
on the States not on the individuals. The case will be 
18 
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changed in the new plan of Government." 1 The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 133 (M. 
Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand) (abbreviations 
expanded in this and subsequent quotations). 
Hamilton subsequently explained to the people of New York 
that the Constitution marked the "difference between a 
league and a government," because it "extend[ed] the author-
ity of the union to the persons of the citizens,-the only 
proper objects of government." The Federalist No. 15, p. 
95. Similarly, Charles Pinckney told the South Carolina 
House of Representatives that "the necessity of having a 
government which should at once operate upon the people, 
and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by 
every delegation present; ... however they may have dif-
fered with respect to the quantum of power, no objection was 
made to the system itself." 4 Elliot's Debates 256. 
The speeches and writings of the Framers suggest why 
they adopted this means of strengthening the National Gov-
ernment. Mason, for example, told the Convention that be-
cause "punishment could not [in the nature of things be exe-
cuted on] the States collectively," he advocated a National 
Government that would "directly, operate on individuals." 1 
Farrand 34. Hamilton predicted that a National Govern-
ment forced to work through the States would "degenerate 
into a military despotism" because it would have to maintain 
a "large army, continually on foot" to enforce its will against 
the States. The Federalist No. 16, p. 101 (J. Cooke ed. 
1961). See also id., at 102; The Federalist No. 15, pp. 95-96. 
Thus, the Framers concluded that government by one sov-
ereign through the agency of a second cannot be satisfactory. 
At one extreme, as under the Articles of Confederation, such 
a system is simply ineffective. At the other, it requires a 
degree of military force incompatible with stable government 
and civilliberty. 3° For this reason, the Framers concluded 
30 Henry M. Hart, Jr., agreed that the Framers were well aware "of the 
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that "the execution of the laws of the national government 
... should not require the intervention of the State Legisla-
tures," The Federalist No. 16, p. 103, and abandoned the 
Articles of Confederation in favor of direct national 
legislation. 
At the same time that the members of the Constitutional 
Convention fashioned this principle, they rejected two pro-
posals that would have given the national legislature power 
to supervise directly state governments. The first proposal 
would have authorized Congress "to call forth the force of the 
Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its 
duty under the articles thereof." 1 Farrand 21. The dele-
gates never even voted on this suggestion. James Madison 
moved to postpone it, stating that "the more he reflected on 
the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the 
justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collec-
tively and not individually." !d., at 54. Several other dele-
gates echoed his concerns, 31 and Madison ultimately reported 
that "[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanc-
tions, for the States as political bodies [has] been exploded on 
all hands." 2 Farrand 9. 
The second proposal received more favorable consider-
delicacy, and the difficulties of enforcement, of affirmative mandates from 
a federal government to the governments of the member states." Hart, 
supra n. 13, at 515. Until the second half of this century, Congress appar-
ently heeded this wisdom. "Federal law," Hart observed in 1954, "often 
says to the states, 'Don't do any of these things,' leaving outside the scope 
of its prohibition a wide range of alternative courses of action. But it is 
illuminating to observe how rarely it says, 'Do this thing,' leaving no choice 
but to go ahead and do it." Ibid. 
31 Governor Randolph of Virginia, for example, opposed a similar pro-
posal for national coercion on the grounds that it was "impracticable, ex-
pensive, [and] cruel to individuals." Instead, he advocated "resort ... to 
a national Legislation over individuals." 1 Farrand 256 (emphasis de-
leted). Mason eloquently argued that "[t]he most jarring elements of na-
ture; fire & water themselves are not more incompatible that [sic] such a 
mixture of civil liberty and military execution." I d., at 339. 
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ation. Virginia's Governor Randolph suggested that Con-
gress should have the power "to negative all laws passed by 
the several States, contravening in the opinion of the N a-
tiona! Legislature the articles of Union." 1 Farrand 21. On 
May 31, 1787, the Committee of the Whole approved this pro-
posal without debate. ld., at 61. A week later, Pinckney 
moved to extend the congressional negative to all state laws 
"which [Congress] should judge to be improper." ld., at 
164. Numerous delegates criticized this attempt to give 
Congress unbounded control over state lawmaking. Hugh 
Williamson, for example, thought "the State Legislatures 
ought to possess independent powers in cases purely local," 
id., at 171, while Elbridge Gerry thought Pinckney's idea 
might "enslave the States." I d., at 165. After much de-
bate, the Convention rejected Pinckney's suggestion. 
Late in July, the delegates reversed their approval of even 
Randolph's more moderate congressional veto. Several del-
egates now concluded that the negative would be "terrible to 
the States," "unnecessary," and "improper." 2 Farrand 27. 32 
Omission of the negative, however, left the new system with-
out an effective means of adjusting conflicting state and na-
tional laws. To remedy this defect, the delegates adopted 
the Supremacy Clause, providing that the federal Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land" 
and that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." 
Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers substituted judicial re-
view of state laws for congressional control of state 
32 Thomas Jefferson disapproved of the congressional veto as soon as he 
heard of it. Writing to Madison from Paris, he declared: "The negative 
proposed to be given [the national legislators] on all the acts of the several 
Legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind. Prima facie I 
do not like it." C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 168 (1937). 
Notably, Jefferson suggested that "an appeal from the State Judicatures to 
a Federal Court, in all cases where the Act of Confederation controuled the 
question, [would] be as effectual a remedy." Id., at 168-169. 
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legislatures. 
While this history demonstrates the Framers' commitment 
to a strong central government, the means that they adopted 
to achieve that end are as instructive as the end itself. 33 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national legislature 
operated through the States. The Framers could have forti-
fied the central government, while still maintaining the same 
system, if they had increased Congress' power to demand 
obedience from state legislatures. In time, this scheme 
might have relegated the States to mere departments of the 
National Government, a status the Court appears to endorse 
today. The Framers, however, eschewed this course, choos-
ing instead to allow Congress to pass laws directly affecting 
individuals, and rejecting proposals that would have given 
Congress military or legislative power over state govern-
ments. In this way, the Framers established independent 
state and national sovereigns. The National Government re-
ceived the power to enact its own laws and to enforce those 
laws over conflicting state legislation. The States retained 
the power to govern as sovereigns in fields that Congress 
cannot or will not preempt. 34 This product of the Constitu-
33 Experience under the Articles of Confederation taught the Framers 
that multiple state legislatures, unchecked by any central power, 
"threat[ en] danger not to the harmony only, but to the tranquillity of the 
Union." C. Warren, supra n. 32, at 166 (quoting Madison). My analysis 
of the Framers' intent does not detract from the proper role of federal 
power in a federalist system, but merely requires the exercise of that 
power in a manner that does not destroy state independence. 
34 This Court quickly recognized that Congress' strength derives from its 
own enumerated powers, not from the ability to direct state legislatures. 
In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the historic decision af-
firming Congress' power to establish a national bank, Chief Justice Mar-
shall declared: "No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to 
create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states, 
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are ade-
quate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the 
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tional Convention, I believe, is fundamentally inconsistent 
with a system in which either Congress or a state legislature 
harnesses the legislative powers of the other sovereign. 35 
III 
During his last Term of service on this Court, Justice Black 
eloquently explained that our notions of federalism subordi-
nate neither national nor state interests: 
"The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' 
Rights' any more than it means centralization of control 
over every important issue in our National Government 
and its courts. The Framers rejected both these 
courses. What the concept does represent is a system 
accomplishment of its ends." !d., at 424. (emphasis added). See also S. 
Davis, The Federal Principle 114 (1978) (after examining history of Con-
stitutional Convention, "only the principle of duality articulated in a single 
constitutional system of two distinct governments, national and state, each 
acting in its own right, each acting directly on individuals, and each quali-
fied master of a limited domain of action, stands out as the clearest fact"); 
Salmon, supra n. 13, at 359 (discussing history of Constitutional Conven-
tion and concluding that substitution of Supremacy Clause for negative on 
state laws "evidenced the clear distinction in [the Framers'] minds between 
the supremacy of the nation, which they approved, and the power of the 
nation to control the functioning of the states, which they rejected"). 
35 After the Convention, several thinkers suggested that the National 
Government might rely upon state officers to perform some of its tasks. 
Madison, for example, thought that Congress might rely upon state offi-
cials to collect national revenue. The Federalist No. 45, pp. 312-313 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961). None of these suggestions, however, went so far as to 
propose congressional control of state legislative power. The suggestions, 
moreover, seemed to assume that the States would consent to national use 
of their officials. See also W. Anderson, The Nation and the States, Ri-
vals or Partners? 86-87 (1955) (noting that First Congress rejected propos-
als to rely upon state officials to enforce federal law and suggesting that 
this decision to leave "the states free to work out, and to concentrate their 
attention and resources upon, their own functions" has become part of our 
constitutional understanding). 
. . 
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in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of 
both State and National Governments, and in which the 
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindi-
cate and protect federal rights and federal interests, al-
ways endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly in-
terfere with the legitimate activities of the States." 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971). 
In this case, I firmly believe that a proper "sensitivity to the 
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments" 
requires invalidation of Titles I and III of PURP A insofar as 
they apply to "state regulatory authorities." Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to uphold those 
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
~The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), im-
poses unprecedented burdens on the States. As Justice 
O'Connor ably demonstrates, it intrusively requires them 
to make a place on their administrative agenda for consid-
eration and potential adoption ~derally proposed 
"standards . " \ ~ ~e statute <;::;,:: not simply ask States 
""' 
to ~si-legislative matters that Congress believes 
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lates the Tenth Amendment when it .&Qeks to decide for 
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States how they will run tneir own state government. 
~~ 
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The most basic attribute of a government's sover-
. . -
2 • 
eignty is its right of self-conception. There is an amaz-
ing variety of ways in which governmental institutions can 
be designed and operated. The diversity of political bod-
ies and traditions in our fifty States evidence this fact. 25 
A keystone of the genius of our federal system is that 
decisions about the structure of state governments have 
been reserved to the States. Heretofore that allocation 
of responsibility has not been questioned. This principle 
of decentralization is basic to our constitutional scheme 30 
and key to the success and adaptability of our federal 
system of government. 1 If "state sovereignty," National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833, 842 (1976), is to 
have any meaning, it must include the recognition that 
States have the right to shape the structure of their own 35 
governmental institutions as they see fit. 
Our decisions reflect the assumption that, so 
1Among the values of local autonomy are "the greater 
sensitivity of local officials to the preferences of citi-
zens and the costs of achieving . . goals in a given 
locality; the diffusion of governmental power and the pro-
motion of cultural and social diversity; and the enhance-
ment of individual participation in and identification 
with governmental decisionmaking." Stewart, Pyramids of 
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L. 
J. 1196, 1231 (1977). See also id., at 1210-1211. 
•' 
3. 
long as individual constitutional rights are not in-
fringed' 2 state choice about the architecture of state 
government is to be preserved for determination by the 40 
States. As Justice Blackmun has recognized in a related 
context, 
"[j]ust as the Framers of the Constitution in-
tended the States to keep for themselves, as 
provided by the Tenth Amendment, the power . to 
regulate elections, • . . each State has the 
power to prescribe the qualifications of its 
officers and the manner in which they shall be 
chosen. Such power inheres in the State 
by virtue of its obligation . . to preserve 
the basic conception of a political community .• 
And this power and responsibility of the 
State applies, not only to the qualifications of 
voters, but also to persons holding state elec-
tive or important nonelective executive, legis-
lative, and judicial positions, for officers who 
participate directly in the formulation, execu-
tion, or review of broad public policy perform 
functions that go to the heart of representative 
government." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 u.s. 634, 
647 (1973) (citations and quotations omitted). 
The fourth section of Article IV of the Constitu-





each State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." 65 
' Consistent with the principle of state autonomy, however, 
this Court has refused to constrict the States' design of 
their own institutions on this basis. Rather it has ruled 
2This exemption must encompass individual Aas defined by 
legislation passed pursuant to §5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Hodel v. Vir,inia Surface Mining & Reclaimation 




. . . 
4 • 
the Guarantee Clause nonjusticiable. E.g., Pacific Tele-
phone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142-143 (1912) • "No 
one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition, that, 
according to the institutions of this country, the sover-
eignty in every State resides in the people of the State, 
L.t' 
and that they may alter and change their form of at their 
1 
own pleasure." Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 47 (1849). 
See Fortson v. Morris, 385 u.s. 231, 234 (1966) ("There is 
no provision of the United States Constitution or any of 
its amendments which either expressly or impliedly die-
tates the method a State must use to select it 
Governor."). Indeed, though our federal tradition is 
premised on the notion that decentralized state democra-
cies promote individual liberty, so § are St~ to 
fashion their own forms of government that they are not 




right to vote. 3 See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodri- 85 
3
n [T]he privilege to vote in a State is within the ju-
risdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the 
State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem 
proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made 
between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitu-
tion." Pope v. Williams, 193 u.s. 621, 632 (1904). See 
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 172-173 (1874). 
. . . 
5 • 
guez, 411 u.s. 1, 35 n. 78 (1973); id., at 101 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) ("the right to vote in state elections has 
itself never been accorded the stature of an independent 
constitutional guarantee") . Compare River a Rodriguez v. 
Popular Democratic Party, No. 81-328 (not yet circulated). 90 
Recognition of the States' exclusive right to 
determine the nature of their own institutions resonates 
throughout our federal tradition. As the products of in-
dependent and coordinate organs of government, state deci-
sions regarding state law have remained immune from feder- 95 
al review. E.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 
( 18 7 4 ) . C f . E i r e v • R . R . v . Tompkins , 3 0 4 U . S . 6 4 , 7 8-7 9 
(1938) ("the Constitution of the United States ..• rec-
ognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the 
States -- independence in their legislative and indepen- 100 
dence in their judicial departments") (quoting Baltimore & 
Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 u.s. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., 
dissenting)). 
n 
By means the Eleventh Amendment, the nation from 
1\ 
its earliest years has protected the intergrity of inde- 105 
pendent state government structures by barring the federal 
6 • 
.. . 
courts from hearing unconsented suits against state trea-
suries. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651, 663-668 
(1974). State sovereign immunity recognizes that budget-
ary vulnerability in a national forum could diminish the 110 
States' freedom to allocate their financial resources be-
tween their institutions of government as they choose. 
Cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 u.s. 1, 21 (1890) ("to deprive 
the legislature of the power of judging what the honor and 
safety of the State may require, even at the expense of a 115 
temporary failure to discharge public debts, would be at-
tended with greater evils than such a failure can cause"). 
To be meaningful, this tribute to the extent to which sov-
ereign state policies are free from federal control must 
presuppose that the very framework of the political insti- 120 
tutions through which state policies are formulated and 
administered must be similarly independent. Indeed, it 
would be a confused constitutional scheme that would rec-
ognize a State's freedom to decide where to locate its 
state capitol, Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 u.s. 559, 565, 579 125 
(1911), but would deny the far more important right to 
decide of what that capitol will consist. 
. . . 
7 • 
The Court has held that Congress may require 
state courts to adjudicate federal causes of action. 
Testa v. Katt, 330 u.s. 386 (1947). This illustrates that 130 
\ under some conditions the federal government indeed may 
call upon state governmental institutions to decide mat-
ters of federal policy for it. But when doing so, Con-
gress must respect the state institution's own structure 
and method of decision. Testa recognized this limitation 135 
when its limited its holding to circumstances under which 
the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate 
under established local law to adjudicate this [federal] 
action." 330 u~s., at 394 (emphasis added) . 4 Testa 
therefore supports the principle that Congress must defer 140 
to a State's design of its own institution. "The general 
rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state 
4The Testa Court then emphasized its meaning by citing 
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 u.s. 117 (1945), where the Court 
stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on ad-
judication in a state court of a federal claim arising 
beyond the jurisdiction of the state court. Id., 121. 
See Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal 
Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial 
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) ("in the Tes-
ta opinion there is no language which would upset the tra-
ditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a 
state's sovereign right to determine and control the ju-
risdictional requirements of its own courts"). 
8. 
control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law 
takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colurn. L. Rev. 489, 508 145 
(1954). 
II 
The PURPA breaks with this tradition. Fairly 
read, it commands the States to conform their terms and 
conditions of governmental participation to federal pre- 150 
scription. 5 Irrespective of preexisting State practice, 
5The Court says Congress has given States a choice by 
which they can avoid this order. Ante, 20-22. If Missis-
sippi dissolves its Public Service Commission and abandons 
entirely~ governmental oversight of its monopoly public 
utilities, the Court reasons, then Mississippi need alter 
no instrument of state government. I find such reasoning 
Orwellian. By employing this dialect, one may transform 
the statement "your money or your life" from an order to a 
simple offer of choice. 
The impoverished character of the "choice" in 
this case may be appreciated by considering a case in 
which States were offered a meaningful option by Congress. 
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 
Inc., 452 u.s. 264 (1981), Congress established an interim 
federal regulatory program in a new area of concern: sur-
face mining and reclamation. The statute at issue there 
offered States the choice of assuming control of the new 
regulatory program on a permanent basis -- if their pro-
gram conformed to federal standards. "If a State d[id] 
not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that corn-
plies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full 
regulatory burden w[ould] be borne by the Federal Govern-
ment." Id., at 288. By contrast, here the Court acknowl-
edges thatthe PURPA "has failed to provide an alternative 
regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of 
state default." Ante, at 22. 
In the cases of federal programs passed under the 
Spending Clause, Congress also may offer States the genu-
ine choice of accepting new federal financial benefits in 
return for cooperative renunciation of aspects of state 
sovereignty. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil 
Service Cornrn'n, 330 u.s. 127, 143 (1947). Commerce Clause 
Footnote continued on next page. 
. . . 
9 • 
the PURPA purports to establish the rules governing who 
may initiate and participate in state regulatory proceed-
ings. 6 It provides that these participation rights are 
enforceable against the State in federal court. 7 If the 155 
nature or timing of state regulatory proceedings fail to 
satisfy everyone, the PURPA authorizes "any person" to 
enforce judicially the PURPA' s requirements -- no matter 
what the States' rule is as to what parties normally are 
~~ t>r-
permitted to petition judicially toA sptir administrative 160 
action. 8 And once the State has carried out its 
federally-imposed duties, the PURPA grants any federally-
mandated participant the right to subject the state agency 
to state judicial review. 9 6ftee /Jgain 
paid to s-t1'dar-d state rules governing 
no~is 
/\ 
access to state 
cases by their very nature, however, may contain a coer-
cive aspect absent from the conditional disbursement of 
federal bounty under the Spending Clause. 
6 See 16 u.s.c. §263l(a) (Supp. IV 1980); 15 u.s.c. §3205 
(Supp. IV 1980) 
7see 16 u.s.c. §2633 (b) (1) and (2) (Supp. IV 1980); 15 
H.s.c. §3207 (a) (2) (Supp. IV 1980). 
See 16 u.s.c. §2633 (c) (1) (Supp. IV 1980); 15 u.s.c. 
§3207(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1980); 16 u.s.c. §824a-3h(2) (A) and 
(B) (Supp. IV 1980). 
9see 16 u.s.c. §2633(c) (1); 15 u.s.c. §3207(b) (2) (Supp. 




courts for the purpose of prot:es W ng state adminstrative 
action. 
The terms and conditions of public participation 
in agency decisionmaking are core aspects of the design of 
a State's administrative~S~me States may be-
lieve that public utilities should be regulated by ap-
pointed officials serving lengthy terms, and that any 
state citizen should be able to petition those officials 
on any matter of regulatory policy. Other States may opt 
170 
for direct election of public utility commissioners for 175 
relatively short terms, but otherwise may restrict the 
participation rights of the general public by means of 
rigorous standing, intervention, and reviewability re-
quirements. Still other states may decide that no utility 
regulation at all is desirable. Possible mixes of repre- 180 
sentation and direct participation in the establishment of 
quasi-legislative administrative bodies are endless. In 
each particular instance, decision about the extent of 
direct political participation before the representative 
body marks a crucial and distinctive feature of that body. 185 
The PURPA invades the liberty of the States to 
11. 
determine the character of one of their own regulatory 
bodies. 10 I therefore would hold that these provisions of 
the PURPA transgress the Tenth Amendment. 
In defense of its holding, the Court reasons that 190 
Congress can condition the States' utility regulatory ac-
tivities on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce 
Clause, Congress has the power to preempt,r completely the 
States' utility regulatory activities. Ante, 21-22. Un-
der this logic, however, Congress validly~ establish 195 
a national park that admits persons on the condition that 
they be white -- on the ground that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause confers federal power to establish national 
parks that exclude everyone. Plainly this reasoning is 
faulty. It fails to distinguish between the separate lim- 200 
itations on federal power contained by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and by the Fourteenth Amendment. As Nation-
al League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 u.s., at 841, and 
10The Court argues that Mississippi's practices in fact 
are not at odds with the prescriptions of the PURPA. 
Ante, 24-25. This is not iJtl!f"' an adequate defense of the 
statute. The PURPA purports to remove States' choice over 
matters that I believe the Tenth Amendment commits to 
their choice alone. The intrusion is not cured by the 
current -- and perhaps otherwise temporary -- coincidence 
of state and federal choice. 
.. 
12 • 
as the structure of the Court's own opinion makes plain, 
ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 205 
Amendment also embody distinct limitations on federal pow-
er. That Congress has satisfied the one demostrates noth-
ing about whether Congress has satisfied the other. 11 
It is true the provisions at issue rework state 
rules of government in ways that might not seem dramatic. 210 
But this is the first occasion on which this Court has 
been required to pass on such federal action. "Of course, 
no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least 
in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it lies in the j(~ 
tyranny of small decisions -- in the prospect that Con- 215 
gress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, 
until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted 
shell." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978). 
In my view, Congress may not coercively reshape the design 
11The Court also cites washington v. Fishing Vessel 
Assn., 443 u.s. 658 (1979), to support its holding. Ante, 
18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that 
a District Court, after adjudicating a contest under fed- ~ 
eral law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing 
rights, may order the losing State to abide by the court's 
decision. Nothing in our Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion 
authorized the federal court to amend the structure of a 
state political institution. 
13. 
; 
of state government under a false banner of "cooperative 220 
federalism." Because I believe that provisions of the 
PURPA do force just such a recasting, I would hold these 
provisions invalid under the Tenth Amendment as interpret-
ed by National League of Cities v. Usery. 
I respectfully dissent • 225 
.. 
05/10/82 jsw 
No. 80-1749 FERC v. Mississippi 
(Second Draft) 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), im-
poses unprecedented burdens on the States. As Justice 
O'Connor ably demonstrates, it intrusively requires them 
to make a place on their administrative agenda for consid-
eration and potential adoption of federally proposed 
"standards." The statute does not simply ask States to 
consider quasi-legislative matters that Congress believes 
they would do well to adopt. It also prescribes adminis-
trative and judicial procedures that States must follow in 
deciding whether to adopt the proposed standards. At 
least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth 
Amendment. 
I 
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative 
2. 
bodies - usually a commission - that regulate the electric 
and gas public utility companies. As these utilities nor-
mally are given monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensive-
ly regulated both substantively and procedurally by State 
law. Until now, with limited exceptions, the federal gov-
ernment wisely has not attempted to preempt this essential 
State function, and certainly has not undertaken to pre-
scribe the procedures by which State regulatory bodies 
make their decisions. PURPA, for the first time, breaks 
·u,., 
~ 
this longstanding deference to principles of federalism. 
I\ 
Now, regardless of established procedures before 
State administrative regulatory agencies, and of State law 
with respect to judicial review, PURPA mandates standing 
rights and procedures including judicial review, that must 
be followed in considering the proposed substantive stan-
dards. 
(Note to John): Here, please spell out in ap-
propriate detail the standing rights, procedures 
and requirements for review under the Federal 
Act. You have done this in general terms on p 9 
of your draft. As the focus of my dissent is on 
these provisions, and I would like them to be 
specifically identified in the text. My recol-
lection is that the procedures prescribed differ 
in some respects according to the Part of the 
Act. 
3. 
The foregoing requirements by PURPA intrude upon - in ef-
feet preempt --core areas of a State's administrative and 
judicial procedure. 
II 
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court 
reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory 
activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under 
the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to preempt 
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. This is 
suggested even though utility regulation has been exer-
cised by some States since the turn of the century. Un-
der the "threat" of preemption reasoning, Congress - one 
supposes - could reduce the States to federal provinces. 
~ 
ButANational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 u.s. at 
841, and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion 
today makes plain, Ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause 
and the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on 
federal power. That Congress has satisfied the one demon-
strates nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the 
other. (John: add here the notes you now have as fn. 
11) . 
4. 
It may be true that the procedural provisions of 
PURPA that prompt this dissent may not effect dramatic 
changes in the laws and procedures of some States. But I 
know of no other attempt by the federal government to sup-
plant State prescribed procedures for administrative agen-
cies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the pow-
er to preempt State court rules of civil procedure and 
judicial review in classes of cases found to affect com-
merce. This would be the type of gradual encroachment 
hypothesized by Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one ex-
pects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one 
fell swoop. If there is any danger, it lies in the tyran-
ny of small decisions -- in the prospect that Congress 
will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until 
someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 
(Put in fn. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 
(1978)). 
I have limited this dissent to the provisions of 
PURPA identified above. Despite the appeal - and indeed 
wisdom - of Justice O'Connor's evocation of the principles 
5. 
of federalism, I believe precedents of this Court support 
the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of 
this Act. 
{John: Here cite Hodel and one or two other cases you 
think most relevant). Accordingly, to the extent the pro-
cedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in 
part and dissent in part. 
{John: In addition to filling in the pro-
visions that we object to, as above requested, 
several of your footnotes are good and perhaps 
you can find a place for them. For example, fn 
4, p 7. Your use of Testa, also is good, and 
could be put in a note. The quote from Hart, p. 
7, possibly also may be used.) 
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Act. 
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4 0 
It may be true that · the procedural provisions of 
PURPA that prompt this dissent may not effect dramatic 
changes in the laws and procedures of some States. But I 
know of no other attempt by the federal government to sup-
plant State prescribed procedures for administrative agen-
cies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the pow-
er to preempt State court rules of civil procedure and 
judicial review in classes of cases found to affect com-
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1749 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET 
AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Publi.~ Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-617 , 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprec-
edented burdens on the States. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR ably 
demonstr~'.tes, it intrusively requires them to make a place on 
their adrr.inistrative agenda for consideration and potential 
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute 
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative mat-
ters tha ·~ Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It 
also pr,~scribes administrative and judicial procedures that 
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed 
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURP A vio-
lates +.he Tenth . Amendment. 
I 
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodies-
usu· tlly commissions-that regulate electric and gas public 
uti) ;ty companies. As these utilities normally are given mo-
no· 1oly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both sub-
st<,ntively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with 
lhnited exceptions, the federal government has not at-
t ~mpted to preempt this important state function, and cer-
tainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by 
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The 
80-1749-DISSENT 
2 FERC v. MISSISSIPPI 
PURP A, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding 
deference to principles of federalism. 
Now, regardless of established procedures before State ad-
ministrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with re-
spect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal proce-
dures on state regulatory institutions. The PURP A 
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy], 
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an af-
fected electric utility may intervene and participate as a mat-
ter of right" in regulatory proceedings respecting electrical 
rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny person (including the Secre-
tary) may bring an action to enforce" the obligations with re-
spect to electrical rate consideration that the PURP A lays 
upon state regulatory commissions. 2 The statute provides 
that "[a]ny person (including the Secretary) may obtain [judi-
cial] review of any determination" made by a state regulatory 
commission regarding PURP A's electrical rate policies. 3 
'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or elec-
tric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in fed-
eral court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(l). 
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the 
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See 
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be 
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2). 
2 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The same enforcement right 
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 3207(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). 
Under PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules re-
lating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying 
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or (under 
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or quali-
fying small power producer'' may bring judicial actions against state regu-
latory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules. 
§ 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B). 
' 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes 
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the 
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power 
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The foregoing requirements by PURP A intrude upon-in ef-
fect preempt-core areas of a State's administrative and judi-
cial procedure. 
II 
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court rea-
sons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activi-
ties of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress has the power to preempt 
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under the 
"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress--one supposes-
could reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N a-
tional League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S., at 841, 
and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion today 
makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal 
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates 
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4 
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(1). No similar right is available in the 
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp. 
IV 1980). 
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the procedural requirements 
for the state regulatory agencies consideration and determination of the 
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See §3203(c); 16 U.S. C. 
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the 
proposition that under some conditions the federal government may call 
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy. 
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state 
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion lim-
ited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdic-
tion adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate 
this [federal] action." 330 U. S., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa 
Court then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 
117 (1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to in-
sist on adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the 
jurisdiction of the state court. Id., 121. See Note, Utilization of State 
Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in 
. .... 
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the impor-
tance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that fed-
eral law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to 
other organs of state government. It may be true that the 
procedural provisions of the PURP A that prompt this dissent 
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures 
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the fed-
eral government to supplant state prescribed procedures that 
in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If 
Congress may do this, presumably it has the power to pre-
empt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial review 
in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This would be 
the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by Professor 
Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the 
states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it 
lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the prospect that 
Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, 
until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 5 
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identi-
fied above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of 
JusTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federal-
ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitu-
Judicial Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa up-
sets "the traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's 
sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of 
its own courts"). 
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unre-
markable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest 
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights, 
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our 
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the 
structure of a state political institution. 
6 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978) . 
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tionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this fa-
cial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt, 
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the proce-
dural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
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ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 91H317, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprec-
edented burdens on the States. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR ably 
demonstrates, it intrusively requires them to make a place on 
their administrative agenda for consideration and potential 
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute 
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative mat-
ters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It 
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that 
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed 
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURP A vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. 
I 
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodies-
usually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public 
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given mo-
nopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both sub-
stantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with 
limited exceptions, the federal government has not at-
tempted to preempt this important state function, and cer-
tainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by 
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The 
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PURP A, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding 
deference to principles of federalism. 
Now, regardless of established procedures before state ad-
ministrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with re-
spect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal proce-
dures on state regulatory institutions. The PURP A 
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy], 
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an af-
fected electric utility may intervene and participate as a mat-
ter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the 
PURP A respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny 
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to en-
force" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consider-
ation that the PURP A lays upon state regulatory commis-
sions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including 
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determina-
tion" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the 
PURP A's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require-
'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or elec-
tric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in fed-
eral court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1). 
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the 
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See 
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be 
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2). 
2 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right 
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
Under the PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules 
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying 
cogeneration and small power production facilities . 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under 
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or quali-
fying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regu-
latory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules pre-
scribed by the PURP A. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B). 
3 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes 
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the 
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ments by the PURP A intrude upon-1n effect preempt-core 
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure. 
II 
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court rea-
sons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activi-
ties of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress has the power to preemp!.__.,J f ~;~ 
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under ~ \...:.....-
"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress-one supposes-
could reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N a-
tional League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841 
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion to-
day makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and 
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal 
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates 
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4 
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power 
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(l). No similar right is available in the 
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp. 
IV 1980). 
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the rocedural re uirements 
for the state regulatory agenciesA cons1 eratwn and determmation o e 
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C. 
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt , 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the 
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call 
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy. 
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state 
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion lim-
ited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdic-
tion adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate 
this [federal] action." Id ., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court 
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on 
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the local court. Id. , at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts 
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial 
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the impor-
tance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that fed-
eral law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to 
other organs of state government. It may be true that the 
procedural provisions of the PURP A that prompt this dissent 
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures 
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Fed-
eral Government to supplant state prescribed procedures 
that in part define the nature of their administrative agen-
cies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power 
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial re-
view in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This 
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by 
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to 
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is 
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the 
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, 
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gut-
ted shell." 5 
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identi-
fied above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federal-
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the 
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sover-
eign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its 
own courts"). 
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unre-
markable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest 
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights, 
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our 
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the 
structure of a state political institution. 
5 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978). 
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitu-
tionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this fa-
cial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt, 
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the proce-
dural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
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does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative mat-
ters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It 
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that 
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed 
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURP A vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. 
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Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodies-
usually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public 
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given mo-
nopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both sub-
stantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with 
limited exceptions, the federal government has not at-
tempted to preempt this important state function, and cer-
tainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by 
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PURP A, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding 
deference to principles of federalism. 
Now, regardless of established procedures before state ad-
ministrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with re-
spect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal proce-
dures on state regulatory institutions. The PURP A 
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy], 
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an af-
fected electric utility may intervene and participate as a mat-
ter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the 
PURP A respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny 
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to en-
force" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consider-
ation that the PURP A lays upon state regulatory commis-
sions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including 
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determina-
tion" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the 
PURP A's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require-
'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or elec-
tric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in fed-
eral court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1). 
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the 
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See 
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be 
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2). 
2 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right 
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
Under the PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules 
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying 
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under 
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or quali-
fying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regu-
latory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules pre-
scribed by the PURP A. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B). 
' 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes 
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the 
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ments by the PURP A intrude upon-in effect preempt-core 
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure. 
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In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court rea-
sons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activi-
ties of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress has the power to preemp!.__.J + ~;~ 
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under ~ \....:....-
"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress-one supposes-
could reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N a-
tional League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841 
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion to-
day makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and 
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal 
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates 
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4 
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power 
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(1). No similar right is available in the 
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp. 
IV 1980). 
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the rocedural re uirements 
for the state regulatory agenciesA cons1 eratwn and determmatwn o t e 
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C. 
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the 
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call 
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy. 
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state 
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion lim-
ited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdic-
tion adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate 
this [federal] action." /d., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court 
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on 
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the local court. Id., at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts 
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial 
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the impor-
tance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that fed-
eral law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to 
other organs of state government. It may be true that the 
procedural provisions of the PURP A that prompt this dissent 
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures 
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Fed-
eral Government to supplant state prescribed procedures 
that in part define the nature of their administrative agen-
cies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power 
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial re-
view in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This 
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by 
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to 
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is 
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the 
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, 
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gut-
ted shell." 5 
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identi-
fied above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of 
JuSTICE O'CONNOR's evocation of the principles of federal-
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the 
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sover-
eign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its 
own courts"). 
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unre-
markable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest 
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights, 
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our 
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the 
structure of a state political institution. 
5 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978). 
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitu-
tionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this fa-
cial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt, 
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the proce-
dural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and 
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utility companies. As these utilities normally are given mo-
nopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both sub-
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limited exceptions, the federal government has not at-
tempted to preempt this important state function, and cer-
tainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by 
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The 
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spect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal proce-
dures on state regulatory institutions. The PURP A 
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy], 
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fected electric utility may intervene and participate as a mat-
ter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the 
PURPA respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny 
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to en-
force" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consider-
ation that the PURP A lays upon state regulatory commis-
sions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including 
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determina-
tion" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the 
PURP A's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require-
'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or elec-
tric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in fed-
eral court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1). 
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the 
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See 
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be 
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2). 
2 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right 
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
Under the PURPA's Title II , § 210, States must implement federal rules 
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying 
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under 
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or quali-
fying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regu-
latory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules pre-
scribed by the PURPA. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B). 
3 16 U.S. C. §2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes 
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the 
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of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Fed-
eral Government to supplant state prescribed procedures 
that in part define the nature of their administrative agen-
cies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power 
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial re-
view in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This 
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by 
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to 
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is 
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the 
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, 
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gut-
ted shell." 5 
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identi-
fied above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of 
JuSTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federal-
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the 
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sover-
eign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its 
own courts"). 
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unre-
markable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest 
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights, 
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our 
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the 
structure of a state political institution. 
5 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978). 
' . 
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitu-
tionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this fa-
cial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt, 
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the proce-
dural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
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JusTICE POWELL, concurring and dissenting. 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprec-
edented burdens on the States. As JusTICE O'CONNOR ably 
demonstrates, it intrusively requires them to make a place on 
their administrative agenda for consideration and potential 
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute 
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative mat-
ters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It 
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that 
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed 
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURP A vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. 
I 
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodies-
usually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public 
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given mo-
nopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both sub-
stantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with 
limited exceptions, the federal government has not at-
tempted to preempt this important state function, and cer-
tainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by 
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The 
J 
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PURP A, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding 
deference to principles of federalism. 
Now, regardless of established procedures before state ad-
ministrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with re-
spect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal proce-
dures on state regulatory institutions. The PURP A 
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy], 
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an af-
fected electric utility may intervene and participate as a mat-
ter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the 
PURP A respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny 
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to en-
force" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consider-
ation that the PURP A lays upon state regulatory commis-
sions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including 
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determina-
tion" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the 
PURP A's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require-
'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or elec-
tric consumer'' may enforce its intervention and participation rights in fed-
eral court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1). 
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the 
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See 
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be 
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2). 
' 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right 
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
Under the PURPA's Title II , § 210, States must implement federal rules 
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying 
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under 
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or quali-
fying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regu-
latory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules pre-
scribed by the PURPA. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B). 
3 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes 
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the 
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ments by the PURP A intrude upon-in effect preempt-core 
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure. 
II 
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court rea-
sons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activi-
ties of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress has the power to preempt 
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under this 
"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress--one supposes--
could reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N a-
tional League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841 
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion to- · 
day makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and 
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal 
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates 
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4 
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power 
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(1). No similar right is available in the 
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp. 
IV 1980). 
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the procedural requirements 
for the state regulatory agencies' consideration and determination of the 
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C. 
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 
' The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947) , in support of the 
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call 
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy. 
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state 
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion lim-
ited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdic-
tion adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate 
this [federal] action." Id., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court 
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on 
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the local court. !d., at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts 
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial 
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the impor-
tance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that fed-
eral law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to 
other organs of state government. It may be true that the 
procedural provisions of the PURP A that prompt this dissent 
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures 
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Fed-
eral Government to supplant state prescribed procedures 
that in part define the nature of their administrative agen-
cies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power 
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial re-
view in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This 
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by 
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to 
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is 
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the 
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, 
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gut-
ted shell." 5 
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identi-
fied above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federal-
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the 
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sover-
eign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its 
own courts"). 
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unre-
markable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest 
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights, 
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our 
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the 
structure of a state political institution. 
5 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978). 
80-1749-DISSENT 
FERC v. MISSISSIPPI 5 
ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitu-
tionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this fa-
cial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt, 
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the proce-
dural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part 
and reverse in part. 
